from the site:
 
Religion and Ethics
 
 
 
Loving the Enemy: Christianity and the Enlightenment

 
 
Dominic Erdozain 
ABC Religion and Ethics 16 May 2016 
 
 
 
_Dominic  Erdozain_ (https://twitter.com/domerdozain)  is a research fellow 
at King's College, London, and the author of  _The  Soul of Doubt: The 
Religious Roots of Unbelief from Luther to Marx_ 
(https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-soul-of-doubt-9780199844616?cc=au&lang=en&;)
 . 
Christians are taught to despise the Enlightenment. It is hard to find a  
theologian with a good word for this era of rational presumption, glistening  
certitude and powdered wiggery. 
The Enlightenment is the sin of the modern, the chimera of crass  autonomy. 
Popular writers have been no kinder. Enter the world of knockdown 
apologetics  and suspicion turns to contempt. "The Great Secular 
Enlightenment," 
growls one  authority, is what gave us Richard Dawkins. 
The picture is sharpened by a secular literature that celebrates the  
Enlightenment as a brave emancipation from theological tutelage: a defiant  
obituary for an expired God. 
The consensus is powerful but mistaken. The real Enlightenment was as  
religious as anything that came before it - a time of spiritual awakening as  
well as criticism and doubt. Indeed, faith and doubt were two sides of the 
same  coin. 
To enter the Enlightenment by means of its authors, not its curators, is to 
 be knocked sideways. From Baruch Spinoza, in the seventeenth century, to 
Mary  Wollstonecraft, writing in the shadow of the French Revolution, the  
Enlightenment radiated an energy and an aggression that bears little 
resemblance  to the later stereotype of self-puffing intellectualism. 
Nor was the quarrel purely ethical. The "supreme, sacred self-confidence"  
that Thomas Carlyle identified in the Quaker, George Fox, was constantly  
apparent in thinkers we have been taught to regard as secular. Like the 
poised,  jail-ready Fox, many of the era's A-list insurgents ascribed their 
ferocity of  will to a certain knowledge of God. Spinoza was the supreme 
example. 
Baruch Spinoza: a metaphysics of mercy
Ejected from the Jewish community in 1656 for heresies unknown, Spinoza 
lived  and moved in philosophical circles that included a group of radical 
Protestants,  known as "Collegiants." Identifying "reason" with the "inner 
light" of  conscience, the Collegiants forged a spiritual rationalism that 
remained  evangelical, conversionist and fiercely Christological. The true 
Christ 
was  known within. 
When a group of English Quakers descended on Amsterdam, they identified the 
 Collegiants as kindred spirits and they seem to have enlisted Spinoza to  
translate two of their tracts, written for the conversion of the Jews. The  
mysterious figure, "Cast out" of the synagogue "because he owneth no other  
teacher but the light," has been painstakingly identified as Spinoza, who 
also  seems to have collaborated with Samuel Fisher, a Quaker scholar, in 
developing  his biblical criticism. Indeed, it was Fisher who commissioned the 
_translations_ (http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/12333860?q&versionId=14558054) . 
Like Fisher, and with many of the same examples, Spinoza urged that the  
"letter" of Scripture was nothing without the "spirit" - just as the "outward" 
 ministries of religion were nothing without an energizing, "inward" 
knowledge of  God. This was the meaning of enlightenment - a concept that found 
a  
proof text in an endlessly quoted verse from John's gospel, where the 
"light" of  Christ is described as "enlighten[ing] everyone who comes into the 
world." 
In the semi-autobiographical _Short Treatise on  God, Man and His 
Well-being_ (https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft) , Spinoza 
describes the liberating power of  spiritual illumination. It is, he urges, the 
highest form of knowledge,  providing strength and security from the 
destructive "passions" of "sadness,"  "despair" and "fear." Defending his right 
as a 
philosopher "to speak of our Love  of God," Spinoza describes the effect of 
divine communion on a troubled soul:  "When we become aware of these 
effects, we can truly say that we have been born  again." This love of God, he 
explains, is as different from ordinary love "as  the incorporeal is from the 
corporeal, the spirit from the flesh." "This," he  continues, "may the more 
rightly and truly be called Rebirth, because, as we  shall show, an eternal 
and immutable constancy comes only from this Love and  Union." 
Spinoza has been called many things: an atheist, a pantheist, "the Moses of 
 modern freethinkers and materialists." But his challenge to a theology of 
terror  and scorching transcendence was rooted in spiritual experience. And 
it was his  belief in the universal availability of such experience that 
sustained his  immanentist worldview. His vision of a God at work in every 
fibre of nature was  anchored not to science, but to an abiding conviction that 
God "cares for all."  It was a metaphysics of mercy. 
Spinoza's shimmering retort to those who claimed that God performs special  
providences was that God "is supremely just and merciful." Spinoza did not 
deny  the possibility of miracles, but he denied that God suspends his own 
laws for a  chosen few. The single idea that offended him, in Jewish and 
Christian thought,  was the notion of a partial, exclusive deity, parcelling 
out 
favours to an  elect. It was this "superstition" - elevated to a science by 
the Dutch Reformed  Church - that he set out to destroy. 
His authority for such a conviction, besides his own spiritual experience,  
was the biblical concept of a "new covenant," offered to all. It was, he  
maintained, "unthinkable that it has been promised only to pious Jews." 
Spinoza  summarized his stance with defiant, ponderous repetition: 
"Paul concludes that God is the God of all nations, that  is, God is 
equally well-disposed to all, and all men are  equally under law and sin, and 
that 
is why God sent his Christ to all  nations, to free all men equally from 
the servitude of the  law."
Indeed, he adds: "Paul teaches exactly what we want to affirm." 
But more than Paul, and the frequently quoted John, Spinoza came back to  
Christ as the model of inward, intuitive knowledge: the wisdom that was  
available to all but acquired by so few. He cited the Sermon on the Mount as an 
 
essay in the superiority of inward truth to leaden precept. Christ 
sometimes  spoke the old language of obligation and duty, Spinoza admitted, but 
his 
aim was  to transcend it. He was no lecturer or princely "legislator." For 
it was "less  external actions that he sought to correct than people's 
minds." Christ was,  Spinoza urged, "the supreme philosopher." 
Spinoza situated the contrast between philosophy and rule-bound religion in 
 the shift from Mosaic "law" to Christian freedom. As he urged in a passage 
that  captures the mystical tenor of this early Enlightenment: 
"For the love of God is not obedience but a virtue necessarily  present in 
someone who rightly knows God ... [For] divine commandments seem to  us like 
decrees or enactments only so long as we are ignorant of their cause.  Once 
we know this, they immediately cease to be edicts and we accept them as  
eternal truths, not as decrees, that is, obedience immediately turns into love 
 which arises from true knowledge as inevitably as light emanates from the  
sun."
Spinoza, the Collegiants and the English Quakers together demonstrate that  
the fiercest solvent of religious authority was spiritual experience. The 
trump  card against theologies of fear, terror and selective redemption was a 
theology  of love. And the source of all heresies was the Bible itself - 
above all the New  Testament's piercing contrast between "the spirit" and "the 
flesh." Churches  were vulnerable when they could be identified with the 
latter - above all  through violence, persecution and various forms of 
coercion. 
The critique of established religion was not that it was spiritual, in a  
newly secular age: the problem was that it was seen as secular, a "cover" for 
 politics. The idea outlived Spinoza. 
Pierre Bayle: a theological escape from theology
If the tendency of Spinoza's world was to blend intellect and soul, reason  
and the inner light, the eighteenth-century impulse was to divide. Here, 
the  mood was sceptical rather than constructive, and the "enchanted castles" 
of a  Descartes or a Spinoza were suddenly as suspect as orthodoxy itself. 
In criticism and practical philosophy, the burden of proof passed to  
conscience. "Metaphysics," as Voltaire insisted, had to be reduced "to  
morality." Yet to explore this morality is once again to confront an intensity  
of 
Christian conviction. 
Pierre Bayle, an exile from religious persecution, set the tone with a  
caustic takedown of Augustine, and the Augustinian doctrine of coercion, in his 
 Philosophical Commentary of 1695. If "philosophy," for Spinoza,  sometimes 
amounted to an erudite mysticism, here it surfaced as a Bible study, a  
thunderous Protestant sermon wresting Scripture from the hands of an errant  
priest. The full title of Bayle's smouldering text was, A Philosophical  
Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14.23: "Compel Them to Come In,  
That My House May Be Full." Bayle used nearly 900 pages to make his point,  
but it was a very simple one: to use the words of Jesus to justify violence  
against heretics is "blasphemy." 
The verdict was clear. But if Augustine's scampering sophistry proved  
anything, it was that the untamed intellect was a dangerous guide to the mind 
of 
 God. A deeper, more stable criterion was needed. Bayle found it in the  
irrefragable voice of conscience: "a distinct and spritely Light which  
enlightens all Men the moment they open the Eyes of their Attention." Even if 
an  
authority as esteemed as Augustine urges that a biblical verse exhorts 
violence,  Bayle urged: 
"we shall see by the bright shining of this interior Truth, which  speaks 
to our Spirits without the Sound of Words ... that the pretended  Scripture 
of this Casuist is only a bilious Vapor from his own Temperament and  
Constitution."
Much as Bayle loved his Bible, he wearied of argument and exegesis. From 
now  on, all interpretations were to be referred to this "natural conception 
of  equity which illumines every man that comes into the world." This was  
John 1:9, the proof text of the early Enlightenment, threatening to eclipse 
its  source. 
The natural light, then, was never very natural. It was loaded with 
Christian  assumptions. For his own part, Bayle never denied that he was a 
Christian: an  exiled Huguenot who defended a career of blistering criticism as 
the 
birth right  of a "good Protestant." Accused, with dreary regularity, of a 
mischievous and  covert atheism, Bayle sharply distinguished his faith in 
Christ from his  battered respect for the churches. His aim was to acquit "our 
Religion at the  expence of its Professors." "I die a Christian 
philosopher," he wrote to his  pastor, hours before his death, "convinced of 
and filled 
with God's goodness and  mercy." The escape from theology was again 
theological. 
Bayle's doctrine of conscience, and his contempt for intellectual 
pretension,  set the mood for an eighteenth-century Enlightenment that was as 
tough 
on  philosophical speculation as theological dogma. The standard account of 
the  period as a binge of epistemological arrogance misses the point that 
this is  what the Enlightenment was against. As Peter Gay has written: "the 
Enlightenment  was not an Age of Reason but a Revolt against Rationalism." It 
was earthy,  practical and positively impatient of the shallow faith in 
reason with which it  has somehow been associated. 
Bayle's vintage putdown was as serviceable for Voltaire and Hume as it was  
for his beleaguered, Protestant self: "Reason is like a runner who doesn't 
know  that the race is over." 
Voltaire: the mercy of God
Voltaire, Rousseau and Kant were all, in their ways, heirs of Bayle's 
revolt  of conscience against creed and overreached intellect. Of the three, 
only 
Kant,  with his omnivorous "moral law within" qualifies remotely as a 
post-religious  thinker. Kant's moral law has no need for God - although Kant 
was 
pretty sure  that God needed it. Prayer, under the stern eye of "practical 
reason," was a  "fetish" and a "grovelling delusion." Grace was for 
weaklings. Religious  "enthusiasm" was the "moral death of the reason without 
which 
there can be no  religion." A painful terminus. 
Yet to read the Enlightenment as a penitent grind to Kant's glassy pinnacle 
 is to secularize it prematurely. The extraordinary thing about a 
philosopher as  angry and destructive as Voltaire is the utter refusal to 
renounce 
faith in God  and true religion while raging against a failed orthodoxy. And 
while Voltaire,  like Rousseau, is in many ways a textbook advocate of 
conscience and natural law  against the artifice of creed, he could not escape 
the 
power of specifically  Christian concepts of mercy and forgiveness - a 
creed of his own. 
So not only was Voltaire's plea for natural religion, as _Carl  Becker_ 
(http://yalebooks.com/book/9780300101508/heavenly-city-eighteenth-century-philos
ophers)  has argued, a refurbished Christianity of law and duty: a  
"scepticism" that retains so much "knowledge." His positive philosophy goes far 
 
beyond the mandates of conscience to a sustained plea for a theology of  
forgiveness. It is here that I found the rituals of disdain for Enlightenment  
thought so ill judged. A figure who has entered posterity as a trivializing  
enemy of faith was a profound and constructive critic. 
A window into Voltaire's critique of conscience and his quest for a 
religion  of mercy may be found in his troubled relationship with Rousseau. For 
Voltaire,  it was the spectacle of a raging moralist, writing bestsellers on 
the education  of the young, while cheerfully abandoning his own children on 
the steps of a  Paris orphanage, that threw the question of "conscience" into 
frightening  relief. 
Rousseau's "heart," Voltaire complained, could justify him in anything.  
Guided by the "inner voice" of conscience, a man could do as he pleased. From  
the murderous and adulterous David, in the Old Testament, to any number of  
latter-day tyrants, Voltaire lamented, history was strewn with icy 
campaigners  who had learned to manage the accusing conscience to expert 
degree. 
"There is a  natural law," he declared rather plaintively in his _Philosophical 
 Dictionary_ 
(https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-pocket-philosophical-dictionary-9780199553631?cc=au&lang=en&;)
 , "but it is still more natural 
to many people to forget  it." 
The sin of religious "fanaticism" was to subordinate conscience to the  
"passions" - under the dangerous delusion that my desire represents  God's 
will. The problem with religion - even in its more acceptable  formulations - 
is 
that it too often flattered, rather than stirred, the  slumbering 
conscience. The moralizing philosopher defined his task in  self-consciously 
homiletic terms: "it is judicious to endeavor to awaken  conscience both in 
mantua-makers and in monarchs." Indeed, "it is necessary to  preach better than 
modern preachers usually do, who seldom talk effectively to  either." 
Enlightenment was again strangely evangelical. 
Natural law is always better than "superstition" and "fanaticism," Voltaire 
 maintains, especially when such theology teaches people to despise the 
ordinary  virtues as "splendid sins." But natural law cannot break the spell of 
violence  and vengeance. From his epic poem on the "clement King," Henry 
IV, to his South  American drama, Alzire (1736), to his final, crowning 
defence of a just  and merciful God, The Sage and the Atheist (1775), Voltaire 
preached  the message that conscience is not enough. A gospel of duty and 
reciprocity will  always return to violence. 
Revenge and recrimination, Voltaire urged with Newtonian certainty, issue  
from human injury like water falling from a height. The genius of an  
all-forgiving Alvarez, in Alzire, or a Quaker, such as William Penn,  was the 
ability to break the logic with a policy of mercy. When the conquering  Henry 
put the divine principle into practice, pardoning and even feeding his  
enemies in Le Henriade, Voltaire described it as the offer of "grace"  to 
"these 
rebels." The defeated soldiers were "rendered to life" by Henry's  "kind 
commands." A historical pattern of hatred was broken by forgiveness. 
The rebuke to a theology of just deserts is unmistakeable. Alzire  was a 
drama dedicated to this single theme, a play that Voltaire claimed to have  
written "with a view of showing how far superior the spirit of true religion 
is  to the light of nature." There is abundant evidence that he meant it. 
When "Freind," the Quaker hero of The Sage and the Atheist,  persuaded a 
Native American to desist from punishing criminals by burning them  alive, 
Voltaire described the triumph as greater than all the "miracles"  performed by 
Jesuits in the New World. He often used untutored peoples to expose  
European vices but he worried about the impotence of a heart-centred natural 
law  
without the stimulus of mercy. And this was where Christian orthodoxy had  
failed. His rage against orthodoxy, while sometimes expressed as an attack on 
 Christianity in the main, centred on a hyper-Augustinian theology that 
seemed to  delight in a cosmic division between the saved and the damned. 
Schooled by Jesuits in a more affirmative theology of free will and  
forgiveness, Voltaire's religious criticism was above all an "anti-Jansenism."  
It 
surfaced, like Spinoza's, from the sectarianism it decried. And like  
Spinoza's protest against the egoism of an elect, Voltaire relentlessly urged  
the connection between theologies of exclusion and the politics of  
persecution. 
For Voltaire, even more than Spinoza, it was the cruel logic of  
predestination that carried the bacillus of fanaticism: the psychology of the  
playground pressed into the gold leaf of dogma. Augustine's frosty intuition  
that 
"Jesus Christ did not die for all men" was, he insisted, the very seed of  
France's troubles. Voltaire's response, even in his bravely "deistic" years, 
was  a cobbled Christianity of his own. 
Voltaire scoured the Bible with a darting eye and an uneven fury. Joshua 
was  a "monster" of tribal imagination, but Joseph, of the Genesis narrative, 
was a  model of grace - "for a hero who pardons is more touching than one 
who avenges."  When the Jewish religion transcended the narrow sight of the 
clan - as in the  Book of Ruth - it was open to praise. 
And finally, the Christ who had been ridiculed in some of the clandestine  
writings came in for dramatic reappraisal. True "theists" - as Voltaire  
increasingly portrayed himself from the 1750s - do not mock a character as 
noble  and penetrating as Christ's. No one exposed the treachery of priestcraft 
better  than Jesus, and no one practiced forgiveness more consistently than 
this "man of  peace." When the atheist, Baron d'Holbach, ridiculed the 
character of Christ in  Christianity Unmasked, Voltaire protested in the 
margins 
of his own  copy that "the morality of Jesus was not perverse." He 
reproached Holbach for  "exaggerating the evils of Christianity." 
But in a softer moment, and a twinkling rhetorical manoeuvre, he admitted  
that the nuclear option of atheism was a legitimate response to a  theology 
of gleeful vengeance. Augustine and Holbach were cousins. The God who  could 
send children to hell for the monstrous crime of entering the world is,  
Voltaire acknowledges, hard to believe in - let alone love. But there was  
another deity: a "Father" God who "lets the sun shine on the evil and the 
good."  A God who "sets bounds" to his "vengeance." 
Voltaire summarized his entire project in two trademark utterances of 1776: 
 "The superstition that we must drive from the earth is that which, making 
a  tyrant of God, invites men to become tyrants." And more simply: "I see 
the mercy  of God where you would see only his power." Whatever this was, it 
was not  secularization. 
Mary Wollstonecraft: divine equality
Faith and doubt were not foreign bodies in the Enlightenment: they were  
beleaguered co-workers. One final example will have to suffice. Mary  
Wollstonecraft is justly celebrated as an icon of the radical Enlightenment and 
 the 
leading progenitor of modern feminism. Less well known is the degree to  
which she launched her egalitarian missiles with the same spiritual poise, the 
 same confidence in the mind of a holy God, as Spinoza, Bayle and Voltaire. 
As  she declared in the opening pages of _A Vindication of the Rights of  
Woman_ (http://www.bartleby.com/144/)  (1792): "I build my belief on the 
perfection of God." Indeed, she  writes: "The only solid foundation for 
morality 
appears to be the character of  the Supreme Being." 
Schooled among rational, Dissenting Protestants, Wollstonecraft ascribed 
her  "wild wish" of equality, her "Utopian dreams," to a creator God - giving 
"thanks  to that Being who impressed them on my soul, and gave me sufficient 
strength of  mind to dare to exert my own reason." Taking issue not with 
Christianity so much  as the imperious, "impious" theology that had sanctified 
the miseries of her  sex, Wollstonecraft declared equality an "obvious 
truth" to an enlightened  believer. The case was theological from first to 
last, 
sometimes expressed as a  prayer: 
"Gracious Creator of the whole human race! hast thou created such  a being 
as woman, who can trace Thy wisdom in Thy works, and feel that Thou  alone 
art by Thy nature exalted above her, for no better purpose ... [than] to  
submit to man, her equal ...? Can she consent to be occupied merely to please  
him - merely to adorn the earth - when her soul is capable of rising to  
Thee?"
Wollstonecraft pictured the submissive female as a stunted worshipper, 
bowing  to the wrong god. If women were to gain "that stability of character 
which is  the firmest ground to rest our future hopes upon," they needed to 
"turn to the  fountain of light, and not [be] forced to shape their course by 
the twinkling of  a mere satellite." It was a withering analogy. God 
outranked twittering mortals  - especially husbands. 
A female preacher explained a life of scandalous independence with the 
same,  brutal clarity: "I chose to obey God rather than man." As _Barbara  
Taylor_ 
(http://www.cambridge.org/au/academic/subjects/literature/english-literature-1700-1830/cambridge-companion-mary-wollstonecraft)
  has written of 
Wollstonecraft's theological-rational milieu: "Pushed  to the limit of their 
revisionary potential, teachings pertaining to the  equality of souls and human 
likeness to God offered female believers a vision of  sacralized selfhood 
sharply at odds with worldly subordination." Indeed, she  continues: 
"This affirmation of women's capacity to apprehend and identify  with the 
divine, expressed in nearly all female writings of the period, was so  
fundamental to women's sense of ethical worth, and so far-reaching in its  
egalitarian implications, that it can properly be described as one of the  
founding 
impulses of feminism."
_Carl  Becker_ 
(http://yalebooks.com/book/9780300101508/heavenly-city-eighteenth-century-philosophers)
  characterized his sermonizing philosophes as 
theologians in  denial, but Wollstonecraft had nothing to deny - even if her 
surviving husband,  William Godwin, found her pieties difficult to process. 
Human rights were divine  commands. The notion of a secular Enlightenment 
would have confused Mary  Wollstonecraft. 
Religion against religion
Each of these thinkers deployed resources native to the Christian tradition 
 against what they regarded as chronic corruptions. They set faith against 
faith,  and religion against religion. Far from denying the existence of 
God, each was  engaged in a process that might be termed a redistribution of 
grace. It was a  sustained revolt against a bruising orthodoxy that seemed to 
conflate human and  divine power. 
The enemy was not Christianity but a phenomenon _Jean  Delumeau_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/Sin-Fear-Emergence-13Th-18th-Centuries/dp/0312035829)  
has 
termed "Augustinism" - a "type" of religion "that spoke more of  the Passion of 
the Savior than of His Resurrection, more of sin than of pardon,  of the 
Judge than of the Father, of Hell than of Paradise." And if, as Delumeau  
suggests, Augustinism sometimes amounted to a cocktail of "Manichaeism and  
fear," its critics cannot be shepherded under a scornful heading of  
"de-Christianization." The truth may be the other way round. 
Clearly, any of these ideas were susceptible to "non-theistic construal," 
as  Charles Taylor might put it. One man's conscience can be another man's 
cliche.  Polemics may be taken up second hand. But does the history of an idea 
matter?  Apart from the small matter of being faithful to the past, a more 
authentic  account of the Enlightenment may arrest some of the ritual 
hostilities of our  religious/secular discourse. Such a history may dispel a 
narrow rendering of  modernity as a slow march from faith to secularity, and 
all 
the fatalism it  entails. 
Secularization is an unworthy expression for men and women who were  
electrified by a certain perception of God, however heterodox it may turn out 
to  
be. And given the role of such "heresy" in the rekindling of missionary  
energies, the folly of the concept becomes even larger. 
The Enlightenment, as _David  Bebbington_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/Evangelicalism-Modern-Britain-History-1730s/dp/0415104645)
  has shown, was a seminal 
influence on the rise of evangelicalism  and its experiential, sensed-based 
spirituality. Pierre Bayle - prophet of  conscience - was not only the 
darling of the philosophes in the  eighteenth century: he played a vital role 
in 
the _emergence of  Continental Pietism_ 
(http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/978-0-271-02367-0.html) . Voltaire, 
meanwhile, added to his scattering of 
liberal  advocates a number of orthodox admirers. He would have enjoyed the 
phrase with  which a _nineteenth-century  priest_ (http://www.amazon.com
/Religion-Voltaire-René-Pomeau/dp/2707803316)  appraised his radioactive 
ministry: "Dieu, par une ruse  diabolique, envoya Voltaire combattre son Eglise 
pour 
le regenerer." 
Finally, Spinoza - "the most impious, the most infamous, and at the same 
time  the most subtle Atheist that Hell has vomited on the earth" - made good 
on his  enduring claim that love is criticism, and criticism is love. Among 
his _posthumous  admirers_ 
(http://yalebooks.com/book/9780300048971/origins-modern-atheism)  was the 
Russian philosopher, Vladimir Soloviev, who 
credited  Spinoza with his return to the Christian faith he lost as a teenager. 
A 
towering  and ecumenical intellect, and perhaps the _single  greatest 
influence_ 
(http://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-teachings-of-modern-orthodox-christianity-on-law-politics-and-human-nature/9780231142649)
  on the Russian 
religious renaissance of the twentieth  century, Soloviev gracefully eludes the 
set-piece humour of secularization. 
Ideas that savoured of blasphemy to a dualistic, Western mind were here 
taken  as intended. Such examples may be multiplied. Together they confirm my 
view that  modernity is a war of religious ideas, not a war on them. The 
secular other is a  not-so-distant relative - possibly a friend. 
.

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