The Atlantic
 
The False Equation of Atheism and  Intellectual Sophistication
Beyond the argument that faith in God is  irrational—and therefore 
illegitimate 

 
_Emma Green_ (http://www.theatlantic.com/emma-green/)   Mar 14  2014, 7:45 
AM ET
 
Atheism is intellectually fashionable. In the past month, The New York  
Times has run _several_ 
(http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/is-atheism-irrational/)   
_stories_ 
(http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/arguments-against-god/?ref=atheism)
   about lack of faith in its series 
on religion. The New Yorker ran an _article_ 
(http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2014/02/17/140217crat_atlarge_gopnik?currentPage=all)
   on 
the history of non-belief in reaction to _two_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/The-Age-Atheists-Sought-Since/dp/1476754314)   _new  
books_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/Imagine-Theres-No-Heaven-Atheism/dp/1137002603)  on the 
subject that were 
released within a week of each other in  February. The veteran writer, Adam 
Gopnik, concludes this: 
What the noes, whatever their numbers, really have now … is a  monopoly on 
legitimate forms of knowledge about the natural world. They have  this 
monopoly for the same reason that computer manufacturers have an edge  over 
crystal-ball makers: The advantages of having an actual explanation of  things 
and processes are self-evident.
This is a perfect summary of the intellectual claim of those who set out to 
 prove that God is dead and religion is false: Atheists have legitimate  
knowledge, and those who believe do not. This is the epistemological 
assumption  looming in the so-called “culture war” between the caricatures of 
godless  liberals and Bible-thumping conservatives in America: One group wields 
rational  argumentation and intellectual history as an indictment of God, 
while the other  looks to tradition and text as defenses against modernity’s 
encroachment on  religious life.
 
The problem is, the “culture war” is a false construct created by 
politicians  and public intellectuals, left and right. The state of faith in 
the 
world is  much grayer, much humbler, and much less divided than atheist 
academics and  preaching politicians claim. Especially in the U.S., social 
conservatives are  often called out in the media for reifying and inflaming 
this 
cultural divide:  The rhetoric of once and future White House hopefuls like 
_Rick  Santorum_ 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/santorum-presses-culture-wars-attack/2012/02/26/gIQAqSkicR_story.html)
 , _Sarah Palin_ 
(http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0908/13101.html) , and  _Bobby  Jindal_ 
(http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/jindal-to-warn-of-silent-war-on-religion-103501
_Page2.html)  reinforces an “us” and “them” distinction between those 
with faith  and those without. Knowing God helps them live and legislate in the 
“right” way,  they say. 
But vocal atheists reinforce this binary of Godly vs. godless, too—the  
argument is just not as obvious. Theirs is a subtle assertion: Believers aren’t 
 educated or thoughtful enough to debunk God, and if they only knew more,  
rational evidence would surely offset faith. 
*** 
To see what this attitude looks like in practice, it’s helpful to check out 
a  new book, _The Age  of Atheists_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/The-Age-Atheists-Sought-Since/dp/1476754314) , by the 
British historian Peter Watson. The 
book interprets  Friedrich Nietzsche’s famous 1882 declaration “God is dead” 
as a turning point  in intellectual history: These words were a call to 
action for all the artists,  writers, philosophers, and poets who tried to 
understand the world thereafter.  Over the course of 626 pages, readers are 
taken 
on a whirlwind tour through the  last 13 decades of European and American 
thought, touching on figures from  Martha Graham and Piet Mondrian to William 
James and Jürgen Habermas. Watson’s  version of Western intellectual 
history isn’t framed around economics or  politics or the dialectics of power, 
which is a pretty radical move in a field  filled with Marxists and 
Foucaultians and closeted Hegelians. Instead, he  narrates history to answer 
one of the 
most basic questions of human existence:  What’s out there, besides us? Is 
there such a thing as “God”? 
And this yields fascinating results. To his credit, Watson includes all 
kinds  of artists on his tour through godless thought. We learn that Isadora 
Duncan, a  mother of modern dance, confessed that “the seduction of Nietzsche’
s philosophy  ravished my being.” There are tales of W.B. Yeats attending a 
séance where “he  lost control of himself and beat his head on the table,” 
and Salman Rushdie  almost dying in a car accident. The novels of Henry 
James are deconstructed to  reveal religious themes, and the jazz musician 
Charlie “Bird” Parker is credited  with the Beat-era advice to “quit thinking!”
 
These anecdotes are artfully woven into a broader narrative about how 
secular  thought has evolved over time. Atheism hasn’t necessarily meant one 
thing  throughout history, Watson argues. But in listing the many ways people 
have  dealt with the “death of God,” he also seems to imply that atheism has 
covered  all intellectual bases. There’s no longer any reason to believe in 
God or  spirits or black magic, Watson appears to say—nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century  intellectuals have got it covered.
 
It’s difficult to summarize Watson’s story of atheism; after all, it took 
him  hundreds of pages and dozens of thinkers to tell it. But, roughly, it 
goes  something like this. Nietzsche wrote about the death of God at a time 
when many  thinkers were starting to recognize a shift in the way Western 
culture related  to Christianity, and throughout the West, his ideas gained 
traction. In Civil  War-era America, this meant the rise of “pragmatist” 
thinkers: People like Ralph  Waldo Emerson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and John 
Dewey 
all realized that “‘ideas  are not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, 
but are tools—like knives and  forks and microchips—that people devise to 
cope with the world,’” Watson writes,  quoting the Israeli academic Steven 
Aschheim. This idea was echoed by a group of  Europeans that included Charles 
Baudelaire, Paul Cézenne, and Edmund Husserl.  The latter’s brand of 
philosophy, called phenomenology, emphasized that a full  experience of life is 
“
not to be achieved suddenly through some ‘transcendent’  episode of a 
religious or therapeutic kind, but is more akin to hard work or  education,” 
Watson says. 

And then the world knew war. World War I “had certain Nietzschean 
overtones,  in that war was seen as the ultimate test of one’s heroic 
qualities,” 
Watson  writes—in other words, armed battle was a test of man’s strength and 
power in a  God-free world. The recklessness of flappers and Gatsby and the 
Jazz Age followed in a whirl of materialistic nihilism, and in philosophy, 
thinkers like  Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein called for the “
verifiability” of all  facts and language (God being non-verifiable, of 
course). 
In Germany, Nazism drew on Nietzsche and contemporary writers like Martin  
Heidegger for its philosophical heft. Amidst the chaos in Europe, Jean Paul  
Sartre and Albert Camus developed existentialism, which Sartre described as 
 such: 
Man is free; but his freedom does not look like the glorious  liberty of 
the Enlightenment; it is no longer the gift of God. Once again, man  stands 
alone in the universe, responsible for his condition, likely to remain  in a 
lowly state, but free to reach above the stars.
In post-war America, Watson says, pop psychology and self-help started  
providing people with frameworks for how to live. This had been foreshadowed  
half a century earlier in the writings of Freud, who was responsible, Watson  
says, for “the dominant shift in thought in modern times, which has seen a  
theological understanding of humankind replaced by a psychological one.” He 
 points to Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, and popular writers like Benjamin 
Spock  as psychologists who gave their craft new purpose: It became a way to 
help  people find value and meaning, presumably in the absence of 
traditional faith.  The Beatniks, for their part, abandoned the search for 
meaning 
altogether; they  looked to desire and spontaneity and improvisation to inspire 
their art. And  then there were the hippies who dropped acid and traded in 
free love, all in the  spirit of humanism, not godliness.
 
 
The story of the last few decades is a little hazier. Watson writes of  “
therapy culture” and the rejection thereof, along with the search for meaning  
in poetry (Hans-Georg Gadamer) and community (Richard Rorty and Ronald 
Dworkin).  People like E.O. Wilson, Daniel Dennett, and Richard Dawkins have 
popularized  today’s most recognizable brand of atheism, which relies on the 
argument that  evolution and biology disprove the existence of God. 
All of this leads to Watson’s conclusion: Religious belief is simply  
insufficient to explain the complexity of the modern world. It has led to  
violence and intolerance, yes, but more fundamentally, the idea of God—a  
unifying, singular lens for understanding everyday life—has been debunked, six  
ways 
to Sunday. Or, to mix metaphors: Modern people can pick their poison for  
killing God. But die He must. 
*** 
The problem with Watson’s argument is not that it lacks evidence—there’s a 
 lot of history crammed into his book. Rather, it’s that Watson assembles  
anecdotes into a scatterplot that undeniably points toward the impossibility 
of  God in the modern world, or so he claims. And this is where the 
intellectual  snobbery comes in: Watson assumes that because a group of smart, 
respected,  insightful people thought and felt their way out of believing in 
God, everyone  else should, too. Because intellectual history trends toward 
non-belief, human  history must, too. 
This is problematic for several reasons. For one thing, it suggests that  
believers are inherently less thoughtful than non-believers. Watson tells  
stories of famous thinkers and artists who have struggled to reconcile  
themselves to a godless world. And these are helpful, in that they offer 
insight  
into how dynamic, creative people have tried to live. But that doesn't mean 
the  average believer's search for meaning and understanding is any less 
rigorous or  valuable—it just ends with a different conclusion: that God 
exists. Watson  implies that full engagement with the project of being human in 
the modern world  leads to atheism, and that's just not true. 
We know it's not true because the vast majority of the world believes in 
God  or some sort higher power. Worldwide, religious belief and observance 
vary  widely by region. It’s tough to get a fully accurate global picture of 
faith in  God or a “higher power,” but the metric of religiosity serves as a 
helpful  proxy. Only 16 percent of the world’s population was not affiliated 
with a  particular faith as of 2010, although many of these people believe 
in God or a  spiritual deity, according to the _Pew  Research Center_ 
(http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-exec/) . More 
than 
three-fourths of the religiously unaffiliated  live in the Asia-Pacific 
region, with a majority (62 percent) living in China.  In other regions, the 
percentage of those who say they have no religious  affiliation are much 
smaller: 7.7 percent in Latin America; 3.2 percent in  sub-Saharan Africa; 0.6 
percent in the Middle East.
 
Arguably, Watson wasn’t writing for the whole world—he stuck to Western  
thinkers and artists. But even if we focus on Europe and North America, his  
implicit argument isn’t supported by statistics. Eighteen percent of 
Europeans  are religiously unaffiliated, but again, many of those people 
believe in 
God—30  percent of unaffiliated French people do, for example. And even 
though  Christianity is growing fastest in Latin America and sub-Saharan 
African, as of  2010, Europe was still home to a quarter of the world’s 
Christians—
the largest  population in the world. 

In America, which sociologists often describe as a uniquely religious 
country  compared with the rest of the Western world, a vast majority of people 
have  faith. According to Pew, 86 percent of Millennials, or people aged 
18-33, _say  they believe in God_ 
(http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/03/2014-03-07_generations-report-version-for-web.pdf)
 , and 94 percent of 
people 34 and older say the same.  It’s true that a growing group say they’re “
not certain” about this belief, and  it’s also true that _affiliation with  
formal religious institutions is declining._ 
(http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/)  But in terms of pure 
belief,  self-described 
atheists and agnostics are a small minority, making up only six  percent of the 
population. 
The Western world in particular is probably less religious than it was 150  
years ago, and the dynamics of belief and observance have certainly become 
more  complex—the growing number of people who are unaffiliated with a 
specific  religion is especially fascinating. But if the age of atheism started 
in  1882 as Watson claims, most people still haven't caught on. 
The Age of Atheists will likely stay confined to certain intellectual  
circles: The casual philosopher, the dogmatic non-believer, the coffee-table  
book collector. But insofar as its argument represents a broader pathology in  
contemporary conversations about belief, this book matters. Most people 
form  their beliefs and live their lives somewhere in the middle of the 
so-called  "culture divide" that outspoken atheists and believers shout across. 
The 
more  these shouters shout, the more public discourse veers away from the 
subtle  struggle of the average person's attempt to be  human.

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