from the philosophical blog :
Stephen Law
 
 
 
 
Wednesday, January 4, 2017
 
 
 
Reason vs other methods of influencing belief
 


 
 
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There are (at least) two ways in which we  can attempt to influence the 
beliefs of others: 


(i) we can use reason. We can provide  scientific and other evidence to 
support beliefs, subject them to critical  scrutiny, reveal contradictions and 
inconsistencies, and so  on.
 
 (ii) we can appeal to such  mechanisms as peer-pressure, emotional 
manipulation, reward and punishment,  humour, sarcasm, repetition, fear 
(especially 
of uncertainty), tribalism,  censorship, vanity, and so on.
 
Now, we philosophers put a lot of  emphasis on (i) rather than (ii), don't 
we? Why is that?

I suggest the answer is: because reason  is truth-sensitive. Try to  make a 
well-reasoned case for believing the Earth's core is made of cheese, or  
that the Antarctic is populated by ant-people, or that Prince Philip is an 
alien  lizard in disguise. You're not going to find it easy. Apply the filter 
of reason  - under which I include the scientific method - to incoming 
beliefs and only those with a fairly good chance  of being true are likely to 
get 
through. That's why we favour the filter of reason. We  want to believe, and 
want others to believe, what's true.


The mechanisms listed under (ii), on the other hand, can  just as easily be 
used to instill true beliefs as false beliefs. They are  truth-insensitive. 



Cults, advertising salespeople, and so on tend to favour  the latter 
mechanisms in order to try to get people to believe. Applied  consistently and 
systematically, they can be very powerful mechanisms.   Religious schools have 
traditionally relied primarily upon such mechanisms for  inculcating 
religious belief in young people. Religious schools are  traditionally tribal; 
they 
apply: peer pressure, fear of hell, hope of heaven,  rose-tinted versions 
of belief in which the less attractive parts are airbrushed  out or ignored, 
endless repetition of key dogmas, positive images of saints,  Popes, imams 
and rabbis, and scary images of the world of the unbeliever and all  its 
terrifying uncertainties. Political parties also exploit these mechanisms  very 
effectively. 


If we want to believe what is true (and I do) applying  reason is a very 
good idea. But that's not to say that the other mechanisms are  not important. 
Yes, no one with an interest in promoting a concern with truth  should rely 
wholly on the latter, truth-insensitive  mechanisms. However, the fact is, 
reason alone will likely fail in  many cases to persuade. A  cogent argument 
is often far less persuasive than a few emotive anecdotes, for  example. 
Compare statistics on alternative medicine with a few well-chosen tales  of 
astonishing 'cures' - the latter will emotionally trump the former, and sit  
more easily in the memory, every time. Tabloid front pages almost always lead 
 with anecdotes rather than dry data, and for good reason - juicy, 
personalised  tales sell newspapers; statistics and charts do not. 


So, it's not that philosophers and freethinkers should shy away from using 
humour, emotive anecdotes,  peer pressure, and so on. These mechanisms 
probably should form a part of our arsenal. But the  bottom line is, they 
should 
not be the foundation. Our foundation should always  involve applying reason 
as far as it will go. Once we lose that foundation,  we're no better than 
the cults or advertising agencies  ourselves. 


And of course, when people accuse the free thought  movement, philosophers, 
etc. of being a cult, of being just another 'religion',  and so on, we can 
now  explain why we are not.
 
We free thinkers always reach for the sword of reason. It  is a 
double-edged sword. It cuts both ways. It favours not the 'teacher's' view  
over the 
'pupil's' but the truth. It's a weapon that the pupil can just as  easily and 
effectively use against their teacher. Which is why many so-called  
educators prefer to either downplay the role of reason it or avoid it  
altogether. 
They rely instead on those other mechanisms which do, always, favour the view 
of the  teacher over that of the pupil, irrespective of what's actually 
true. Trouble  is, the result is not education but  indoctrination.




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