NY Times
 
_The Opinion  Pages_ (http://www.nytimes.com/pages/opinion/index.html)  | 
Op-Ed Contributor 
Islamists Are Not Our  Friends

By DENNIS B. ROSS
 
September 11, 2014
 
 
 
 
WASHINGTON — A new fault line has emerged in Middle  Eastern politics, one 
that will have profound implications for America’s foreign  policy in the 
region. This rift is not defined by those who support or oppose  the _Islamic  
State in Iraq and Syria_ 
(http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda_in_mesopotamia/index.html?inline=nyt-org)
  
(ISIS), or by conflict between Sunnis and Shiites  and the proxy war between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is characterized by a  fundamental division between 
Islamists and non-Islamists.
 
On one side are the Islamists — both Sunni and Shiite.  ISIS and the 
_Muslim  Brotherhood_ 
(http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/m/muslim_brotherhood_egypt/index.html?inline=nyt-org)
  represent the 
Sunni end of the spectrum, while the Islamic  Republic of Iran and its 
militias, including Hezbollah (in Lebanon and Syria)  and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (in 
Iraq), constitute the other. Many of these Islamists  are at war with one 
another, but they are also engaged in a bitter struggle with  non-Islamists to 
define the fundamental identity of the region and its states.  What the 
Islamists all have in common is that they subordinate national  identities to 
an 
Islamic identity. 
To be sure,  not all are as extreme as ISIS, which seeks to obliterate 
sovereign nations  under the aegis of a caliphate. But the Muslim Brotherhood 
is 
committed to the  Umma, the larger Muslim community. One reason behind the 
popular revolt against  its rule in Egypt was that the Brotherhood violated 
a basic principle of  national identity: It was Islamist before it was 
Egyptian.
 
Now,  President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi sees his country engaged in an 
existential  conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood. He is backed financially by 
Saudi Arabia,  the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. Mr. Sisi also collaborates 
closely with  Algeria, and has support from Morocco and Jordan. 
During the  recent conflict in the Gaza Strip, there were demonstrations 
against Israel in  Europe — but not in the Arab states. Unlike Turkey and 
Qatar, which support the  Muslim Brotherhood, the other Sunni states in the 
region wanted to weaken Hamas,  the Brotherhood’s _Palestinian_ 
(http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/p/palestinians/index.html?inlin
e=nyt-classifier)   wing. Those states were alienated when Washington 
turned to Qatar and Turkey as  possible mediators of a cease-fire in the recent 
conflict.
 
The Arab  Awakening of 2011 did not usher in an era of democracy, nor could 
it. The  institutions of civil society were too weak; the political culture 
of  winner-take-all too strong; sectarian differences too powerful; and a 
belief in  pluralism too inchoate. Instead, the awakening produced political 
vacuums and a  struggle over identity. 
President  Obama is right to note the old order’s disappearance in the 
region and the time  it’s taking for a new one to emerge. The administration is 
struggling to define  an effective strategy — but the Islamist vs. 
non-Islamist divide creates an  opening. 
The  non-Islamists include the traditional monarchies, authoritarian 
governments in  Egypt and Algeria, and secular reformers who may be small in 
number but have not  disappeared. They do not include Bashar al-Assad’s regime 
in 
Syria; he is  completely dependent on Iran and Hezbollah and cannot make 
decisions without  them.
 
Today, the non-Islamists want to know that the United  States supports 
them. For America, that means not partnering with Iran against  ISIS, though 
both countries may avoid interfering with each other’s operations  against the 
insurgents in Iraq. 
It means actively competing with Iran in the rest of the  region, 
independently of whether an acceptable nuclear deal can be reached with  
Tehran. It 
means recognizing that Egypt is an essential part of the  anti-Islamist 
coalition, and that American military aid should not be withheld  because of 
differences over Egypt’s domestic behavior.
 
America  should also coordinate with Egypt and the U.A.E. when they bomb 
Islamist targets  in Libya, or elsewhere. Coordination will make their 
military operations more  effective, as well as provide America with greater 
ability to influence their  actions. (And Washington would want to be able to 
head 
off military acts that it  sees as ill-advised.) 
The Obama  administration worries about the consequences of excluding all 
Islamists. It  worries, too, about appearing to give a blank check to 
authoritarian regimes,  when it believes there need to be limits and that these 
regimes are likely to  prove unstable over time. But as Egypt and the U.A.E. 
showed with the airstrikes  on Islamists in Libya, some of America’s 
traditional partners are ready to act  without us, convinced that the 
administration 
does not see all Islamists as a  threat — and that America sees its 
interests as different from theirs. That is a  problem.
 
These non-Islamists are America’s natural partners in the  region. They 
favor stability, the free flow of oil and gas, and they oppose  terrorism. The 
forces that threaten us also threaten them. The Obama  administration needs 
to follow three principles in these partnerships. 
First,  focus on security and stability. Nothing, including tolerant, 
pluralist  societies, is possible without it. 
Second, do  not reach out to Islamists; their creed is not compatible with 
pluralism or  democracy. In Tunisia, the Ennahda party surrendered power 
only when it realized  its policies had produced such a backlash that the party’
s very survival was  threatened. Islamists, even apparent moderates like 
those of Ennahda, must be  left with no choice but coexistence.
 
Turkey is a  special case because it is a NATO ally. There is much we can 
do with Turkey when  it comes to fighting ISIS, but the Turkish president, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan,  should understand that his support for the Muslim 
Brotherhood limits what we  will do with him and necessarily isolates Turkey 
from 
its neighbors. 
Third,  America’s support for non-Islamist partners does not require 
surrendering our  voice or supporting every domestic policy. We should press 
them 
on pluralism,  minority rights and the rule of law. 
The new  fault line in the Middle East is a real opportunity for America. 
Yes, the United  States will face challenges and have to manage tensions 
between our values and  our interests. No strategy is free of risk, but joining 
with our natural  partners offers the best way forward.

-- 
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