MIT  Technology Review
 
America’s Religion  
Using the Internet can destroy your faith. That’s the conclusion  of a 
study showing that the dramatic drop in religious affiliation in the U.S.  
since 
1990 is closely mirrored by the increase in Internet use.  

 
 
 




 
Back in 1990, about 8 percent of the U.S. population had no religious  
preference. By 2010, this percentage had more than doubled to 18 percent. 
That’s 
 a difference of about 25 million people, all of whom have somehow lost 
their  religion. 
That raises an obvious question: how come? Why are Americans losing  their 
faith? 
Today, we get a possible answer thanks to the work of Allen Downey, a  
computer scientist at the Olin College of Engineering in Massachusetts, who has 
 
analyzed the data in detail. He says that the demise is the result of 
several  factors but the most controversial of these is the rise of the 
Internet. 
He  concludes that the increase in Internet use in the last two decades has 
caused a  significant drop in religious affiliation. 
Downey’s data comes from the General Social Survey, a widely respected  
sociological survey carried out by the University of Chicago, that has 
regularly  measure people’s attitudes and demographics since 1972. 
In that time, the General Social Survey has asked people questions such  
as: “what is your religious preference?” and “in what religion were you 
raised?”  It also collects data on each respondent’s age, level of education,  
socioeconomic group, and so on. And in the Internet era, it has asked how 
long  each person spends online. The total data set that Downey used consists 
of  responses from almost 9,000 people. 
Downey’s approach is to determine how the drop in religious affiliation  
correlates with other elements of the survey such as religious upbringing,  
socioeconomic status, education, and so on. 
He finds that the biggest influence on religious affiliation is  religious 
upbringing—people who are brought up in a religion are more likely to  be 
affiliated to that religion later. 
However, the number of people with a religious upbringing has dropped  
since 1990. It’s easy to imagine how this inevitably leads to a fall in the  
number who are religious later in life. In fact, Downey’s analysis shows that  
this is an important factor. However, it cannot account for all of the fall 
or  anywhere near it. In fact, that data indicates that it only explains 
about 25  percent of the drop. 
He goes on to show that college-level education also correlates with  the 
drop. Once it again, it’s easy to imagine how contact with a wider group of  
people at college might contribute to a loss of religion. 
Since the 1980s, the fraction of people receiving college level  education 
has increased from 17.4 percent to 27.2 percent in the 2000s. So it’s  not 
surprising that this is reflected in the drop in numbers claiming religious  
affiliation today. But although the correlation is statistically 
significant, it  can only account for about 5 percent of the drop, so some 
other factor 
must also  be involved. 
That’s where the Internet comes in.  In the 1980s, Internet use  was 
essentially zero, but in 2010, 53 percent of the population spent two hours  
per 
week online and 25 percent surfed for more than 7 hours. 
This increase closely matches the decrease in religious affiliation. In  
fact, Downey calculates that it can account for about 25 percent of the  drop. 
That’s a fascinating result. It implies that since 1990, the increase  in 
Internet use has had as powerful an influence on religious affiliation as the 
 drop in religious upbringing. 
At this point, it’s worth spending a little time talking about the  nature 
of these conclusions. What Downey has found is correlations and any  
statistician will tell you that correlations do not imply causation. If A is  
correlated with B, there can be several possible explanations. A might cause B, 
 
B might cause A, or some other factor might cause both A and B. 
But that does not mean that it is impossible to draw conclusions from  
correlations, only that they must be properly guarded. “Correlation does 
provide 
 evidence in favor of causation, especially when we can  eliminate 
alternative explanations or have reason to believe that they are less  likely,” 
says 
Downey. 
For example, it’s easy to imagine that a religious upbringing causes  
religious affiliation later in life. However, it’s impossible for the  
correlation to work the other way round. Religious affiliation later in life  
cannot 
cause a religious upbringing (although it may color a person’s view of  their 
upbringing). 
It’s also straightforward to imagine how spending time on the Internet  can 
lead to religious disaffiliation. “For people living in homogeneous  
communities, the Internet provides opportunities to find information about  
people 
of other religions (and none), and to interact with them personally,”  says 
Downey. “Conversely, it is harder (but not impossible) to imagine plausible 
 reasons why disaffiliation might cause increased Internet use.” 
There is another possibility, of course: that a third unidentified  factor 
causes both increased Internet use and religious disaffiliation. But  Downey 
discounts this possibility. “We have controlled for most of the obvious  
candidates, including income, education, socioeconomic status, and rural/urban 
 environments,” he says. 
If this third factor exists, it must have specific characteristics. It  
would have to be something new that was increasing in prevalence during the  
1990s and 2000s, just like the Internet. “It is hard to imagine what that 
factor  might be,” says Downey. 
That leaves him in little doubt that his conclusion is reasonable.  “
Internet use decreases the chance of religious affiliation,” he  says. 
But there is something else going on here too. Downey has found three  
factors—the drop in religious upbringing, the increase in college-level  
education and the increase in Internet use—that together explain about 50  
percent 
of the drop in religious affiliation. 
But what of the other 50 percent? In the data, the only factor that  
correlates with this is date of birth—people born later are less likely to have 
 a 
religious affiliation. But as Downey points out, year of birth cannot be a  
causal factor. “So about half of the observed change remains unexplained,” 
he  says. 
So that leaves us with a mystery. The drop in religious upbringing and  the 
increase in Internet use seem to be causing people to lose their faith. But 
 something else about modern life that is not captured in this data is 
having an  even bigger impact. 
What can that be? Answers please in the comments section. 
Note:
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