The New Criterion
 
 
November 2012
He was the change
by _James  Piereson_ (http://www.newcriterion.com/author.cfm?authorid=229) 
 
Four years ago, in the excited aftermath of the  2008 election, Barack 
Obama was widely viewed as a liberal messiah who would  engineer a new era of 
liberal reform and cement a Democratic majority for  decades to come. He would 
prove to be, as many pundits predicted, a Franklin  Delano Roosevelt, or 
perhaps even an Abraham Lincoln, for our time. They were  not alone in saying 
this: Obama himself said much the same thing. 
These forecasts seemed grandiose at the time; today, after four  years of 
an Obama presidency, they look positively silly. In contrast to 2008,  2012 
Obama looks less like a transformational president and more like a  typically 
embattled politician trying to survive a tight contest for reelection.  
Even some of his strongest supporters are now “defining Obama down” as just  
another Democratic “pol” making compromises and paying off constituencies in 
 order to keep his coalition together. Extravagant hopes have given way to 
a  scramble for survival. Few continue to believe that Obama will establish 
the  foundations for a new era of liberal governance. Some are beginning to 
point  toward a more surprising turn of events: Far from bringing about a 
renewal of  liberalism, Obama is actually presiding over its disintegration 
and  collapse. 
This is the thesis of Charles R. Kesler’s fascinating and  insightful new 
book, I Am the Change: Barack Obama and the Crisis of  Liberalism.1  Mr. 
Kesler, a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and  editor of 
The Claremont Review, is a well-known conservative scholar and  authority on 
the history of liberal thought. Professor Kesler presents a  critical yet 
nuanced portrayal of Obama and his rise to power. From his  perspective as 
scholar and theorist, Kesler sees Obama as a conventional liberal  or, better 
yet, as a progressive, and not as a socialist or anti-American  subversive (as 
some of the President’s critics would have it). Viewed through a  wide 
historical lens, Obama appears as the most recent—and perhaps the last—of a  
line of liberal presidents beginning with Woodrow Wilson a century ago and  
running through FDR to Lyndon Johnson  and beyond to Jimmy Carter and Bill 
Clinton. A signal virtue of this book is  that it shows how the Obama 
presidency fits into the evolution of modern  liberalism from its origins in 
the 
Progressive movement more than a century  ago._1_ 
(http://www.newcriterion.com/articleprint.cfm/He-was-the-change-7484#footnote-34540-1)
  
The great political battles in the United States during the  nineteenth 
century were never ideological contests in the modern sense but  rather 
controversies fought over the meaning of the Constitution and the  intentions 
of 
the founding fathers. Political contests over expansion, the Bank  of the 
United States, slavery, secession, and the regulation of commerce were  fought 
out along constitutional lines. The politicians and statesmen of that era  
were not divided into liberal and conservative camps; those terms had little  
meaning in nineteenth-century America. Abraham Lincoln was not thought of as 
a  “liberal,” nor were slave owners derided as “conservatives.” Both 
sides of that  controversy appealed to the Constitution or to the Declaration 
of 
Independence  to defend their positions. 
The Progressives introduced an ideological  element into American politics 
by detaching their arguments from the  Constitution and grounding them 
instead in claims about progress and historical  development. Progressives 
(they 
were not yet called “liberals”) asserted that  the Constitution, with its 
complex framework designed to limit government, was  out of date in the 
modern age of science, industrialism, and large trusts and  corporations. 
Constitutionalists looked backwards to the founding fathers;  Progressives 
looked 
forward to a vast future of never-ending progress and  change. The founding 
fathers and their nineteenth-century successors anchored  popular government 
in a philosophy of natural rights; Progressives looked to  different 
foundations in history and development. Progressives could not get rid  of the 
Constitution, but they could reinterpret it to allow for more federal  action 
to 
regulate the trusts, resolve industrial disputes, and engineer  progress. 
Thus was born the idea of a “living Constitution,” an open-ended and  
flexible document readily adapted to changing conditions. 
The Progressives were proponents of scientific government, not  necessarily 
of popular or representative government. They disdained legislative  bodies 
with their vote-trading and petty disputes over constituent interests;  
thus, they looked to the presidency rather than to the Congress for national  
leadership in the direction of reform and progress. The president spoke for 
the  people or the nation, Congress spoke for special interests. Progressives 
wanted  to delegate power to administrative bodies, commissions, and 
bureaus staffed by  disinterested experts who could apply up-to-date knowledge 
to 
solve new  problems. The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Food and Drug 
Administration,  the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board 
were Progressive  initiatives. The Progressives dreamed of a time when 
political contests among  rival interests would give way to impartial 
administration by experts and judges  trained by and recruited from the best 
colleges 
and universities in the land.  Academic institutions, as Mr. Kesler points 
out, would go on to play a major  role in the evolution of liberalism. 
Professor Kesler identifies Woodrow Wilson as the chief architect  of this 
vision in American politics, helping to lay the intellectual foundations  
for progressivism and then beginning to put them in place during his term as  
president. As a research scholar and university president, Wilson brought 
some  of the abstract qualities of a college professor to the study of 
politics. He  wrote an influential study of the US Congress without visiting 
the US 
Capitol.  While he admired the founding fathers, he criticized them for 
leaving behind a  constitutional structure that was disorderly and inefficient, 
and encouraged  conflict rather than cooperation. Thus he claimed that the 
separation of powers  in the Constitution was a mischievous invention 
designed to limit the powers of  government and to prevent cooperation among 
the 
branches (which was partly  true). Wilson wanted to bring the branches closer 
together through presidential  leadership and responsible party government. 
He favored a parliamentary system  like that in place in Great Britain in 
which the executive and legislative  branches are unified under the control 
of a single party and led by the Prime  Minister. 
Most fundamentally of all, Wilson claimed that the vision of the  founding 
fathers did not lead to progress but to endless division and factional  
infighting. The Constitution was a Newtonian machine designed to balance  
conflicting forces when what was now required was a Darwinian instrument  
flexible 
enough to evolve in response to changes in its environment. It was not  
necessary to change the Constitution itself in order to bring about such a  
fundamental change; it was only necessary for Americans to think about it in a  
new way. After all, Washington, Jefferson, and Madison led a revolution and 
 wrote the Constitution in response to the challenges of their time: Why 
should  not Americans in the twentieth century do the same? Thus Wilson and 
his  associates in the Progressive movement looked to an intellectual 
revolution as  the means by which Americans would liberate themselves from the 
constricted and  obsolete doctrines of the founding fathers, and in the process 
free themselves  from the limits the founders placed upon government. 
Given his vast ambitions, Wilson could not hope to implement much  of this 
agenda in eight short years in office. Yet he established the  foundations 
for an influential and long-running movement based upon progress and  change 
as a way of life, presidential leadership and executive power, trust in  
experts, and disdain for traditional constitutional forms. Mr. Kesler does not  
spend much time on Wilson’s path-breaking approach to international 
diplomacy,  his role in the Paris Peace Conference, and his aborted personal 
campaign “to  make the world safe for democracy.” Yet these may be understood 
as 
logical  extensions from his broader philosophy that traditional forms of 
governance had  reached a dead end and that new ones had to be built through 
inspired  leadership. 
It was FDR who began to use the term “liberalism” in  place of “
progressivism” in order to distinguish the New Deal from the  Progressive Party 
that 
flamed out in the 1920s and, in contrast to the  progressives, to associate 
his program with the founding ideals of the nation.  It was also Roosevelt 
who hijacked the term from the classical liberals in order  to associate it 
with reform and the welfare state in opposition to free markets  and limited 
government. FDR, as  Professor Kesler suggests in an illuminating chapter in 
the book, kept the  language and rhetoric of the founders while not so 
subtly changing their meaning  and purposes. This has also been true of the 
liberal presidents who have  succeeded him. 
The Republican victories during the 1920s demonstrated to Roosevelt  just 
how fleeting and transient Wilson’s victories turned out to be. “Think of  
the great liberal achievements of Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom,” he said in 
one  of his radio addresses during the 1930s, “and how quickly they were 
liquidated  under President Harding.” Roosevelt formulated programs (like 
Social Security  and the Wagner Act) that had popular followings but were also 
grounded in the  language of rights and liberty such that no one could claim 
that they were  “un-American.” FDR paid homage to  Jefferson and the 
Declaration of Independence, but also said that the basic  rights outlined in 
that 
document were subject to redefinition in light of  changes in the social 
order. Jefferson wrote about natural rights and liberty  while FDR spoke of 
positive rights as a  foundation for security. In his Second Bill of Rights, 
FDR outlined a vast agenda of such positive  rights, including a right to 
adequate medical care, to a good education, to a  decent home, to a 
“remunerative
” job, and to adequate protection from “the fears  of old age, sickness, 
accident, and unemployment.” The pursuit and perfection of  these rights 
provided modern liberalism—and the Democratic Party—with an almost  unlimited 
agenda of reform. 
Among FDR’s successors, no  one tried harder to emulate him and more 
miserably failed to do so than Lyndon  Baines Johnson. Johnson began his 
political 
career in the 1930s as a New Deal  functionary and then as a young member 
of the House of Representatives. “FDR was my hero; he was like a father to me,
”  Johnson told a reporter during his White House years. Johnson mastered 
the art  of using public patronage to build political support. “He wanted to  
out-Roosevelt Roosevelt,” according to one of his aides. “We’re in favor 
of a  lot of things and against mighty few,” he said during his 1964 
campaign, thereby  giving voters a taste of things to come. 
Johnson, as Professor Kesler explains, sought to complete the  agenda of 
quantitative liberalism by passing federal health insurance  programs for the 
aged (Medicare) and the poor (Medicaid), and expanded welfare  and food 
stamp programs to assist the underprivileged. Yet, given the insatiable  spirit 
of modern liberalism, Johnson was not content to rest there. In his Great  
Society speech, he proclaimed a new agenda of qualitative liberalism  through 
which government would elevate the spirit and quality of life of the  
American people. The Great Society, he said, “is a place where the city of man  
serves not only the needs of the body and the demands of commerce but the 
desire  for beauty and the hunger for humanity.” Johnson launched a “war on 
poverty” and  a campaign to end urban decay, passed civil rights bills, funded 
the arts and  education, and gave the federal government license to enter 
into every area of  American life. 
Yet, by a cruel irony, Johnson’s high hopes and grand expectations  soon 
turned into disappointment and tragedy as the country was torn apart by  
crime, riots in nearly every major urban center, and violent protests against  
the war in Vietnam. His vast expansion of domestic expenditures turned loose 
an  ugly stampede for federal dollars that only incited demands for more. Far 
from  being an era of spiritual fulfillment, the 1960s was one of anger, 
alienation,  and escape through drugs and violence. Mr. Kesler writes that the 
enduring  legacy of the 1960s is “the strange combination, still very much 
with us, of a  more ambitious state and a less trusted government than ever 
before.” The more  patronage the government handed out, the less satisfied 
its beneficiaries  became. 
If the New Deal stands out as the great triumph of modern  liberalism, then 
the Great Society represents its signal tragedy and failure.  This was the 
period, as Mr. Kesler writes, when “the radicalism that was latent  all 
along in liberalism broke free of its faith in progress, science, and the  
democratic process itself.” Johnson’s failures arose from overreaching 
ambitions 
 and the delusion that all human problems, even those of the spirit, must 
find  solutions in politics and government programs. Yet, as the author 
argues, this  kind of over-reaching is endemic to modern liberalism. It was 
already present,  for example, in Wilson’s claims about progress and change and 
also in FDR’s unlimited agenda of positive rights.  Liberalism both lives and 
dies off promises it cannot fulfill. 
Barack Obama is the latest liberal president to  attempt to harmonize grand 
hopes with the messy realities of programmatic  reform. In this sense, he 
is a worthy heir to the legacy of Wilson, FDR, and LBJ, all of whom addressed 
the same  challenge. Yet of the three, only one of them may be said to have 
ended his  presidency on a positive note. Obama hopes to join FDR/span> as 
one of the successful presidents of  the liberal era, but Mr. Kesler doubts 
his prospects for success. 
Like FDR, who  distinguished the New Deal from the New Freedom, Obama tried 
to make his break  from the rancorous politics of the 1960s. He celebrates 
the flag, observes  patriotic holidays, and praises the military. He is a 
solid family man. He even  extolls the founding fathers, up to a point. In his 
view, the founders made a  good start in laying down some noble principles, 
even if they did not live up to  them and perhaps did not really believe 
them. 
Obama was also aware that many of the bold initiatives of the 1960s  were 
eventually discredited and, for the most part, rejected by the American  
people. No liberal today could possibly run for office citing the model of the  
Great Society. Without an ambitious programmatic agenda on which to run, 
Obama  had little choice but to organize his campaign around “hope and change.”
 Few  asked what exactly that might mean. One answer was that Obama 
himself, as a  biracial and multicultural candidate, son of a Kenyan father and 
middle-class  American mother, personified the change he and others were 
seeking. It was proof  that America could overcome its racially scarred past. 
“I 
am the change,” as he  has suggested on more than one occasion. 
Here, then, according to Mr. Kesler, is one terminus of the liberal  
project. Where can it go beyond Barack Obama and the personal politics of hope  
and change? Another end point is fiscal and budgetary. With Obama’s signature  
health care legislation, an ambitious stimulus package, a series of 
trillion  dollar plus deficits, and the impending retirement of the baby 
boomers, 
there is  no more money left to fund further liberal projects. There is not 
even enough  money left to fund those already in place. Will Obama’s 
presidency mark the end  of the politics of public spending and thus the end of 
a 
movement that came into  its own a full century ago with the election of 
Woodrow Wilson? That is a  distinct possibility, and one brought into clear 
focus 
in this most illuminating  and gracefully argued book. 
 
 
_1_ 
(http://www.newcriterion.com/articleprint.cfm/He-was-the-change-7484#footnote-34540-1-backlink)
   I Am the Change: Barack Obama and the Crisis of 
Liberalism by Charles R.  Kesler

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