Why ‘Too Big to Fail’ Is a Bigger Problem 
Than Ever
 
 
 
 
_Rob  Garver_ (http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Authors/G/Rob-Garver) 


The Fiscal  Times  
 
 
January 9,  2014


 
 
 
Just how big are the largest banks in the U.S.? Here’s a little  
perspective: 
In the past few months, JPMorgan Chase has agreed to pay, depending on how  
you do the math, somewhere between $22 billion and $25 billion in fines and 
 penalties for various illegal activities, from hiding its suspicions about 
Ponzi  schemer Bernie Madoff to misleading investors about the notorious 
London  Whale. 
Meanwhile, as of the third quarter of 2013, 99.1 percent of banks chartered 
 in the U.S. had less than $20 billion in total assets on their books. 
Think about that for a moment. In the space of less than 90 days, JPMorgan  
Chase has agreed to fines greater than the total value of all the assets 
held by  almost every bank in the country. And not only is it still in 
business, it’s  generating revenues roughly equal to all those fines every 
quarter. 
And its  stock price is _soaring_ 
(http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=JPM+Interactive#symbol=JPM;range=3m) .  The 
bank’s share price rose again 
yesterday despite The Wall Street Journal’s _revelation_ 
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303848104579308543399871248.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNew
sCollection)   of yet more potential illegal activity – JPM is one of 
several banks being  investigated for deliberately mispricing volatile 
residential mortgage-backed  securities during the financial crisis.



 
The point here is not to pick on JPMorgan alone. The very largest banks in  
the U.S. are _posting_ 
(http://blogs.barrons.com/stockstowatchtoday/2014/01/08/citigroup-bank-of-america-jpmorgan-chase-pick-a-bank-any-bank/?mod=BOLBlo
g)   almost uniformly spectacular financial results that have seemingly 
inured them  to the regulatory and legal penalties they are made to pay. 
A hearing held Wednesday by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and  
Urban Development addressed one of the reasons why the banks are doing so 
well  even as they face continued legal actions: They enjoy a massive subsidy 
rooted  in the market’s belief that, should they ever get in trouble, the 
government  will bail them out. That enables those banks to borrow more cheaply 
than their  smaller competitors and leads shareholders to believe that they 
are protected  from downside risk should the bank get in trouble. 
In the hearing Wednesday, Lawrance L. Evans, Jr., Director of Financial  
Markets and Community Investment for the Government Accountability Office,  
testified that during the financial crisis, the more than $1 trillion in 
support  given to the financial markets by the federal government went largely 
to 
the  biggest banks. 
Evans said that a follow-up report, due out sometime this year, will 
quantify  the financial benefits that large banks receive as a result of the 
public
’s  expectation that the government will not allow them to fail. 
Advocates of breaking up the biggest banks said that they hope the GAO’s  
findings will convince the public of their case. 
Professor Cornelius Hurley, who directs the Boston University Center for  
Finance, Law & Policy, said that he expects public support for shrinking the  
biggest banks to coalesce “once the public realizes that bailouts are not 
just  something that happened in 2008 but something that’s going on today.” 
Big banks, he said, “are using the full faith and credit of the United 
States  as a lever to get a better rate for themselves in the market. The big 
banks have  free insurance they don’t pay a premium for.” 
During the hearing, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) was one of a number of  
lawmakers who raised the question of whether the largest financial 
institutions  should be forced to downsize. 
“The four largest banks are nearly 40 percent bigger today than they were  
just five years ago. The six largest banks now control two thirds of the 
banking  assets in this country, a 37 percent increase over where they were 
just in the  last five years,” Warren said. “These banks, in other words, are 
a whole lot  bigger now than they were when we bailed them out in 2008 
because they were too  big too fail.” 
Warren has introduced legislation that would effectively break up the 
biggest  banks by separating the traditional business of deposit-taking and 
lending from  more risky activities in the securities markets, a position that 
was supported  by witnesses at Wednesday’s hearing. 
In his testimony, Simon Johnson, Ronald Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship 
 at MIT Sloan School of Management pointed out that even the Federal 
Reserve  Board has begun to consider limiting the size of the largest banks, 
citing  Governor Daniel K. Tarullo’s suggestion that bank size might be limited 
to a  specific percentage of the gross domestic product. 
“The implication is that we should not allow the size of our largest bank  
holding companies to increase further,” Johnson said. But under questioning 
from  Sen. Warren, Johnson went further, saying, “The Federal Reserve should 
take  remedial actions…including breaking up the banks” along the lines of 
Warren’s  legislative proposal. 
==================================== 

 
 
 
 

5 Years After the Crisis: What Banks 
Haven’t Learned
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

_Suzanne McGee_ (http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Authors/M/Suzanne%20McGee) 






The Fiscal  Times  
 
 
September 10,  2013


 
 
 
This week brings with it two rather bleak anniversaries. It’s been  12 
years since the September 11 terrorist attacks and five years since Lehman  
Brothers filed for bankruptcy as part of the 2008 crisis that nearly brought 
the 
 global financial system to its knees. Along with remembrance, these 
milestones  should bring with them a sense that we have learned enough to 
ensure 
that  history doesn’t repeat itself – or at least, a sense that the pain and 
misery is  receding in the rear view mirror. 
In the case of the financial crisis at least, I’m not sure that we  can say 
so. For proof, look no further than JPMorgan Chase (NYSE: JPM), which  
emerged from the crisis a big winner. The bank had sailed in to buy Bear 
Stearns 
 and prevent its collapse in March 2008. That was hardly a public service 
(it  gave JPMorgan a big boost in Wall Street league tables, and Dimon picked 
up the  assets for a song, with government help), but it may also have sent 
the wrong  message to the rest of Wall Street: that their own institutions 
would be too big  to fail. 
Be that as it may, JPMorgan Chase came through the crisis relatively  
stronger than it had been. But take a look at some of the comments and  
disclosures it made only yesterday, during a presentation to the Barclays 
Global  
Financial Services Conference in New York, and it becomes clear that five years 
 after the crisis, we have yet to put many problems behind us. And even the 
 winners still have a lot to learn. 
Wall Street Remains Full of  Supersize Institutions 
JPMorgan Chase is the biggest of these, and critics including Sheila  Bair, 
former head of the FDIC, aren’t at all confident that any of them  have a 
good strategy for addressing the “too big to fail” conundrum. That means  
that if a future risk management snafu or business misjudgment triggers the  
collapse of a big financial institution, we could be right back at square  
one. 
While JPMorgan Chase CFO Marianne Lake bragged about the bank’s  giant 
market share and capital position at the Barclays conference, Bair’s  broader 
point is that that kind of market share brings systemic risk with it,  and 
unless and until there’s a workable “resolution” structure in place, the  size 
of some of these institutions today is still worrying. 
Nor do many of Wall Street’s critics draw much comfort from the  Federal 
Reserve’s annual stress tests – especially after the last one showed  
Citigroup (NYSE: C) as being more resilient than JPMorgan. “That’s just  
downright 
odd,” one analyst told me back in the spring, when those results were  
released. 
Risk Management Remains Imperfect 
The financial crisis was a reminder of how often Wall Street failed  to ask 
itself the most basic kind of question – what might go wrong here? – and  
failed to put in place systems that would increase the odds of identifying 
the  biggest sources of risk before they morphed into large losses and 
writedowns.  Risk management – which, after all, isn’t a profit center but 
instead eats into  returns on equity – still isn’t embedded in Wall Street DNA. 
JPMorgan Chase is a great example of that, as the London Whale  trading 
losses reminded everyone last year. The bank’s own reports on the  problematic 
trades displayed myriad gaps in risk management – including evidence  that 
some of the bank’s managers manipulated internal risk models. Two of the  
directors who served on the bank’s risk committee stepped down in July. 
JPMorgan  Chase just yesterday announced their replacements, both of whom have 
solid track  records in finance and one of whom, Linda Bammann, is a banking 
exec with risk  management expertise. But why wait five years to do this? 
Mistakes Continue, and Continue  to Cost Money 
Government agencies have been busy filing suits of all kinds against  Wall 
Street institutions, many of them related to the way mortgage securities  
were originated, packaged, priced and sold before the crisis. At JPMorgan 
Chase,  the federal government and its agencies alone are conducting criminal  
investigations into the mortgage-backed securities operations as well as its  
energy-trading activities; other investigations target the London Whale 
losses,  the bank’s credit card collections policies and activities and the way 
it  handles mortgage foreclosures and guards against money laundering. 
 
Not all of these problems are historic in nature – the  energy trading 
kerfuffle has surfaced only in the last year. New or old, the  cost of 
defending 
against these allegations, paying fines to settle regulatory  claims and 
providing against other penalties, is climbing. Lake, the chief  financial 
officer, told her conference audience yesterday that an increase to  the bank’s 
litigation reserve to address a “crescendo” of these actual and  potential 
lawsuits will “more than offset” the $1.5 billion of consumer loan  loss 
reserves that will be released as credit quality on the bank’s loan  
portfolio has improved. “We are still finalizing the number,” she  said.

Some Problems Never Disappear; They Just  Metamorphose 
Back in 2008, banks were stuck with big portfolios of mortgages, and  
especially poor-quality “subprime” ones. They had been lending foolishly,  
assuming that they could always repackage those loans in such a way as to make  
them look appealing to someone out there. 
Fast forward five years and the mortgage arena once more is a  problem area 
for banks like JPMorgan Chase. This time it isn’t a question of  losses, 
but of revenue – or rather, a steep decline in revenues from the home  lending 
business that the bank is likely to see as interest rates rise. Lake  said 
yesterday that mortgage refinancing demand has fallen 60 percent from its  
peak in May, sooner and more rapidly than the bank had expected. Add that to  
competitive pressures and the time it takes to complete “taking expenses 
out of  the system” (translation: eliminating some jobs in this part of the 
business)  and profit margins here will be negative. At least this time, the 
mortgage  business is likely to be only a drag on profits rather than a big 
question mark  hanging over the future of the industry. 
None of these are reasons to panic or to expect a re-run of the  events of 
2008. What is disconcerting, however, is the limited extent to which  big 
financial institutions have changed the way they function in the wake of  
their near-death experience. New regulations have been slow to emerge and have  
had unintended consequences; others haven’t even materialized. On the part 
of  the banks themselves, a new mindset may be even further away today than 
it was  in the autumn of 2008, when CEOs and CFOs were still scared silly by 
the  narrowness of their escape from complete  disaster.


















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