Reason
   
Crony Capitalism vs. Market Morality
Finding an ethical lobbying line in a fallen age of  corporatism
_Timothy P. Carney_ (http://reason.com/people/timothy-p-carney/all)  from 
the _February 2014_ (http://reason.com/issues/february-2014)  issue
 
Scenario 1: It's 2005. While Republicans are fighting to permanently repeal 
 the estate tax (or "death tax," in their phrasing), a nonprofit called the 
 Coalition for America's Priorities spearheads the counterattack, deriding 
the  proposed repeal as the Leave No Heiress Behind Act. One television 
spot, run by  a coalition partner called United for a Fair Economy, features a 
lithe,  flaxen-haired, Paris Hilton-esque narrator named "London" thanking 
the GOP for  trying to maximize her inheritance.
 
The anti-repeal campaign is suffused with populist rhetoric. ("This is not 
a  country of inherited wealth," coalition head Steve Ricchetti tells USA  
Today. "This is a country of earned wealth.") Yet the entire thing is  funded 
by the life insurance industry. 
Why? Because the death tax creates business for life insurers. A major  
selling point of life insurance is that its benefits, unlike inherited money,  
can be totally tax-free. Take the estate tax away, and that selling point  
disappears. Hence the campaign. 
Scenario 2: It's 2010. William Hambrecht, a Bay Area financier, has donated 
 more than $1 million to Democrats since 1993. More than $13,000 of that 
money  has gone to Nancy Pelosi, a San Francisco congresswoman who once gave a 
House  floor speech praising "a business pioneer, a philanthropist, and a 
longtime  friend, Bill Hambrecht." 
She could have added "business partner." When Hambrecht founded the United  
Football League in 2009 to try to compete with the NFL, Paul Pelosi Sr. 
-Nancy's  husband-invested $12 million in one of the league's first four teams. 
In a  fortuitous coincidence, Hambrecht's small investment bank has 
employed Paul  Pelosi Jr., the congresswoman's son, for years. 
In the waning days of Pelosi's term as speaker of the House, Hambrecht 
comes  to Capitol Hill to testify before the Financial Services Committee. The  
committee is meeting to discuss a proposed tweak to regulations that govern  
initial public offerings (IPOs). Hambrecht's company would be the prime  
beneficiary of the proposal. 
Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-Mass.) pointedly notes at the beginning 
of  the hearing that the regulatory change was not his idea. "I should note 
also  that it was Speaker Pelosi who first called this to our attention 
earlier in the  year.…It is something that the speaker has taken a great 
interest in because  of her interest in job creation, so we have had to find a 
way to have this  hearing." 
Both of these scenarios sound sleazy: the kind of influence-peddling,  
insider-colluding tales that make Americans cynical about Washington. But in  
fact, only one of the two lobbying campaigns is genuinely objectionable.  
Explaining why means tackling one of the most important questions for  
libertarians observing our modern crony-capitalist economy, where the  
government's 
tendrils are so intimately entwined with the business world: What  sorts of 
corporate lobbying are morally justified? 
Baptists and Bootleggers 
The life insurers' partnership with the left to save the estate tax is a  
classic case of Baptists and bootleggers, to borrow a famous phrase from the  
economist Bruce Yandle. In Yandle's account, the Baptist preacher provides 
the  anti-alcohol campaigner with a moral cover story for his efforts, while 
the  bootlegger, who will profit from Prohibition, bankrolls the effort. 
George W. Bush's 2001 tax cut included a gradual repeal of the estate tax.  
But because the Bush bill was scheduled to sunset in 10 years, the tax was 
set  to rise from the dead on January 1, 2011. After voters re-elected Bush 
and  increased the Republicans' Senate majority in 2004, permanent repeal of 
the  estate tax became a GOP priority. 
Many liberals wanted to keep the tax, arguing that it helped slow the 
growth  of economic inequality. But the real muscle opposing permanent repeal 
came not  from liberals but from insurers. Steve Ricchetti and his brother Jeff 
founded  Ricchetti Inc., a K Street firm, in 2001. (Jeff still runs the 
lobbying firm;  Steve is now Joe Biden's chief of staff.) In 2004 the 
Association of Advanced  Life Underwriting hired the Ricchettis to lobby on 
"issues 
affecting estate tax  repeal," according to a filing with the Senate Office 
of Public Records.  Ricchetti Inc. was also retained by a larger industry 
group, the American  Council of Life Insurers (ACLI). 
The inheritance tax gives wealthy people two artificial incentives to buy  
life insurance. The first is that insurance enables them to avoid paying the 
 tax. If a woman died in 2001 and left her son $2.5 million, the son would 
have  owed about $1 million to the government. But if the mother had a $2.5 
million  whole-life insurance policy and assigned ownership to her son, he 
wouldn't pay a  penny in either estate or income tax on that money. 
Considering the tax savings,  the policy would be a good deal even if she paid 
$3 
million in premiums to get  the $2.5 million benefit. 
The second incentive is not about avoiding the tax; it's about  affording 
it. If you want to hand down a family business, an art  collection, or some 
other illiquid item, you might buy a life insurance policy  adequate to pay 
the tax on the inheritance. Wealthy people "quite often use life  insurance 
as a means to generate the cash to pay the tax on the transfer to the  next 
generation," Jim Swink of the Planning Corporation of America told On  Wall 
Street, an investing publication, in 2007. 
You can see why the insurance industry lobbies like crazy. In years when 
the  estate tax is on the legislative table, ACLI reliably makes the top tier 
of K  Street interest groups; in 2004 only five single-industry lobbies 
spent  more.
 
If "the social responsibility of a business is to increase its profits," as 
 Milton Friedman once wrote, can a libertarian blame life insurance 
companies for  these efforts? They were acting, after all, on behalf of their 
own 
shareholders  and creditors. And the efforts worked: The death tax still 
exists, continuing to  generate business and profits for the life insurance 
industry.
 
But yes, we can blame them. The problem is not that the insurers sell  
products that derive their value from big government; it's that they're 
actively 
 pushing for the interventions that give their products value. They are not 
just  filling a need created by big government. They are demanding that big 
government  create that need. 
Lobbying for Liberty 
Contrast that with Hambrecht's attempts to revise the rules for IPOs.  
Hambrecht's business would have been the prime beneficiary of the policy he was 
 
proposing, but he was not lobbying to constrain anyone's freedom or 
increase  anyone's taxes. 
Under existing law, companies wanting to go public needed to jump through  
complex and expensive regulatory hoops that left them dependant on the giant 
 Wall Street firms to underwrite their IPOs. Small firms, worth less than 
$5  million, were exempted from these rules. Hambrecht was lobbying to 
increase the  exemption level to $30 million. (In 2012 a provision much like 
Hambrecht's  passed into law as part of a broader reform of financial 
regulations 
called the  JOBS Act.) 
Long ago, WR Hambrecht & Company developed a simpler, cheaper process for  
businesses to take their companies public. OpenIPO is Hambrecht's registered 
 trademark, and it is one of the primary ways smaller companies get listed 
on  public exchanges. The more small companies go public, the more clients 
there are  for OpenIPO, and the more profit Hambrecht makes. 
So Hambrecht was lobbying for his own profits, but he was also lobbying for 
a  change that would give more opportunity to smaller companies and smaller 
 investors. And there was nothing in the reform he backed that would stop  
competitors to OpenIPO from trying to take his business. 
Hambrecht evidently believed that if businessmen were more free to choose 
how  to go public, they would choose his product. The only victims of his 
lobbying  were the big investment banks who had long enjoyed an oligopoly on 
the  unnecessarily costly process of taking small companies public. In other 
words,  Wall Street giants were losing a government-granted privilege. 
Hambrecht's influence game had all the trappings of special-interest  
pleading. But it's hard to find fault with what he did. 
Hambrecht is different from the insurers because he's not profiting off of  
big government. But even profiting off of big government can be blameless, 
if  you do it like Anthony DeNicola does. DeNicola, the president and 
co-founder of  White Buffalo, is a professional sharpshooter. Local governments 
hire his  company to thin deer herds that have become nuisances. He brings his 
team of  sharpshooters to town, scopes out good shooting spots, and then 
spends a few  days in tree stands or high back decks, taking out hundreds of 
deer. 
In 2000, for instance, the area around Princeton, New Jersey, had more than 
 300 deer-auto collisions. "The herd's population had climbed to nearly 100 
deer  per square mile, prompting some residents to refer to the animals as 
'rats of  the night,' " Outdoor Life reported. "One root cause of the 
deer  overpopulation: Princeton Township had outlawed hunting in 1980." So the 
town  hired DeNicola's hunters to cull the herd. It was hardly the company's 
only  client: DeNicola is flooded with work from suburbs up and down the 
East Coast.  Hunters don't have much political power in the suburbs, so there 
are a lot of  places between Boston and D.C. where hunting has been banned. 
DeNicola's business-his dream job-depends on counterproductive government  
intrusions on the liberty of hunters. In this regard, he is like the life  
insurers. But unlike the insurers, he does not lobby for the maintenance and  
expansion of the laws from which he benefits. To the extent that he has any 
say  over hunting regulations, he calls for their liberalization. In the 
meantime,  his business helps solve a problem those bad laws created. You 
can't fault him  for that. 
Drawing the Line 
There's nothing inherently wrong with profiting off big government. If the  
government creates a surplus of deer, someone has to thin that surplus. If  
government forces factories to clean up their emissions, someone has to 
make the  smokestack scrubbers. If government requires drivers to use ethanol, 
someone has  to make the stuff. 
Nor is it inherently wrong to lobby for policies that increase your 
profits.  "Petitioning the government for the redress of grievances" is 
protected 
by the  First Amendment, and the regulatory environment often chips away at 
the profits  companies would otherwise make. What is wrong is to lobby for 
policies  that enrich your business by taking away other people's property or  
liberty.
 
If undue intrusions on liberty are immoral, then helping enact those  
intrusions is also immoral. Sure, the politicians who create corporatist  
policies bear the ultimate blame, but if you, as a lobbyist, convince someone 
to  
do something wrong, how are your hands not also dirty?
 
One might object that a corporate executive's primary duty is to maximize  
shareholder value, period, usually by maximizing profits. But almost  nobody 
really believes that the profit-maximizing directive should be  absolute.  
[emphasis added] What if a foreign king promised a  secret supply of slave 
labor to a corporation in exchange for a pittance in  patronage? Would the 
CEO be duty-bound to accept this great deal? 
No. The CEO's charge should not be "increase shareholder value by any means 
 necessary." It should be "increase shareholder value by all appropriate  
means." That precludes participating in slavery, and it precludes lobbying 
for  unjust laws. 
So where do you draw the line? In 2001, a Costco shareholder wrote to the  
company to complain about its willingness to benefit from eminent domain. 
Costco  counsel Joel Benoliel replied that in places where "Redevelopment 
Districts with  bonding authority and powers of condemnation have been the norm 
for many  decades," his company's participation in the process does not make 
eminent  domain any more common; it just affects who benefits from it. "The 
fact is,"  Benoliel wrote, "if we refrained from participating in these 
deals, our  competitors for these sites…would take advantage of our 
reticence, and our  shareholders would be the losers." 
The plausibility of this defense depends on the specifics. If a county 
takes  land through eminent domain and then looks for retailers to set up  
shop, 
it's hard to blame a business for trying to get in on the deal. But if a  
county, seeking a particular company, offers to acquire some property for 
that  enterprise through eminent domain, it is harder to justify saying yes. If 
a  developer or retailer explicitly asks a government for an eminent domain 
taking,  it is asking for outright theft. The fact that everyone else is 
doing it does  not change the moral calculus. 
Lobbyists and CEOs will always have a free-market-sounding defense to make. 
 Sometimes the defense will be legitimate. Frequently it will not. 
Libertarians  need to probe those defenses, asking businessmen and their hired 
guns 
these  tough questions. Keep it up, and perhaps one day the businessmen will 
start  asking those questions of themselves.

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