There's a whole system, not just one institution.
There's also a large scale breakdown of anything resembling morality
that pretty much characterizes Big Finance. Screw anybody and  anything
but if makes money for us, why that's OK no matter who gets hurt.
Might be nice if we could lay all the blame on one Bad Actor
but I just don't see it.
 
I miss WaMu, our regional "medium" bank. Nice people, at least those
that I had dealings with.  And, yes, the 2008 crash did them in,  gobbled up
by Chase, but what has come out in the wash is that the bank execs
threw all caution to the winds in the mid 2000s and invested heavily
in derivatives and other bad bets. So, who is to blame ? 
The system, the Fed, Wall Street, you name it, but the fact is that
the high mucky-mucks at WaMu also screwed themselves.
 
Billy
 
-----------------------------------------------------------
 
 
4/29/2012 9:21:51 P.M. Pacific Daylight Time, [email protected]  
writes:

I blame the FDIC and administrations back to FDR.  The FDIC (and the old 
FSLIC) ALWAYS looked for a bank bigger than the failing  bank to take over the 
failing bank. Couldn't let local competition grab it up,  which is how 
Shreveport just about doesn't have a local bank any more. Dallas,  either, as 
Republic  was merged with Nations, which was then merged with  BofA in the 
1985 carnage. I forget how Chase got a foothold over here.  

David 

  _   
 
"Free  speech is meant to protect unpopular speech. Popular speech, by 
definition,  needs no protection."—Neal  Boortz 



On 4/29/2012 12:16 PM,  [email protected]_ (mailto:[email protected])  wrote:  

NY Times
 
 
Telling Strength From  Weakness  
By _GRETCHEN MORGENSON_ 
(http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/gretchen_morgenson/index.html?inline=nyt-per)
 
Published: April 28, 2012 

 
ARE the perils posed by too-big-to-fail banks a  thing of the past? 
 
That’s what we keep hearing from Washington.  Politicians who wrote the 
Dodd-Frank law insist that it eliminates the  dangers posed by large, 
politically connected financial institutions. At a  news conference last week, 
Ben S. 
Bernanke, the chairman of the _Federal Reserve_ 
(http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/f/federal_reserve_system/index.html?i
nline=nyt-org) , said that higher capital and  greater liquidity 
requirements for big banks, combined with more watchful  regulators, were 
making our 
financial giants stronger and less likely to  require taxpayer backstops.  
Outside the Beltway, however, it is hardly clear  that we’ve resolved this 
signal threat. Big banks are bigger than ever, and  they exert enormous 
power over regulators and lawmakers. Increasingly,  smaller institutions can’t 
compete.  
So it was refreshing last week to hear _Kevin M.  Warsh_ 
(http://www.hoover.org/fellows/77701) , a former Fed governor, speak candidly 
and critically 
about the  government backing that continues to support our largest banks. 
Equally  refreshing were his prescriptions for eliminating the too-big-to-fail 
 problem.  
“We cannot have a durable, competitive, dynamic  banking system that 
facilitates economic growth if policy protects the  franchises of oligopolies 
atop 
the financial sector,” Mr. Warsh _told an audience_ 
(http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/WarshLawSchool.pdf)
  at the 
Stanford Law School on  Wednesday night. “Those ‘interconnected’ firms that 
find 
themselves  dependent on implicit government support do not serve our economy
’s  interest.”  
Mr. Warsh, who is a distinguished visiting fellow  at the Hoover 
Institution at Stanford and a lecturer at Stanford’s Graduate  School of 
Business, 
left government in 2011. His last position was at the  Fed, where he was a 
governor for five years. Given his front-row Fed seat  during the financial 
crisis, his views on preventing a repeat of it carry  some weight.  
Put simply, Mr. Warsh does not believe that higher  capital standards for 
banks and greater regulatory scrutiny will be enough  to prevent future 
taxpayer-financed bailouts. “At core, I’m worried that the  Dodd-Frank Act 
doubles down on regulators, gives up on markets and  outsources capital 
requirements to an international standards group in  Basel, Switzerland,” he 
said in 
an interview last week.  
Importantly, none of these responses have moved us  closer to “ridding the 
United States financial system of large, quasi-public  utilities atop the 
sector,” he said.  
Mr. Warsh does not prescribe breaking up giant  institutions. Rather, he 
says their disclosures must be subject to new and  ramped-up transparency 
requirements so investors can differentiate strength  from weakness.  
“The Federal Reserve’s most recent stress tests —  particularly the 
enhanced disclosure — are a step in the right direction,”  he told his Stanford 
audience. “Still, disclosure practices by the largest  financial firms remain 
lacking, and the periodic reporting overseen by the  Securities and 
Exchange Commission tends to obfuscate as much as inform.”   
Regulators must require clearer and more expansive  disclosures so that the 
financial statements and associated risks of large  and complex companies 
can be assessed, Mr. Warsh said. If investors had more  detailed information 
from these institutions, they would very likely sell  their shares and debt 
if they took too many risks. This would hold the  managers of these 
institutions accountable for reckless behavior by making  them pay more to fund 
their businesses.  
But this powerful market force is ineffectual in a  world where investors 
believe that the government will save faltering  institutions. “
Unfortunately, the Dodd-Frank Act has only reinforced the  view that big and 
troubled 
banks will receive special government  assistance,” Mr. Warsh said in his 
speech. “By sanctioning some list of  too-big-to-fail firms — and treating them 
different than the rest — policy  makers are signaling to markets that the 
government is vested in their  survival.”  
Mr. Warsh also questions our nation’s  participation in the Basel 
negotiations regarding bank capital requirements.  He pointed out that many of 
the 
countries working alongside the United  States on these rules back their banks 
more explicitly than we do.  Therefore, their approach to capital standards 
is bound to vary greatly from  ours.  
“My concern is that the negotiation, while well  intended, is between 
banking systems that at their core are fundamentally  different and aspire to 
fundamentally different things,” he said. “The  largest banks in Japan, 
Germany, for example, have long been akin to  national champions. Perhaps they 
reason that their banks need less capital  than ours because their sovereigns 
more assuredly stand behind them.”  
Our financial regulators, Mr. Warsh suggested,  should work with countries 
that don’t explicitly back their largest  institutions. “We should work 
with them to instill real market discipline  and real capital levels and do a 
more rigorous job on regulation,” he said.  Britain and Switzerland are two 
possible candidates for this joint effort,  in large part because their banks 
are too big to be bailed out by their  governments.  
CIRCLING back to the pernicious effects of large  and politically 
interconnected banks, Mr. Warsh makes a direct link between  the favors handed 
to 
these institutions and our disturbingly high  unemployment rate. Small and 
medium-size banks, after all, are at a  competitive disadvantage to the big 
guys, so they are less able to lend to  companies of modest size, which do so 
much of the hiring in this country.   
“The policy has favored large global banks and  disfavored small and 
medium-sized banks,” he said. “So I’m not surprised  that real economic and job 
growth that should come from these enterprises is  still lacking. Our failure 
to have a dynamic competitive banking system is a  partial explanation for 
the weakness we are seeing.”  
Granted, Mr. Warsh is far outnumbered by those  arguing for the status quo 
and the continued hegemony of big banks. Many of  those people, not 
surprisingly, work in Washington. But their refusal to  concede that taxpayers 
remain imperiled by banks too big to succeed only  ensures that we will face 
another financial crisis. And that it will come  sooner, not later. 




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