Airtight theory of social evolution that demolishes all political  
ideologies
 
 
This model of social evolution has been around for more than 30 years
but here it is, from under our noses, and if there is even one small  flaw
in it I'd like to know what it is.
 
So much for Marxism, Fascism,  free market Capitalism, Libertarianism, 
Anarchism, Liberalism, Conservatism, and whatever else you make think  of.  
 
HOWEVER, and here is an irony that forever rises to the surface when
thinking about political partisans of any stripe, for like just about  
everyone
of either Right or Left, or "other," Andrew Schmookler  -an  independent 
minded
Democrat- can only (or mostly) see the evil on the Right and is  horribly
unable to see the (even worse) evil on the Left.
 
Radical Centrists do not ignore the evils of either Right and Left  even 
if, from
one era to the next, one faction may not be as bad as the other.  However,
we need a new and realistic understanding of human nature, which is
Schmookler's great strength. Hence the next irony, his theory needs  to
be applied full force to the Left for when it is, for this and other  
reasons,
the Left  -its assumptions and values as a system-  will  collapse.
Just as, maybe not as badly but nonetheless, so will the Right
and square-peg-in-round-hole philosophies like Libertarianism
 
 
"Schmookler lives in the Shenandoah Mountains of Virginia with his wife,  
April Moore. They have three children." 
You've got to admit that, about this, he is one helluva smart man. Ever 
seen  the Shenandoah Valley? I have, many times, what an American paradise, 
there is  nothing like it anywhere else.
 
 
Looking for parables you never know what you will find.
 
 
 
 
Billy
 
 
---------------------------------
 
 


_About In Context_ (http://www.context.org/iclib/)  / _Governance_ 
(http://www.context.org/iclib/ic07/)   
 
 
The Parable Of The Tribes
A new look at how the history of civilization
may have  been largely shaped
by the raw struggle for power between societies
By Andrew Schmookler
One of the articles in _Governance  (IC#7)_ 
(http://www.context.org/iclib/ic07/) 
Originally published in Autumn 1984 on  page 5
_Copyright (c)1984, 1997 by  Context Institute_ 
(http://www.context.org/about/permissions/) 
 
The following article is based on excerpts from the first part of a major  
new book (same title and author, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984,  400pp, $19.95) that argues that the history of civilization has been 
largely  shaped by the way that, as a system, civilization has no mechanisms 
for  restraining the raw struggle for power between societies. Schmookler 
brings a  remarkable depth of both scholarship and insight to this issue, 
tracing (in the  latter parts of the book) the myriad insidious ways that this 
struggle has  thwarted human choice. He makes it clear that the problems we 
face now, as we  try to come to grips with our planetary interconnectedness, 
can’t simply be  blamed on personalities or ideologies, but are rooted in 
the fundamental  structure of 5000 years of international anarchy. The problem 
of power that he  raises and explores is a fundamental challenge for 
governance (at many levels)  that we must deal with somehow if we are to have 
any 
hope of creating a humane  sustainable culture as a successor to the 
darkness we call civilization. If you  want to deepen your understanding of the 
full challenge we face, you’ll find the  book a mind-stretcher and a sobering 
treat. Reprinted with permission. 

The Dynamics of History 
THE COMMONSENSE THEORY of social evolution offers a benign and reasonable  
view of human affairs. According to this image, people are continually 
hunting  for ways to better their condition. (One immediately recognizes the 
Economic Man  of capitalist theory.) The alternatives are readily generated by 
this pursuit of  improvement. The longer the hunt goes on, the more 
alternatives are discovered.  And, since man is an inventive as well as 
exploratory 
creature, what is  discovered in the world is increasingly supplemented by 
what people have  created. With the passage of time, therefore, more and more 
cultural  alternatives become available for all aspects of our cultural 
business – how and  what to produce, how to govern ourselves, what to think, 
how 
to travel, play,  make music, and so on. The process of selection is done 
by people. The criterion  for selection? People choose what they believe will 
best meet their needs,  replacing old cultural forms when new and better 
ones become available. Again,  the resonance with economic theory is striking: 
social evolution is the product  of choices made in the marketplace of 
cultural possibilities. 
The commonsense theory of selection by human choice leads one to expect a  
continuous betterment of the human condition. For a story of improvement,  
however, the history of civilization makes rather dismal reading, and as the  
culmination of ten thousand years of progress the twentieth century is 
deeply  disappointing. It is not simply that history is strewn with regrettable 
events,  with accidents leaving carnage and wreckage on the thoroughfare 
bound for  Progress. The road itself has been treacherous. If the stupendous 
historical  transformation in the structure of human life has been the result 
of people  choosing what they believe will best satisfy their needs, why 
have not human  needs been better met? 
The idea of history as progress is itself of relatively recent origin. And  
those who endorse that idea are usually looking only at relatively recent  
history for support. But even the advances of modern civilization have their 
 nightmarish side, escalating as they have the destructive capacities of  
civilization. Looking at history as a whole, it is far from clear that the 
main  "advances" of civilized societies have consistently improved the human  
condition. In earlier eras of history, the cutting edge of civilization’s  
progress led from freedom into bondage for the common person. The great  
monuments of the ancient world were built with the sweat of slaves whose  
civilized ancestors had not known the oppressor’s whip. After four thousand  
years 
the pyramids of Egypt can still stand as an emblem of the problem of  
civilization, that its achievements are more reliably impressive than  benign. 
The idea of progress has relied in another way on the lack of a clear 
vision  of the distant past. The life of primitive peoples is widely assumed to 
have  been nasty, brutish, and short. The step from the "savage" state to the 
 "civilized" is consequently assumed to have been straight up. 
Increasingly,  however, as anthropologists have taken a closer and less 
ethnocentric 
look at  hunter-gatherers, the evidence has shown that primitive life was not 
so bad. 
Among hunting-and-gathering bands, the burden of labor is comparatively  
small, leaving more time than most civilized people have known for play, 
music,  dance. The politics of these small societies are largely free of 
coercion 
and  inequality. Relationships are close and enduring. Primitives enjoy a 
wholeness  and freedom in their lives which many civilized peoples may well 
envy. This new  view of our starting point demands a new look at the entire 
course. 
The Struggle For Power 
In his classic, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes describes what he calls  "the 
state of nature" as an anarchic situation in which all are compelled, for  
their 
very survival, to engage in a ceaseless struggle for power. About this  
"war of all against all," two important points should be made: that Hobbes’s  
vision of the dangers of anarchy captured an important dimension of the human 
 condition, and that to call that condition "the state of nature" is a 
remarkable  misnomer. 
In nature, all pursue survival for themselves and their kind. But they can 
do  so only within biologically evolved limits. The living order of nature, 
though  it has no ruler, is not in the least anarchic. Each pursues a kind 
of self-  interest, each is a law unto itself, but the separate interests and 
laws have  been formed over aeons of selection to form part of a tightly 
ordered harmonious  system. Although the state of nature involves struggle, 
the struggle is part of  an order. Each component of the living system has a 
defined place out of which  no ambition can extricate it. Hunting- gathering 
societies were to a very great  extent likewise contained by natural limits. 
With the rise of civilization, the limits fall away. The natural  
self-interest and pursuit of survival remain, but they are no longer governed 
by  any 
order. The new civilized forms of society, with more complex social and  
political structures, created the new possibility of indefinite social  
expansion: more and more people organized over more and more territory. All  
other 
forms of life had always found inevitable limits placed upon their growth  
by scarcity and consequent death. But civilized society was developing the  
unprecedented capacity for unlimited growth as an entity. (The limitlessness 
of  this possibility does not emerge fully at the outset, but rather 
becomes  progressively more realized over the course of history as people 
invent 
methods  of transportation, communication, and governance which extend the 
range within  which coherence and order can be maintained.) Out of the living 
order there  emerged a living entity with no defined place. 
In a finite world, societies all seeking to escape death- dealing scarcity  
through expansion will inevitably come to confront each other. Civilized  
societies, therefore, though lacking inherent limitations to their growth, do 
 encounter new external limits – in the form of one another. Because human 
beings  (like other living creatures) have "excess reproductive capacity," 
meaning that  human numbers tend to increase indefinitely unless a high 
proportion of the  population dies prematurely, each civilized society faces an 
unpleasant choice.  If an expanding society willingly stops where its growth 
would infringe upon  neighboring societies, it allows death to catch up and 
overtake its population.  If it goes beyond those limits, it commits 
aggression. With no natural order or  overarching power to prevent it, some 
will 
surely choose to take what belongs to  their neighbors rather than to accept 
the limits that are compulsory for every  other form of life. 
In such circumstances, a Hobbesian struggle for power among societies 
becomes  inevitable. We see that what is freedom from the point of view of each 
 
single unit is anarchy in an ungoverned system of those units. A freedom 
unknown in nature is cruelly transmuted into an equally unnatural  state of 
anarchy, with its terrors and its destructive war of all against  all. 
As people stepped across the threshold into civilization, they  
inadvertently stumbled into a chaos that had never before existed. The 
relations  among 
societies were uncontrolled and virtually uncontrollable. Such an  
ungoverned system imposes unchosen necessities: civilized people were compelled 
 to 
enter a struggle for power. 
The meaning of "power," a concept central to this entire work, needs to be  
explored. Power may be defined as the capacity to achieve one’s will 
against the  will of another. The exercise of power thus infringes upon the 
exercise of  choice, for to be the object of another’s power is to have his 
choice 
 substituted for one’s own. Power becomes important where two actors (or 
more)  would choose the same thing but cannot have it; power becomes important 
when the  obstacles to the achievement of one’s will come from the will of 
others. Thus as  the expanding capacities of human societies created an 
overlap in the range of  their grasp and desire, the intersocietal struggle for 
power arose. 
But the new unavoidability of this struggle is but the first and smaller 
step  in the transmutation of the apparent freedom of civilized peoples into 
bondage  to the necessities of power. 
The Parable 
The new human freedom made striving for expansion and power possible. Such  
freedom, when multiplied, creates anarchy. The anarchy among civilized 
societies  meant that the play of power in the system was uncontrollable. In an 
anarchic  situation like that, no one can choose that the struggle for power 
shall cease.  But there is one more element in the picture: no one is free 
to choose  peace, but anyone can impose upon all the necessity for power. 
This is the  lesson of the parable of the tribes. 
Imagine a group of tribes living within reach of one another. If all choose 
 the way of peace, then all may live in peace. But what if all but one 
choose  peace, and that one is ambitious for expansion and conquest? What can 
happen to  the others when confronted by an ambitious and potent neighbor? 
Perhaps one  tribe is attacked and defeated, its people destroyed and its lands 
seized for  the use of the victors. Another is defeated, but this one is 
not exterminated;  rather, it is subjugated and transformed to serve the 
conqueror. A third seeking  to avoid such disaster flees from the area into 
some 
inaccessible (and  undesirable) place, and its former homeland becomes part 
of the growing empire  of the power-seeking tribe. Let us suppose that 
others observing these  developments decide to defend themselves in order to 
preserve themselves and  their autonomy. But the irony is that successful 
defense against a  power-maximizing aggressor requires a society to become more 
like the society  that threatens it. Power can be stopped only by power, and 
if the threatening  society has discovered ways to magnify its power through 
innovations in  organization or technology (or whatever), the defensive 
society will have to  transform itself into something more like its foe in 
order 
to resist the  external force. 
I have just outlined four possible outcomes for the threatened tribes:  
destruction, absorption and transformation, withdrawal, and imitation. In  
every one of these outcomes the ways of power are spread throughout the system. 
This is the parable of the tribes. 
This parable is a theory of social evolution which shows that power is like 
a  contaminant, a disease, which once introduced will gradually yet 
inexorably  become universal in the system of competing societies. More 
important 
than the  inevitability of the struggle for power is the profound social 
evolutionary  consequence of that struggle once it begins. A selection for 
power 
 among civilized societies is inevitable. If anarchy assured that power  
among civilized societies could not be governed, the selection for power  
signified that increasingly the ways of power would govern the destiny of  
mankind. This is the new evolutionary principle that came into the world with  
civilization. Here is the social evolutionary black hole that we have sought 
as  an explanation of the harmful warp in the course of civilization’s  
development. 
Power Versus Choice In Social Evolution 
The parable of the tribes provides a perspective on social evolution quite  
different from the commonsense view. Even without rewriting history, the 
parable  of the tribes puts it in a wholly new light. 
The Question of Choice The commonsense model emphasizes the  role of free 
human choice: social evolution is directed by a benign process of  selection 
in which people choose what they want from among the cultural  alternatives. 
Viewed from the perspective of the parable of the tribes, human  destiny is 
no longer governed by free human choice. At the heart of the loss of  
choice is not that some could impose their will upon others, but that the whole 
 
reign of power came unbidden by anyone to dominate human life. People  
inadvertently stumbled into a struggle for power beyond their ability to avoid  
or to stop. This struggle generated a selective process, also beyond human  
control, which molded change in a direction that was inevitable – toward 
power  maximization in human societies. 
The parable of the tribes is not, however, rigidly deterministic. It does 
not  maintain that specific events are preordained. Even major developments 
can arise  owing to relatively fortuitous circumstances. The history of a 
continent may be  altered by a burst of human creativity, a people’s destiny 
may hinge on the  wisdom or folly of its leaders, the texture of a culture may 
bear for ages the  imprint of some charismatic visionary. What the parable 
of the tribes does  assert is that once mankind had begun the process of 
developing civilization,  the overall direction of its evolution was 
inevitable. This is  suggested by the way civilization developed in those 
regions of 
the Old and New  worlds where it arose more or less independently: their 
courses show significant  parallels. People can act freely and intelligently, 
but uncontrolled  circumstances determine the situation in which they must act 
and mold the  evolution of their systems 
Thus we find that the major trends in the transformation of human society  
have had the effect of increasing competitive power. This effect in itself 
does  not prove that the selection for power has been the cause of these 
trends,  especially since many of these transformations also increase a society’
s ability  to achieve goals outside the realm of competition. A major 
purpose of my work is  to make compelling the case for the contention of the 
parable of the tribes that  the reign of power has been a significant factor in 
dictating the principal  trends of the social evolution. 
History-makers People do make history. Historical "forces"  can be 
expressed only in the doings of flesh-and- blood human beings. In the  
commonsense 
view of social evolution, history is shaped by "the people" in  general. To 
recognize that some people play a large historical role and that  others play 
almost no role at all still falls within the realm of common sense.  This 
inequality does not challenge the essentially democratic view of history as  
governed by human choices if the history makers are seen as representative 
of  humanity. They can be representative if, like George Washington, they are 
first  in the hearts of their countrymen, or if, like Bach or Edison, they 
have an  extraordinary ability to create what the people want. 
The parable of the tribes, however, sees the history makers as an  
unrepresentative lot. To the extent that social evolution is governed by the  
selection for power, it is the power maximizers who play the important role in  
the drama of history. This group is selected for its starring role not by the  
human cast as a whole but by impersonal and ungoverned forces. They are  
therefore not representative in the democratic sense. Nor in the Gallup Poll  
sense, for they are selected because of how they are different from the 
other  actors. They are different in their capacity to get and to wield power. 
Finally,  they are not representative in the sense of the hero who carries 
his community’s  banner and fulfills his community’s aspirations, for the 
power wielders of  history have often been the conquerors, the destroyers, the 
oppressors of their  fellow human beings. Though we must see history as a 
drama in which the main  actors are the powerful and aggressive, we should not 
slip into seeing them as  the villains, for it is not the actors who set 
the stage or who govern the  thrust of the plot. 
The category of "power maximizers" embraces a couple of different kinds of  
actors in the human drama. Most especially, it includes entire sovereign 
social  entities (like the imperialistic tribes of the parable) who impinge 
upon other,  previously autonomous societies. The parable of the tribes 
focuses primarily on  the intersocietal system because that system forms the 
comprehensive context for  human action, but more importantly because in that 
system anarchy has been most  complete and least curable. Anarchy is at the 
core of the problem of power,  making struggle inevitable and allowing the ways 
of power to spread uncontrolled  throughout the whole like a contaminant. 
Thus, nowhere has power had so free and  decisive a reign as in that arena of 
sovereign actors where, by definition,  there is no power to hold all in 
awe. 
Yet the problem of power exists in some form also within societies; for 
even  though in one sense societies are governed, in another more profound 
sense they  are usually subject to anarchy. The formation of government and the 
 
establishment of the rule of law can be – and usually have been in large 
measure  – the embodiment of the rule of raw power rather than a restraint 
upon it. The  search for a fuller understanding of the problem of power in 
social evolution  leads therefore to an intrasocietal analogue of the parable 
of 
the  tribes. And the category of history’s power maximizers includes those 
groups  (like the feudal class) and individuals (like Stalin) who are 
successful in  competing for power within a society’s boundaries. Again, it is 
those  distinguished by their capacity to grasp and wield power who gain the 
means to  shape the whole (social) system according to their ways and their 
vision. And  again, the history makers are cast in their roles not by the 
people affected but  by an unchosen selective process; and generally, they are 
not those whom mankind  would choose to guide its destiny. 
The Spread of Cultural Innovations Both the commonsense view  and the 
parable of the tribes would predict that innovations tend to spread from  their 
place of origin. Both would predict an erosion of cultural diversity among  
societies, but the two theories view this process of cultural homogenization  
differently. If innovations are seen as "improvements," naturally they will 
 spread. When people in more "backward" areas learn of better ways of 
meeting  their needs, they will adopt them. Cultural diversity is thus 
diminished 
by a  process of diffusion. In the perspective of the parable of the 
tribes, the  historic trend toward cultural homogeneity is decreed by the reign 
of 
power.  Whether or not a cultural innovation spreads throughout the system 
of  interacting societies depends not so much on its ability to enhance the 
quality  of human life as on its capacity to increase the competitive power 
of those who  adopt it. The ways of power inevitably become universal. While 
the diffusion  model represents cultural homogenization as the result of 
free human choice, the  parable of the tribes stresses the role of compulsion: 
the conqueror spreads his  ways either directly or by compelling others to 
imitate him in self-  defense. 
Civilization and Human Needs If civilization were governed  by human 
choice, we would expect it to be fairly well designed for the  fulfillment of 
human needs. This expectation led us earlier to the Rube Goldberg  problem, the 
ludicrous disproportion between the gargantuan apparatus of  civilization 
and the disappointing benefit in human terms. The parable of the  tribes 
sweeps aside this dilemma. If the selection for power, and not choice,  has 
governed the evolving shape of civilized society, there is no reason to  expect 
the design to correspond with the needs of human beings. According to the  
parable of the tribes, civilized peoples have been compelled to live in  
societies organized for the maximization of competitive power. People become 
the  
servants of their evolving systems, rather than civilized society being the 
 instrument of its members. 
Not that the selection for power systematically selects what is injurious 
to  people. The process is not hostile to human welfare, simply indifferent. 
Many  things that serve power serve people as well, such as a degree of 
social order  and the provision of adequate nutrition to keep people 
functioning. (As this  implies, there are a great many roads to hell that the 
need for 
social power  helps close off.) But the parable of the tribes suggests that 
the service to  people of such power-enhancing attributes of society may be 
entirely incidental  to their raison d’etre. Those of us who now enjoy 
affluence and freedom  as well as power are predisposed to believe that benign 
forces shape our  destiny. But to the extent that our blessings are incidental 
by-products of the  strategy for power at this point in the evolution of 
civilization, our optimism  may be ill-founded. If the forces that now favor 
us are the same as those that  earlier condemned masses of people to tyranny 
and bondage, the future  requirements of power maximization may compel 
mankind not toward the heavenly  utopia to which we aspire but toward the 
hellish 
dystopias that some like Orwell  and Huxley have envisioned. Our well-being 
may prove to be less like that of the  squire who feeds himself well off 
the land that he rules than like that of the  dairy cow who, though pampered 
and well fed, is not served but exploited by the  system in which she lives. 
The bottom line that governs her fate is not her own  calculation; when she 
is worth more for meat than for milk, off she goes to the  slaughterhouse. 
Power and Choice Wisdom is often less a matter of choosing a  particular 
view as the truth than of combining different truths in a balanced  way. So it 
is with the parable of the tribes and the commonsense view of social  
evolution. The selection for power does govern a good deal of the evolution of  
civilization, but people also shape their destiny by their choices. The power 
 wielders are, to be sure, prominent in the human drama, but there are 
creative  and charismatic figures (Shakespeare, Buddha) whom we choose to give 
a 
very  different kind of power to shape our experience. The ways of power 
may spread by  compulsion, but antibiotics, fine silks, and the idea of 
liberty can diffuse  throughout the world by human choice. Thus, while human 
well-being may be  incidental to one major social- evolutionary force, there is 
room for human  aspiration to dictate a part of the story. I therefore argue 
not that the  parable of the tribes has been the sole force directing the 
evolution of  civilization but only that it has been an extremely important 
one. 
The evolution of civilization can be seen as dialectic between the 
systematic  selection for power and the human striving for a humane world, 
between 
the  necessities imposed upon humankind regardless of their wishes and their 
efforts  to be able to choose the cultural environment in which they will  
live.


 

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