One consideration to add to what Michael Medved says in the
following article
is that in both Obama elections the young cast their
ballots for him on the basis
of belief, hope, or even worship, cie vous plait.
There has been nothing comparable
in the democratic Party since McGovern, and in comparison,
McGovern was weak tea.
.
Can this phenomenon be repeated after Obama ? Nothing is
impossible
in politics, but 2010 may provide a reasonable look at the
youth vote
post-BHO. That year, Obama, not on the ticket, they stayed
home.
.
Not sure what the solution to the problem is. My own view,
of course, is that
Obama sold the under 30 set a bill of goods that they were
eager to buy
because of how he looks, viz, youthful, and a
representative of "diversity."
And because of a number of his political stands, stands
based on , in many
particulars, an utterly false view of the problems facing
us as a nation.
.
Which is not some kind of endorsement of the Republicans.
This was one more
"lesser of two evils" election. Like many others who cast
ballots for the GOP ticket,
I wasn't very happy with Romney during the election
campaign and am even less
happy with him now. Could Obama have been defeated had the
Republicans
nominated a better candidate ? That should be obvious. But
the more important
question is : Will the young stay
"liberal" ?
.
Something has to be done to change the popular culture.
This is the main task.
For unless that culture changes --this means Hollywood,
the music biz,
literature, education in the broad sense, Broadway theater,
etc--
the young will continue to imbibe bad liquor by the gallon.
.
That's the real problem.
.
Billy
.
.
=============================================
Daily Beast
The Not-So-Liberal American Future
Young Obama voters will stay
Democrats all their lives. That’s the latest liberal
argument—but statistics showing many maturing voters
turn conservative, plus our aging population, should
give Republicans hope, says Michael Medved.
Does ideology shape life experience, or does life
experience determine ideology? The future direction of
American politics depends on our response.
In response to the disappointing results of November’s
elections, I have
argued that conservatives should take heart from the
undeniable aging of the electorate, which will tilt future
contests toward Republicans. 2012 exit polls showed Mitt
Romney sweeping voters 65 and older in a 12-point landslide,
and among all those above age 30 (81 percent of the voting
public) the Republican nominee prevailed by a solid margin.
President Obama won the overall vote solely on the strength of
his crushing 60-to-36 advantage with the 18-to-30 crowd. If
official projections prove accurate, low birthrates and rising
life expectancy will produce a much higher percentage of
elderly Americans in the electorate, conferring a significant
edge for conservative candidates in future close elections.
But Democrats hope that young Obama enthusiasts will
maintain their overwhelmingly liberal orientation even as
they grow older and their life circumstances change. In a provocative piece for New York
magazine that calls conservatives “doomed,” Jonathan
Chait argues that the president’s support from young voters
in the last two election cycles went “beyond the usual
reasons—social issues like gay marriage and feminism,
immigration policy or Obama’s personal appeal—and suggest a
deeper attachment to liberalism. The proclivities of younger
voters may actually portend a full-scale sea change in
American politics.” He goes on to cite a Pew survey
suggesting that “Americans form a voting pattern early in
their life and tend to hold to it.”
That conclusion, however, contradicts the evidence of 40
years of exit polls. In 11 presidential elections since
1972, voters over 65 have voted more Republican than
voters under 30 in every contest but one (1988, for some
reason). In none of the 11 elections did young voters tilt
more Republican than the overall electorate; their levels
of support for Democratic candidates in each campaign
topped those of the general electorate by an average of
five points.
These figures conclusively rebut the progressive hope
that youthful liberals generally maintain their fervent
commitment to liberalism as they age and mature. The
voters who lean Republican in middle age and beyond are
the same people, after all, who leaned Democratic in their
younger years. For all their diabolical cleverness, Karl
Rove and other cunning conservatives haven’t yet developed
a scheme for creating new voters in a lab who emerge
pre-aged to a seasoned 65 with an unstoppable instinct to
vote for members of the Bush family.
My own experience could serve to illustrate the point.
I cast my first presidential ballot in 1972 for the
Democratic nominee, George
McGovern. (I also worked professionally in the
McGovern campaign, but that’s another story entirely.) At
the time, I joined my fellow baby boomers, then 18-29, in
giving McGovern 46 percent of our support—vastly better
than the truly pathetic 38 percent he received from the
overall electorate on his way to crushing defeat in a
49-state landslide.
Twelve years later, my cohort had moved on, and so had I.
The youngest of the old group had now reached age 30 and
the oldest of us were well into their 40s. Like 58 percent
of all voters between ages 30 and 49 in 1984, I proudly
cast my vote for Ronald Reagan (I had also supported him
in 1980.) This time, the boomers who had given McGovern an
eight-point advantage compared to his showing in the
broader electorate gave Democrat Walter Mondale only one
point more, 42 percent, than his percentage of the
nationwide popular vote. In other words, as we moved
toward middle age, the progressive tilt that had
characterized our youth had all but disappeared.
Of course it’s too early to determine with any certainty
whether the same maturing process will work its magic on
youthful Obama cadres from 2008 and 2012, but there is some
indication that the shift has already begun. As the
hope-and-change candidate of four years ago, Obama swept
voters between 18 and 29 by a truly stunning margin of 34
points, 66 to 32 percent. Four years later, a significant
portion of those true believers had moved into the 30- to
45-year-old segment of the population, a group that chose
Obama with a much more modest majority of 52 percent. It was
exactly the same percentage, by the way, that he received
from the same age group four years before.
Chait suggests that the progressive inclinations of this
year’s under-30s will remain steady and unshakable as the
years pass, citing polling data showing 33 percent of
young voters calling themselves liberal in 2012, compared
to 25 percent of the larger electorate. But that’s a
reflection of their circumstances as much as their
ideological commitment. People under 30 are
disproportionately single, religiously uncommitted, and
earning incomes below the national median. Such voters
combined to deliver Obama’s margin of victory.
Among the unmarried, who make up 41 percent of the
electorate, Obama won by a margin of 24 percent. Among the
17 percent who say they “never” attend religious services,
he won by 28 percent. And with those earning less than
$50,000 a year, who comprise 41 percent of the voting
public, he enjoyed a 22-percent edge.
The most salient point about all these characteristics is
that, like youth itself, they count as temporary: the
statistics show that few of those who are single,
irreligious, and economically challenged before age 30
will stay that way as they progress through middle age and
beyond. And it’s no accident that Romney won big
majorities of those groups—the married, the religiously
engaged, and the economically prosperous—associated so
clearly with the middle aged and the middle class.
Chait expresses admiration for the 59 percent of young
voters who agreed with the statement that “government
should do more to solve problems” and assumes that this
opinion stems from thoughtful analysis of the issues of
the day. But it’s at least as plausible that the youthful
preference for activist government stems from the
relatively small number of those between 18 and 29 who’ve
ever been asked to pay for such initiatives. IRS figures
indicate that they are vastly under-represented among the
bare majority of Americans who pay personal income taxes,
and even more under-represented among those who pay at the
highest rates. It’s also safe to assume that under-30s
include a substantial number who benefit directly from
subsidized student
loans, either as current students or as recent
graduates struggling with debt.
None of this means their liberal leanings are
inappropriate or unworthy, but they are often fleeting,
polling data suggest. And for those who suggest that the
modern university provides such a thorough brainwashing
that college graduates will never escape its influence, it
might be worth considering that Romney, not Obama, won a
majority of the 29 percent of voters with undergraduate
degrees. The great majority of those students attended
university since the 1970s, well after the loony left had
captured control of the Ivory Tower. After all, it was
1986 when Jesse Jackson led 500 Stanford students in the
memorable chant “Hey hey, Ho Ho, Western Civ has got to
go!”
Not even the most incurably optimistic conservative could
expect that all youthful leftists would make the
liberating journey from darkness to light, from callow
adolescence to responsible maturity, and join the
enlightened armies of the right. But even a relatively
small portion—say, 10 percent—managing to follow that
well-worn path would push most elections in a Republican
direction in a future nation where the percentage of the
young remains steady or slightly shrinks, and the numbers
of the old vastly and consequentially expand.
