The Atlantic
 
 
 
How The New Republic Lost Its  Place
The magazine is a victim of the  rightward shift in politics, not of 
changes in the media landscape. 
 
_Peter  Beinart_ (http://www.theatlantic.com/peter-beinart/)    |   Dec 8 
2014
 
 

 
The strangest thing about _the  calamity that last week struck my old 
magazine_ 
(http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2014/12/05/tnr_resignations_after_top_editors_franklin_foer_and_leon_wieseltier_quit.html)
 , The New 
Republic,  is this: It wasn’t about politics. When I was coming of age in the 
1980s and  1990s, TNR was known for its intramural ideological brawls. “There 
was a  singular lack of office politics,” _wrote  Hendrik Hertzberg_ 
(http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120159/hendrik-hertzberg-editing-new-republic-its-
most-contentious) , who edited the magazine for part of that time, in TNR’s 
 100th-anniversary issue. “What we had instead was politics politics”—
ongoing  feuds about the Cold War, race, the Middle East, and liberalism itself.
Yet the struggle that last week resulted in the ouster of its editor Frank  
Foer and literary editor Leon Wieseltier and the resignation of most of the 
 magazine’s senior staff wasn’t about political differences. To be sure, 
it  stemmed from a profound difference about how to practice journalism. But  
ideologically, owner Chris Hughes and the editorial staff largely saw  
eye-to-eye, something that was often not the case between 1974 and 2010, when  
Marty Peretz wrote most of the checks. 
Ironically, that may have been part of the problem. Under Marty, TNR’s role 
 as a liberal magazine that was frequently at odds with other liberals made 
it  ideologically contentious and ideologically distinct. Inside the 
magazine, these  heresies often sparked conflict. In retrospect, some of 
them—TNR’
s crusade for  military intervention in Bosnia—look laudable. Others—the 
magazine’s support for  war with Iraq and its decision to publish an excerpt 
of The Bell  Curve—look awful. But like TNR’s brand of liberalism or loathe 
it, it was  idiosyncratic. And that idiosyncrasy played a big role in Marty’
s willingness to  lose money on the magazine year after year. If TNR went 
down, there would still  be lots of great political journalism. But nothing 
would replace its peculiar  ideological voice. 
In recent years, that became less true because TNR became less 
ideologically  distinct. And I suspect that helps explain what happened last 
week. Chris 
Hughes  has more money than Marty ever did. But he was less willing to lose 
it because  he views TNR not as a collection of causes but as a media 
property. If you see  TNR as a crusading publication in the tradition of 
Partisan 
Review and  Dissent, it makes sense to subsidize its losses. If you see it 
as a  less successful BuzzFeed, it does not. 
The fact that in recent years TNR lost much of its ideological  
distinctiveness is not the fault of Frank Foer or the other talented editors 
and  
writers who followed him out the door. By the time Marty sold the magazine, the 
 
kind of contrarian liberalism it had espoused in previous decades was out of 
 date. Frank responded by eliminating unsigned editorials and trying to 
turn TNR  into “The New Yorker of Washington”—a magazine defined less by the  
singularity of its political vision than by the quality of its reporting and 
 writing. He executed that transition well. But the interesting question is 
why  he had to. What is it about today’s political climate that has made TNR
’s brand  of left-baiting liberalism obsolete? 
The key factor, I think, has been the shift of American public-policy  
discourse to the right. As mainstream Democrats have grown more centrist and  
mainstream Republicans have grown more radical, it has become virtually  
impossible to craft a provocative, credible form of liberalism that lies  
somewhere between the two. 
The clearest example lies in foreign policy. In the 1980s, TNR positioned  
itself between a Reagan administration whose anti-communism it considered  
dangerous and a Democratic Party it didn’t consider anti-communist enough. 
That search for a third way had deep historical roots. Although too young 
to  have witnessed the heyday of the Old Left in the 1930s, Marty still 
nursed a  grudge against those progressives who had apologized for Stalin. Long 
after  anyone except for a few octogenarian anti-anti-communists on the Upper 
West Side  still cared, TNR kept trying to prove that Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg had been  Soviet spies. 
TNR’s historical indignation toward the Old Left was nourished in the 1980s 
 by battles with the remnants of the New Left born during Vietnam. The 
magazine  avoided the crackpot revisionism of Norman Podhoretz and other 
neoconservatives  who insisted that, absent a failure of American will, Vietnam 
could have been  won. But neither did TNR believe Vietnam had discredited the 
Cold War. While  critical of Ronald Reagan, the magazine still believed he 
was right to seek ways  of pressuring the Soviet empire. That led TNR to 
editorialize against the  nuclear freeze and in favor of Reagan’s missile 
deployments in Western Europe  and aid to the Nicaraguan Contras—all stances 
that 
placed it at odds with most  of the intellectual left, and with some of the 
magazine’s own writers. 
Even when the Cold War ended, TNR’s battle with the left over the legacy of 
 Vietnam continued. In 1990, most respectable liberals, and most Democratic 
 politicians, opposed the Gulf War. TNR, by contrast, joined with George 
H.W.  Bush and the GOP to support it. That decision owed something to the 
magazine’s  passionate (or obsessive, depending on your perspective) support 
for 
Israel. But  TNR’s hawkishness was about more than Zion. In the mid-1990s, 
when many liberals  saw the Balkans as another Vietnam, TNR was maniacal—and 
eloquent—in its support  for humanitarian war there. As in the Reagan era, 
TNR’s hawkishness did not make  it a clone of the right. (Many conservatives 
opposed the interventions in Bosnia  and Kosovo, and even those who 
supported them offered national-interest  rationales rather than humanitarian 
ones.) But in insisting that there were  foreign enemies—be they Leonid 
Brezhnev 
or Slobodan Milosevic—who posed a  greater threat to global decency than did 
the 101st Airborne, TNR was doffing  its cap to a core argument of the 
American right. 

The problem came under George W. Bush. After 9/11, TNR again positioned  
itself between a hawkish Republican president and his liberal opponents, as it 
 had during the 1980s. But because in the intervening decades the entire 
terms of  foreign-policy debate had grown much more hawkish, the analogy 
proved horribly  misguided. By 2003, the magazine’s image of Democrats as 
Vietnam-scarred  pseudo-pacifists was long out of date. The Gulf War and the 
Balkan 
interventions  had birthed a Democratic foreign-policy class far more 
comfortable with the  morality of war, and far more fearful of the political 
costs of opposing it. For  their part, George W. Bush and Dick Cheney were 
proposing an invasion far  riskier than anything Reagan or George H.W. Bush had 
contemplated. Attacking  Democrats as insufficiently interventionist may have 
made TNR creative and vital  in the 1980s and 1990s, when the kinds of 
militarily interventions being  proposed were more modest. But by 2003, during 
the Iraq debate, it made the  magazine reckless. (My book, _The  Icarus 
Syndrome_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/The-Icarus-Syndrome-History-American/dp/B00D57J6JG) , 
which I wrote in part to expiate my guilt for having  supported the 
Iraq War as TNR’s editor, discusses this in detail). 
On foreign policy, TNR never recovered from Iraq, which is a good thing.  
Unlike the Bill Kristol and John McCain types who pretended that the “success”
  of the Iraq surge vindicated the initial decision to invade, TNR was 
genuinely  changed by the war. It stopped defining itself as the liberal 
magazine that  urged other liberals to be more pro-war. But since jettisoning 
that  
foreign-policy identity, TNR has not found a new one. On Russia, TNR—_led 
by Julia  Ioffe_ (http://www.newrepublic.com/authors/julia-ioffe) —took a 
strongly anti-Putin line. On Syria, Leon Wieseltier advocated  humanitarian 
intervention, as he had in the Balkans. But on many of the key  debates of the 
Obama era—troop withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan, drone  attacks, Iran—
TNR took no clear position at all. Even the magazine’s traditional  
hawkishness on Israel receded. 
By the Obama era, The Nation—which for decades had critiqued  Democrats for 
being insufficiently dovish—retained a distinct foreign-policy  voice. TNR—
which had made its name critiquing Democrats for being insufficiently  
hawkish—no longer did. 
Over the same period, TNR’s domestic-policy voice also grew less distinct. 
In  the 1980s and 1990s, while the magazine was pushing Democrats to the 
right on  foreign policy, it was doing something similar on domestic issues: 
demanding  that they reform welfare, use markets rather than government 
bureaucracy to  solve social problems and get tougher on crime. 
In the era of Walter Mondale, this felt edgy. But during the 1990s—for good 
 and for ill—TNR’s New Democratic agenda triumphed. Clinton eliminated the 
budget  deficit, reformed welfare, deregulated the financial-services 
industry and,  along with governors across the country, locked vast numbers of 
people up.  Meanwhile, a new generation of conservative radicals led by Newt 
Gingrich began  challenging the welfare state in ways Reagan had never dared. 
By 2009, Gingrich  and his heirs were calling Obama a socialist for 
proposing a version of  health-care reform that many leading Republicans had 
once 
embraced. 
As the domestic-policy debate—like the foreign-policy debate—shifted 
right,  it eliminated the need for a liberal magazine that criticized other 
liberals for  being too far left. It had been one thing to triangulate between 
Ted Kennedy and  Bob Dole. It was quite another to triangulate between Obama 
and Ted Cruz. In  2011, the _Democratic  Leadership Council_ 
(http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/06/how-to-save-the-gop/309306/)
 , TNR’s 
old ally in pushing Democrats to the center,  closed its doors because its 
agenda had been largely achieved. For its part, TNR  stopped positioning itself 
to the right of the Democratic mainstream and threw  itself into the battle 
against conservative radicalism. Led by exceptional  policy analysts like 
_Jonathan Cohn_ (http://www.newrepublic.com/authors/jonathan-cohn)  and _Noam 
Scheiber_ (http://www.newrepublic.com/authors/noam-scheiber) , it  played 
that role well. But TNR no longer occupied a distinctive ideological  niche. 
On the major domestic-policy battles of recent years, TNR’s perspective  was 
virtually identical to the one espoused by Ezra Klein, The New York  Times, 
and MSNBC. That’s not a criticism. Had the magazine tried to remain  a 
half-step to the Democratic Party’s right in an era when the entire policy  
debate had shifted right, it would have repeated the mistake it made on  Iraq. 
Different political eras create openings for different kinds of arguments.  
The role TNR played in the Reagan era—when it demanded that liberals 
grapple  more seriously with insights from the political right—is now being 
played 
by  reform conservatives like _David  Frum_ 
(http://www.theatlantic.com/david-frum/) , _Reihan Salam_ 
(http://www.theatlantic.com/reihan-salam/) ,  and 
Yuval Levin, who are demanding that their side grapple with insights from  
the political left. 
In fact, in this era of wage stagnation, crumbling infrastructure, and  
mind-numbing inequality, even today’s Democratic Party could use an 
intellectual  challenge from the left. Just as TNR helped develop the centrist 
critique 
of the  Democratic Party that Bill Clinton ran on in 1992, there’s a need 
for writers  able to help develop the progressive critique of the Democratic 
Party on which  Elizabeth Warren, or someone else, can one day run. That 
critique could include  a challenge to the bipartisan hawkishness that a decade 
after Iraq still  permeates Beltway discourse. It’s remarkable how rarely 
prominent liberals argue  that America can deter a nuclear Iran, or that ISIS 
isn’t a grave threat. If TNR  made itself vital in the 1980s and 1990s by 
standing to the right of the  Democratic Party elite, the open and 
interesting space today is to that elite’s  left. 
Whoever fills these open spaces with a contentious, crusading journalism 
will  be The New Republic’s true  heir.

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