Jerusalem Post
 
Concerned but quiet, Israel watches Egypt with an anxious eye 
By _HERB  KEINON_ (http://www.jpost.com/Authors/AuthorPage.aspx?id=107)  
LAST  UPDATED: 07/04/2013

 
Israel used to live in a neighborhood where the evil men in charge  were at 
least predictable, but that has all changed. 
 
 
Israel likes stability, yearns for predictability. It abhors chaos. And 
that  is why the “Arab Spring” has been so problematic from an Israeli point 
of view.  
There is presently precious little predictability in the region. Nations 
can  turn on themselves over night, unleashing God only knows what. And that’s 
the  inherent danger – from Israel’s point of view – regarding what is 
happening in  Egypt right now. No one knows what forces will be unleashed, or 
where they will  lead.
 
Israel likes the knowable, even if the knowable, the stability, is based on 
 fundamentally bad actors. Take Syrian President Bashar Assad and his 
father,  Hafez, for example. These are evil men who caused Israel countless 
headaches and  much suffering. Yet they were predictable. Israel knew, for the 
most part, how  they would act, could predict their reaction. 
Israel was able to take out a _Syrian nuclear installation in 2007_ 
(http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Govt-mute-on-reported-attack-on-Syria-a
rms-convoy)  (at least according to  foreign reports and the memoir of 
former US President George W. Bush) because it  could fairly judge what Bashar 
Assad’s reaction would be. If the Syrian  president’s nose was not rubbed 
into the act, the conjecture went, he would not  react. And, indeed, he didn’
t. 
The same could be said of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. He was 
no  lover of Zion, but after almost three decades of dealing with him, Israel 
knew  him and what he was – and was not – capable of. 
And this is why the “Arab Spring” has been so problematic for Israel. That 
 predictability, stability, has been lost. First in Syria, and now – for a 
second  time – in Egypt. 
As millions of _people take to the streets in Egypt to rid themselves of 
their  president elected_ 
(http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Egyptian-army-tells-Morsi-is-no-longer-president-318628)
  just a year ago, Jerusalem – as 
Israeli officials have  been instructed to say – “is watching carefully.” 
And that is all they are instructed to say. Beyond that mantra, government  
officials – wisely – are not commenting. 
They are not commenting on what they want to see, or on what they think 
they  will see. 
This is wise policy for a couple of reasons. First, because whatever Israel 
 says on behalf of one side or the other will be used against that side by 
the  other one. 
Second: What could Israel possibly say? That it hopes whatever happens in  
Egypt, Cairo will honor the peace treaty? That would simply be stating the  
obvious. These are domestic Egyptian events over which Israel has absolutely 
no  impact or say. So why speak out? Official silence, however, should not 
be  confused with a lack of concern. Israel is concerned, mightily 
concerned. 
Not panicky, because this country has the ability to defend itself and  
protect its vital interests, but concerned. 
Concern No. 1 is how the current chaos and anarchy impact the ability of  
Egypt to police and control _what happens in Sinai_ 
(http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-Sinai-is-becoming-a-major-threat-to-Egypt-314242)
 . 
In the immediate aftermath of the "Tahrir Square" revolution two years ago, 
 the situation in Sinai deteriorated. The gas pipelines to Israel and 
Jordan were  repeatedly sabotaged and blown up, and terrorist attacks and 
rocket 
attacks were  staged from Sinai. In the past, when the Egyptian military was 
distracted by  events taking place in Cairo, elements inside Sinai used the 
commotion to launch  attacks and create problems in and from the peninsula. 
A second concern is that Egypt may become ungovernable. Israel has no  
interest in its largest neighbor becoming a failed state. A failed state, an  
ungovernable country, cannot be counted upon to uphold its treaty 
requirements,  for instance. 
Israel also has no illusions – just as it has no illusion concerning Syria –
  that whoever ultimately prevails there will be imbibed with pro-Israel  
sensitivities. One of the names bandied about as a potential leader is Amr  
Moussa, a former foreign minister and former head of the Arab League known in 
 Jerusalem for his long-time antipathy toward Israel. Another name 
appearing in  the Western media as a leader of the opposition is Mohamed 
ElBaradei, 
someone  whose exit as chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
2009 Israel  had longed to see. 
A third concern is that if anarchy prevails in Cairo, Israel and/or the 
Jews  will be blamed. This concern is deeply ingrained in the Jewish and 
Israeli DNA.  (Those who think this is little more than Jewish paranoia need 
look 
no further  then Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay’s comment on 
Tuesday that  “Diaspora Jews” were responsible for the Gezi protests that 
rocked his country  last month.)  
And the final concern regarding Egypt has to do with how all this will 
impact  Hamas. On paper, a weakened Muslim Brotherhood should mean a weakened 
Hamas, as  the Brotherhood was seen as Hamas’s older sibling and patron. In 
practice, the  relationship between the two has not been completely smooth. 
Mohamed Morsi did not provide Hamas with all it had hoped for – he clamped  
down on the arms smuggling into Gaza, and three Hamas men were accused of 
taking  part in last August’s attack that killed 16 Egyptian soldiers. 
Hamas has been quiet lately, both because of Israeli deterrence and because 
 of a sense of obligation to commitments it made toward Morsi, who helped 
broker  a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas in November. If Hamas no longer 
feels  committed to Morsi, it may no longer feel obligated to keep the 
border  quiet. 
Israel and Egypt worked out an odd modus vivendi during the year Morsi was 
in  office. According to the new rules, there is absolutely no contact 
between the  countries’ leaders – as there had been in the past – and even no 
contact at the  level of foreign minister to foreign minister. But there is a 
good channel of  communications between the militaries and defense 
establishments. 
Jerusalem never harbored any fantasy concerning Morsi. Steps he took in 
Sinai  to crack down on the anarchy there, or moves to stop arms smuggling into 
Gaza,  or even efforts to broker quiet between Israel and Hamas in Gaza 
were perceived  as things he did to protect his own interests. 
>From the day he took office until today, there had been deep concern in  
Jerusalem because of his extreme Islamic worldview, about how he would relate 
to  Israel and the peace treaty five or 10 years down the line, if he was 
ever able  to get his chaotic house in order. 
That turned out to be a huge “if.”  
When it comes to Egypt, Israel can do little more than worry - and prepare  
for a worst-case scenario.

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