A provocative idea. The concept is sound, but in practice seems hard to 
distinguish from Universal Basic Income. 



Virtuous Rent: a Rudder That Can Transform Our Economy - Evonomics
http://evonomics.com/dont-ditch-capitalism-tax-extractive-side-effects-fuel-growth-barnes/
(via Instapaper)

By Peter Barnes

THE LONDON UNDERGROUND abounds with warnings to “mind the gap,” referring to 
the space between station platforms and train doors. In our larger society 
similar warnings could be issued for the gaps between rich and poor and between 
humans and nature. These gaps must not only be minded, they must also be 
narrowed. The persistent question is how to do this, and I con­tend that a form 
of rent may be the best possible tool. But before we get to that, we must first 
become familiar with rent.

The term was first used by classical economists, including Adam Smith, to 
describe money paid to landowners. It was one of three income streams in the 
early years of capitalism, the others being wages paid to labor and interest 
paid to capital.

In Smith’s view, landlords benefited from land’s unique ability to enrich its 
owners “independent of any plan or project of their own.” This ability arises 
from the fact that the supply of good land is limited, while the demand for it 
steadily rises. The effect of landowners’ collection of rent, he concluded, 
isn’t to increase society’s wealth but to take money away from labor and 
capital. In other words, land rent is an extractor of wealth rather than a 
contributor to it.

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A century later, a widely-read American economist named Henry George (his 
magnum opus, Progress and Poverty, sold over two million copies) enlarged 
Smith’s insight substantially. At a time when Karl Marx was blaming 
capital­ists for expropriating surplus value from workers, George blamed 
landlords for expropriating rent from everyone. Such ­rent­ extraction operated 
like “an immense wedge being forced, not underneath society, but through 
society. Those who are above the point of separation are elevated, but those 
who are below are crushed down.” George’s proposed remedy was a steep tax on 
land that would recapture for society most of landowners’ parasitic gains.

More recently, the concept of rent was expanded to include mono­poly pro­fits, 
the extra income a company reaps by quashing com­pe­tition and raising prices. 
Smith had written about this form of wealth extraction too, though he didn’t 
call it rent. “The interest of any particular branch of trade or manufac­tures 
is always to widen the market and to narrow the competition…To widen the market 
may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the public; but to narrow 
the competition must always be against it, and can only serve to enable the 
dealers, by raising their profits above what they naturally would be, to levy, 
for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow-citizens.”

It’s important to recognize that the tax Smith spoke of isn’t the kind we pay 
to government; rather, it’s the kind we pay, much less visibly, to businesses 
with power. That’s because prices in capitalism are driven by four factors: 
supply, demand, market power and politi­cal power. The first two, which are 
omnipresent in economics texts, deter­mine what might be called fair market 
value; the last two, which are prevalent in the real world, determine rent. 
Actual prices charged are the sum of fair market value and rent. Another way to 
say this is that rent is the extra money people pay above what they’d pay in 
truly com­pe­titive markets.

More recently, the term has been further extended to include income from 
privileges granted by government—import quotas, mining rights, subsidies, tax 
loop­holes and so on. Many econo­mists use the term “rent-seeking” to describe 
the multiple ways special interests use govern­ment to enrich them­selves at 
the expense of others. If you’re wondering why Washington, D.C. and its 
envi­rons have grown so prosperous in recent decades, it’s not because 
govern­ment itself has become gargantuan, it’s because rent-seeking has.

In short, traditional rent is income received not because of anything a person 
or business produces, but because of rights or power a person or business 
possesses. It con­sists of takings from the larger whole rather than additions 
to it. It redis­tributes wealth within an econ­omy but doesn’t add any. As 
British economist John Kay put it in the Financial Times, “When the 
appropriation of the wealth of others is illegal, it’s called theft or fraud. 
When it’s legal, it’s called rent.”

BECAUSE RENT ISN’T LISTED separately on any price tag or corpor­ate in­come 
statement, we don’t know exactly how much of it there is, but it’s likely 
there’s quite a lot. Consider, for example, health care in America, about 
one-sixth of our economy. There are many reasons the U.S. spends 80 percent 
more per capita on health care than does Canada, while achieving no better 
results, but one of the biggest is that Canada has wrung huge amounts of rent 
out of its health care system and we haven’t. Every Canadian is covered by 
non-profit rather than profit-maximizing health insurance, and pharmaceuti­cal 
prices are tightly controlled. By contrast, in the U.S., drug companies 
overcharge because of patents, Medicare is barred from bargaining for lower 
drug prices, and private insurers add many costs and inefficiencies.

Or consider our financial sector. Commercial banks, the kind that take 
depo­sits and make loans, receive an immensely valuable gift from the federal 
gov­ernment: the right to create money. They’re allowed to do this through 
what’s called fractional reserve bank­ing, which lets them lend, with interest, 
about ten times more than they have on deposit. This gift alone is worth 
billions.

Then there are commercial banks’ cousins, investment banks, which are in the 
business of trading securities. They can’t mint money the way commercial banks 
do, but they have tricks of their own. For one, they charge hefty fees for 
taking private companies public, thus seizing part of the liquidity pre­mium 
public trading creates. For another, they make lofty sums by creat­ing, and 
then manipulating, hyper-complex financial “products” that are, in effect, bets 
on bets. This pumps up the casino economy and extracts capital that could 
otherwise benefit the real economy.

We could wander through other major industries—energy, tele­com­muni­ca­tions, 
broadcasting, agriculture—and find similar ex­tractions of rent. What 
percentage of our economy, then, consists of rent? This is a question you’d 
think economists would explore, but few do. To my knowledge, the only prominent 
economist who has even raised it is Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate at 
Columbia University, and he hasn’t answered it quantitatively.

The amount of rent in the U.S. economy, Stiglitz says, is “hard to quantify 
(but) clearly enormous.” Moreover, “to a significant degree,” it “redistributes 
money from those at the bottom to those at the top.” Further, it not only adds 
no value to the economy, it “distorts resource allocation and makes the 
econ­omy weaker.”

SO FAR I’VE DESCRIBED rent as a negative force in our economy. Now I want to 
introduce the concept of virtuous rent, a form of rent that would have 
distinctly positive effects.

A perfect example of virtuous rent is the money paid to Alaskans by the Alaska 
Permanent Fund. Since 1980, the Permanent Fund has distributed equal yearly 
divi­­dends to every person who resides in Alaska for one year or more. The 
divi­dends—which have ranged from $1,000 to $3,269 per person —come from a 
giant mutual fund whose beneficiaries are all the people of Alas­­ka, present 
and future. The fund is capitalized by earnings from Alaska’s oil, a commonly 
owned resource. Given the steady flow of cash to its entire pop­u­la­tion, it’s 
not surprising that Alaska has the highest median income and one of the lowest 
pover­ty rates of any state in the nation.

Broadly speaking, virtuous rent would be any flow of money that starts by 
raising the cost of harmful or extractive activity and ends by increasing the 
incomes of all members of society. Another way to think of it is as rent that 
we, as collective co-owners, charge for private use of our common assets. 
Think, for example, of charging polluters for using our common atmosphere and 
then sharing the proceeds equally.

There are two key differences between traditional and virtuous rent. The first 
has to do with how the rent is collected, the second with how it’s distributed.

Traditional rent is collected by businesses whose market and/or political power 
enables them to charge higher-than-competitive prices. It leads to higher 
prices that serve no economic, social or ecological function. Virtuous rent, by 
con­trast, would be collected by not-for-profit trusts that represent all 
mem­bers of a polity equally. It would be generated by charging private 
busi­nesses for using common assets that most of the time they use for free. 
Such rent would also lead to higher prices, but for good reasons: to make 
business­es pay costs they currently shift to society, nature and future 
genera­tions, and to offset traditional rent.

The second difference is distributional. Traditional rent flows upward to the 
small minority that owns most of the stock of rent-extracting businesses. 
Virtuous rent would flow to everyone equally.

When collection and distribution are merged, the effects of traditional rent 
are doubly negative: it diminishes the efficiency of our economy and the 
in­comes of all those who pay it but don’t get any. The effects of virtuous 
rent, by con­trast, are doubly positive: it increases the health and fairness 
of our economy and the security of our middle class.

At this moment, of course, traditional rent totals trillions of dollars a year, 
while virtuous rent (out­side of Alaska) is more of a concept than a reality. 
But virtuous rent can and should grow. To understand how this could hap­pen, 
it’s necessary to ex­plore two other concepts: common wealth and exter­nalities.

Common wealth has several components. One consists of gifts of nature we 
inherit together: our atmosphere and oceans, water­sheds and wetlands, forests 
and fertile plains, and so on. In almost all cases, we overuse these gifts 
because there’s no cost attached to using them.

Another component is wealth created by our ancestors: sciences and 
techno­lo­gies, legal and political systems, our financial infra­structure, and 
much more. These confer enormous benefits on all of us, but a small minority 
reaps far more financial gain from them than do most of us.

Yet another chunk of common wealth is what might be called “wealth of the 
whole”—the value added by the scale and syner­gies of our economy itself. The 
notion of “wealth of the whole” dates back to Adam Smith’s insight 
two-and-a-half centuries ago that labor specialization and the exchange of 
goods —pervasive features of a whole system—are what make nations rich. Beyond 
that, it’s obvious that no business can prosper by itself: all busi­nesses need 
cus­­tomers, suppliers, distributors, highways, money and a web of 
comple­men­tary products (cars need fuel, software needs hardware, and so 
forth). So the economy as a whole is not only greater than the sum of its 
parts, it’s an asset without which the parts would have almost no value at all.

The sum of wealth created by nature, our ancestors and our econ­omy as a whole 
is what I here call common wealth. Several things can be said about our common 
wealth. First, it’s the goose that lays almost all the eggs of private wealth. 
Second, it’s extremely large but also (like the dark matter of the universe) 
mostly invisible. Third, because it’s not cre­ated by any indivi­dual or 
business, it belongs to all of us jointly. And fourth, because no one has a 
greater claim to it than anyone else, it belongs to all of us equally, or as 
close to equally as we can arrange.

The big, rarely asked question about our current economy is who gets the 
benefits of common wealth? No one disputes that private wealth creators are 
entitled to the wealth they create, but who is entitled to the wealth we share 
is an entirely different question. My contention is that the rich are rich not 
so much because they create wealth, but because they capture a much larger 
share of common wealth than they’re entitled to. Another way to say this is 
that the rich are as rich as they are—and the rest of us are poorer than we 
should be—because extracted rent far exceeds virtuous rent. If that’s the truth 
of the matter, the solution is to diminish the first kind of rent and increase 
the second kind.

EXTERNALITIES are a better-known concept than common wealth. They’re the costs 
businesses impose on others—workers, communities, nature and fu­ture 
generations—but don’t pay themselves. The classic example is pollution.

Almost all economists accept the need to “internalize externalities,” by which 
they mean making businesses pay the full costs of their activities. What they 
don’t often discuss are the cash flows that would arise if we actually did 
this. If businesses pay more money, how much more, and to whom should the 
checks be made out?

These aren’t trivial questions. In fact, they’re among the most momentous 
questions we must address in the twenty-first century. The sums involved can, 
and indeed should, be very large—after all, to diminish harms to nature and 
society, we must internalize as many unpaid costs as possible. But how should 
we collect the money, and whose money is it?

One way to collect the money was proposed nearly a century ago by British 
economist Arthur Pigou, a colleague of Keynes’ at Cam­bridge. When the price of 
a piece of nature is too low, Pigou said, government should impose a tax on 
using it. Such a tax would reduce our usage while raising revenue for 
government.

In theory Pigou’s idea makes sense; the trouble with it lies in 
imple­mentation. No western government wants to get into the business of 
price-setting; that’s a job best left to markets. And even if politicians tried 
to adjust prices with taxes, there’s little chance they’d get them “right” from 
nature’s perspective. Far more likely would be tax rates driven by the very 
corporations that domi­nate government and overuse nature now.

An alternative is to bring some non-governmental entities into play; after all, 
the reason we have externalities in the first place is that no one represents 
stakeholders harmed by shifted costs. But if those stakeholders were 
repre­sent­ed by legally accountable agents, that problem could be fixed. The 
void into which externalities now flow would be filled by trustees of common 
wealth. And those trustees would charge rent.

As for whose money it is, it follows from the above that payments for most 
externalities—and in particular, for costs imposed on living creatures present 
and future—should flow to all of us together as beneficiaries of common wealth. 
They certainly shouldn’t flow to the companies that impose the exter­nalities; 
that would defeat the purpose of internalizing them. But neither should they 
flow to government, as Pigou suggested.

In my mind, there’s nothing wrong with government taxing our individual shares 
of common wealth rent, just as it taxes other personal income, but government 
shouldn’t get first dibs on it. The proper first claimants are we, the people. 
One could even argue, as economist Dallas Burtraw has, that government capture 
of this income may be an unconstitutional taking of pri­vate property.

THIS BRINGS US BACK to virtuous rent. There are several points that can be made 
about this sort of rent.

First, paying virtuous rent to ourselves has a very different effect than 
paying extractive rent to Wall Street, Microsoft or Saudi princes. In addition 
to dis­couraging overuse of nature, it returns the money we pay in higher 
prices to where it does our families and economy the most good: our own 
pockets. From there we can spend it on food, housing or anything else we 
choose. Such spending not only helps us; it also helps businesses and their 
employees. It’s like a bottom-up stimulus machine in which the people rather 
than the government do the spending. This is no trivial virtue at a time when 
fiscal and monetary policy have both lost their potency.

VIRTUOUS RENT



Second, virtuous rent isn’t a set of government policies that can be changed 
when political winds shift. Rather, it’s a set of pipes within the market that, 
once in place, will circulate money indefinitely, thereby sustaining a large 
middle class and a healthier planet even as politicians and their policies come 
and go.

And third, though virtuous rent requires government action to get started, it 
has the political virtue of avoiding the bigger/smaller government tug-of-war 
that paralyzes Washington today. It thus can appeal to voters and politicians 
in the center, left and right.

A TRIM TAB is a tiny flap on a ship or airplane’s rudder. The designer 
Buck­minster Fuller often noted that moving a trim tab slightly turns a ship or 
a plane dramatically. If we think of our economy as a moving vessel, the same 
metaphor can be applied to rent. Depending on how much of it is collected and 
whether it flows to a few or to many, rent can steer an economy toward extreme 
inequality or a large middle class. It can also guide an economy toward 
excessive use of nature or a safe level of use. In other words, in addi­tion to 
being a wedge (as Henry George put it), rent can also be a rudder. An economy’s 
outcomes depend on how we turn the rudder.

Think about the board game Monopoly. The object is to squeeze so much rent out 
of other players that you wind up with all their money. You do this by 
acquiring monopolies and building hotels on them. However, there’s another 
feature of the game that offsets this extracting of rent: all players get a 
cash payment when they pass Go. This can be thought of as virtuous rent.

As Monopoly is designed, the rent extracted through monopoly power greatly 
exceeds the virtuous rent players receive when pass­ing Go. The result is that 
the game always ends the same way: one player gets all the money. But sup­pose 
we tip the scale the other way. Suppose we decrease the extracted rent and 
increase the virtuous kind. For example, we could pay players five times as 
much for passing Go and reduce hotel rents by half. What then happens?

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Instead of flowing upward and concentrating in the hands of a single winner, 
rent flows more evenly. Instead of the game ending when one winner takes all, 
the game continues with many players remaining.

The point I wish to make is that different rent flows can steer a game—and more 
importantly, an economy—toward different outcomes. Among the out­comes that can 
be affected by differing rent flows are the levels of wealth co­n­centration, 
pollution and real investment as opposed to specu­lation.

Rent, in other words, is a powerful tool. And it’s also something we can fiddle 
with. Do we want less extracted rent? More virtuous rent? If so, it’s up to us 
to build the pipes and turn the valves.

2016 August 10

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