Very thoughtful article. I agree with his facts, though I’m not sure about his framing. I think we need a deeper understanding of why Christianity lost its moral authority...
Sent from my iPhone > On Oct 22, 2018, at 12:40, Billy Rojas <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > > > Touchstone > September / October 2018 issue > Liberalism Occupied > > The Rise of the Gnostic Liberal State After Christianity > by Andrew Latham > > > --- > > > > Post-liberalism. Beyond liberalism. After liberalism. In recent years, books > and articles with titles containing these and similar phrases have > proliferated at a breathtaking pace, reflecting a now widely held view that > the three-centuries-old liberal era is coming to (has come to?) a decisive > end. To be sure, these books and articles often differ significantly in their > respective analytical assumptions, political concerns, and practical > recommendations. But they share at least one common—indeed, > defining—commitment: a belief that, for better or worse, liberalism as a > political project is a spent force, and we had better prepare ourselves to > endure both its tumultuous death throes and the turbulence that will > inevitably accompany the birth of its successor. > But is this an accurate account of where we find ourselves today? Are we > really witnessing the demise of liberalism as a world-historical project? Are > we as a society actually slouching, via the way station of today's illiberal > liberalism, toward the Gomorrah of a definitively post-liberal world? > > > > In a word, no. While it is impossible to gainsay the all-too-evident fact > that the liberalism of today is different from that of the seventeenth > century, or even that of the first half of the twentieth, claims that these > differences are profound enough to signify the end of liberalism > underestimate liberalism's ability to adapt itself to changing historical > conditions and cultural contexts. Just as liberalism manifested itself as > "classical liberalism" in the particular historical circumstances of John > Locke's time and, in a very different guise, as "New Liberalism" or "Social > Liberalism" in the historical context of John Dewey's time, so it is > manifesting itself in distinctive ways in our time. > > > > The challenge today, then, is neither to autopsy liberalism nor to try to > limn the contours of some post-liberal political project assumed to be > materializing just over the temporal horizon. Rather, the task before us is > to specify the cultural forces at work within contemporary American society > and to ask how those forces are reshaping the way in which enduring or core > liberal ideals and values are being implemented. Once we have done this, it > will become clear that the problem today lies not with liberalism per se, but > with the gnosticism that in recent decades has replaced Christianity as the > cultural matrix within which the liberal project is embedded. > > > > Defining Liberalism > > Before we proceed, however, it is necessary to define this thing called > liberalism. As the English political philosopher John Gray argues in his > classic book Liberalism (1986, 1995), it is a mistake to approach this task > as if liberalism has a single unchanging nature or essence. It is better, he > says, to treat liberalism as a tradition of political thought that coheres > around a distinctive set of themes but that manifests itself quite > differently in different historical and national contexts. Gray then > enumerates a number of enduring leitmotifs that define the liberal tradition, > three of which I think are particularly important: > > • Individualism—belief in the moral primacy of the person over and against > the claims of any collective; > > • Egalitarianism—a commitment to the basic moral equivalence of all human > beings; and > > • Meliorism—the conviction that the human condition can be improved through > the use of critical reason. > > To Gray's list I would add one more. Drawing on the work of Pierre Manent, I > would include: > > • Emancipation—a commitment to the liberation of the "sovereign human will" > from all constraining externalities. > > > > While this commitment is not an exclusive property of liberalism (it is > evident, for example, in the thought of both Machiavelli and Nietzsche), it > does seem to me to be an enduring thread within the liberal tradition. > > At one level, then, liberalism can be understood as a set of abstract > concepts or intellectual commitments. As Gray argues, however, in the real > world, liberalism is never simply a free-floating congeries of ideas or > abstractions taking the same form wherever it touches down. Rather, it > assumes different forms as it is implemented in different national settings > or in the same national setting at different historical junctures. French > liberalism, then, is distinct from British liberalism, and American > liberalism in the seventeenth century is different from American liberalism > in the early twentieth. But, Gray insists, these manifold varieties of > liberalism are not "two or more traditions or a diffuse syndrome of ideas." > Rather, they are "separate branches of a common lineage," "variations on a > small set of distinctive themes." > > > > This being the case, how can we account for the variations? Gray's own answer > to this is serviceable enough for his purposes: various crises in modernity > manifested themselves in different ways in different national and cultural > settings, each eliciting highly specific responses. For my purposes, though, > some refinement is required. In place of the somewhat nebulous claim that > variations in liberalism are triggered by "crises in modernity," my claim is > that in any given historical setting what we might label "real, existing > liberalism" is the product of the interaction of the abstract liberal vision > described above with the concrete social challenges of a given historical > moment—or rather with the aspirations and anxieties generated by those > concrete challenges—and with the wider culture. > > > > Early America > > Thus, for example, during the American Revolutionary era, "real, existing > liberalism" was conditioned by the core liberal principles articulated > above—individualism, egalitarianism, meliorism, and emancipation—along with > the principles associated with civic republicanism. These constituted the > primum mobile of the early American experiment in ordered liberty. But the > way in which these ideas were implemented was itself conditioned by the > concrete challenges confronting the liberals of the time—specifically, the > threat posed to individual liberty by a tyrannical political order, actual in > the case of the British state, potential in the case of the > under-construction American one. > > > > As a result, early American liberalism sought to advance its core principles > by devising a political system of negative liberty that both limited the > power of the state and created a robust zone of autonomy around the > individual citizen. The latter was secured by the rights to free speech, > assembly, petition, and the free exercise of religion. > > > > Because politics is always downstream from culture, the "real, existing > liberalism" of the early national era was also shaped, inflected, and limited > by the wider cultural matrix from which it emerged. Left unchecked, as Alexis > de Tocqueville grasped all too clearly, the inner logic of classical > liberalism always tends toward more individualism, more meliorism, more > egalitarianism, etc., with the logical outcome being an atomized political > and social order in which all organic, natural, and pre-political human bonds > are dissolved and the sovereign human will is freed from all internal and > external constraints. But in the post-Revolutionary era, as Tocqueville also > understood, this inner logic was checked by America's "spirit of > religion"—that is, by the admixture of Christian natural law and biblical > anthropology that underpinned and suffused early American social imagery. > > > > According to Tocqueville, foundational and largely unquestioned beliefs about > the sovereignty of God, the fallen and fixed nature of humanity, the > naturalness of marriage and family, the organic character of political > community, and the inevitability of hierarchy all worked to temper the > propensity to recast human nature and society according to the dictates of > unconstrained human will inherent in America's "spirit of liberty." The > result was a distinctively Christian liberalism that provided a > socio-political framework within which what Russell Hittinger has called "the > three necessary societies"—domestic society (marriage and family), the > polity, and the church—could, and did, flourish. > > > > Twentieth-Century America > > Fast forward to the opening decades of the twentieth century and we see a > similar dynamic at work in the Social Liberalism of John Dewey and the > progressive reformers. Once again, liberals sought to give effect to > liberalism's core ideals, only this time in the context of a new set of > anxieties raised by rapid industrialization, urbanization, rising inequality, > and what many progressives characterized as the moral degeneracy associated > with widespread poverty. > > > > In order to address these new challenges—and drawing on novel ideas pioneered > in countries like Britain, France, Italy, and especially Germany—progressives > abandoned the principles of negative liberty and the limited state and > embraced instead those of positive liberty and its handmaiden, the > interventionist, administrative state. Limited government, the rule of law, > and other hallmarks of classical liberalism were to varying degrees replaced > by new modalities of rule that permitted the state to regulate more and more > areas of life. American society remained essentially liberal, only now the > state had a whole new set of political tools for perfecting that society. > > > > Left unchecked, of course, this marriage of the liberal project to the > administrative state would inevitably have resulted in an authoritarian > political order in which all intermediary institutions were swept away by a > totalizing state committed to remaking human nature and society. This did > not happen, however. The reason: the "really, existing liberalism" of the > first half of the twentieth century remained embedded in an essentially > Christian cultural matrix that tempered and limited this dynamic. > > > > Certain widespread beliefs, among them the conviction that human beings are > bearers of inalienable natural rights, that the nuclear family is a permanent > and natural institution, that the administrative state should not interfere > in domains reserved to the family and civil society, that Christians had a > right to enter the public square as Christians, and that freedom of religion > was the "first freedom" and thus entitled to robust protections, established > guardrails that limited what Social Liberals could even conceive of, much > less accomplish. Thus, though it differed in important respects from the > Christian liberalism of the Revolutionary era, a recognizably Christian > liberalism—one that proved conducive to Hittinger's three necessary societies > of family, church, and polity—also underpinned the progressive era. > > > > Latter-Day Liberalism > > Fast forward again to the late 1960s, and we see the inauguration of yet > another age of liberalism. Like the prior two liberalisms, this new form was, > in the first instance, the product of an attempt to give effect to > liberalism's defining ideals in the context of a specific set of challenges > and concerns—this time revolving around race, sex, sexuality, and the > widespread perception that American society had become stultifying and > oppressive. Unlike in the previous two eras, however, the working out of this > dialectic in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century took place not > against the backdrop of an ambient Christian culture, but against that of a > progressively post-Christian one. > > > > As thinkers such as George Weigel, Archbishop Charles Chaput, Rod Dreher, R. > R. Reno, Anthony Esolen, Mary Eberstadt, and Pierre Manent have persuasively > argued in their respective idioms, this age has witnessed an almost complete > unwinding of what Hugh Heclo has called the double-helix of liberalism and > Christianity. Largely as a result of the long march through the institutions > carried out by cultural Marxists and other illiberal forces beginning in the > interwar years but progressing with increasing vigor into the 1960s, the > bedrock Christian anthropological, sociological, and political norms that had > so productively channeled and constrained liberalism in the past were first > challenged, then increasingly discredited, and finally largely marginalized. > > > > The ultimate consequence of this unwinding was not only that it decisively > displaced the Christian customs, morals, and sentiments—what Tocqueville > called "habits of thought"—that had restrained liberalism in the past. It > also, and more consequentially, created something of a cultural vacuum—a > vacuum that was quickly filled by a form of gnosticism that had been > gestating on the margins of American society since the interwar years. > > > > What were the defining features or leitmotifs of this newly ascendant > gnosticism? Scholars as diverse as Eric Voegelin, Hans Jonas, George Weigel, > and Robert George have offered answers to this question, but I think Gerald > Hanratty best sums up its key elements. According to Hanratty, gnosticism is > a tradition of political-theological thought that coheres around three basic > themes: > > • Self-deification—the glorification and divinization of the human self; > > • Prometheanism—the valorization of the human will's potential for heroic > defiance of arbitrary authority; and > > • Vanguardism (my term)—the belief that human nature and society can be > perfected through the intervention of a spiritual and cognitive elite > possessing extraordinary insight, learning, or knowledge. > > There are other elements to contemporary gnosticism, to be sure. Professor > George, for example, has recently focused on the mind-body dualism inherent > in gnosticism to explain changes in gender and marriage norms. But while > these other elements can shed some light on the ongoing, relatively narrow—if > important—transformations in particular elements of liberalism, I find > Hanratty's focus on self-deification, Prometheanism and vanguardism > well-suited to the task of illuminating the broader transformation of > liberalism as a world-historical project. > > > > The Effects of Gnostic Liberalism > > Specifically, I would argue that, since the 1990s, the themes Hanratty > identifies have come to dominate the commanding heights of American culture > such that they now define and delimit the cultural context within which the > liberal project is being implemented. The result has been the opposite of the > dynamic tension between liberalism and Christianity that characterized most > of American history. Where Christian natural law and biblical anthropology > had tempered liberalism's core impulses, gnosticism now amplifies them, with > the result that we are now seeing the negative consequences that had always > been possible in previous eras but had not materialized thanks to the > constraining effects of Christianity. > > > > Consider, for example, the effects of the interaction between liberalism and > gnosticism in the realm of anthropology. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, > the liberal emphasis on the moral centrality of the individual human person > was tempered by a Christian anthropology that enmeshed the individual in a > web of greater or lesser obligations to God, family, community, patria, and > so forth. In practical terms, this meant that individuals, while autonomous, > were also subject to both the sovereign authority of God and the dictates of > natural law, and therefore were not radically autonomous. In the earlier eras > of Christian liberalism, individualism was less about developing for oneself > the kind of "plan of life" that John Stuart Mill famously advocated than it > was about discovering the individual's unique role in God's divine order and > liberating the individual to play that role without hindrance. > > > > Today's gnostic liberalism, however, is based on a radically different set of > anthropological assumptions. The admixture of gnostic self-deification and > liberal individualism has, over the past half-century or so, given rise to > what George Weigel calls the religion of the "imperial sovereign self." In > place of an embedded individual subject to divine authority and natural law, > we see a radically autonomous individual subject to no superintending > authority whatsoever. Where Christian liberalism involved a healthy > commitment to human dignity, gnostic liberalism involves an unhealthy worship > of the individual as a kind of divinity, a demiurge capable of fashioning and > refashioning his or her own (human) nature according to the dictates of the > sovereign will. Moreover, gnostic liberalism further assumes that in a just > society, all persons will be permitted to live according to their > self-defined nature without legal or moral hindrance. > > > > The effects of the interaction between liberalism and gnosticism can also be > discerned at the sociological level. For instance, the interaction of gnostic > Prometheanism with the core liberal value of emancipation has produced what > Roger Scruton calls a "culture of repudiation"—that is, a culture in which > every constraining tradition, custom, norm, or taboo is rejected as > oppressive. During the eras of Christian liberalism, the liberal commitment > to the liberation of the "sovereign human will" from all constraining > externalities was tempered by the Christian notion that postlapsarian human > society must place limits on the sovereign will of the individual if society > is not to collapse under the weight of sinful human nature. But in the > current era, the tempering effect of Christianity on emancipation has given > way to the amplifying effect of Promethean valorization, in which the > defiance of authority is seen as heroic. The result has been the repudiation > of any societal limitations on the sovereign will of the individual and the > rejection of the culture through which those limitations have historically > been transmitted from one generation to the next. > > > > A New Political Order > > Finally, the convergence of liberalism and gnosticism in the contemporary era > has given rise to a new conventional wisdom with regard to politics. To begin > with, absent the moderating effects of Christian beliefs regarding humanity's > fixed and fallen nature, the current era has seen the pragmatic meliorism > that characterized real, existing liberalism prior to the mid-twentieth > century mutate into a utopian meliorism—a desire to perfect humanity and > human society so as to "immanentize the eschaton," as Voegelin famously put > it. > > > > In previous eras, the liberal idea that history was bending in the direction > of a cosmopolitan and rationalist future, in which social relations and > institutions would be built on reason rather than on culture, custom, or > tradition, was tempered by an essentially Christian belief that in a > postlapsarian world, "out of the crooked timber of humanity nothing straight > was ever made." The result was a form of liberalism that assumed that while > the human condition might be improved, it could never be perfected. > > > > In the contemporary era, however, meliorism is no longer tempered by the > Christian notion that humanity is fallen and therefore imperfectible. > Instead, there is a widespread belief that a secular, cosmopolitan, and > rationalist millennium can indeed be realized. Human society can be > perfected—that is, made perfectly just, perfectly equitable, and perfectly > free. And not only human society—human nature itself, according to the canons > of gnostic liberalism, can also be perfected. Since, according to the > utopians, our nature is not unalterable, at some point in the future we > should be able to apply emerging technologies, eugenics, and even good > old-fashioned re-education to finally make straight the "crooked timber of > humanity." > > > > How will all this be brought about politically? The interaction of gnostic > vanguardism and liberal meliorism-cum-utopianism has given rise to the view > that the new order will be ushered in only when an enlightened elite is able > to construct a Leviathan-like state that will give it the power and means to > perfect society in the face of inevitable resistance from those who are less > enlightened or just plain evil. Such an elite will possess the esoteric > knowledge, the gnosis, that is needed to bring about our secular salvation, > and will exercise the leadership needed to immanentize its gnostic eschaton. > > > > But if these elites are to succeed—if they are to accelerate the movement of > history in the direction of individualism, secularism, cosmopolitanism, and > rationalism—they will need to construct a state that is truly fit for > purpose. Whereas biblical anthropology and Christian natural law established > the family, civil society, and the church as natural and necessary > institutions mediating between the state and the individual, gnosticism > recognizes no such natural or necessary institutions. Indeed, the gnostic > liberal state will need to free the sovereign will of the individual from all > these limiting institutions, while also ensuring perfect justice and > equality. > > > > In order to achieve this utopian goal, the state will have to abolish all > forms of identity and thought that do not conform to this political project, > including particular attachments (like patriotism), "irrational" belief > systems (like Christianity), mediating institutions (like civic > associations), and forms of the family that have proven most stubbornly > resistant to the more revolutionary schemes of liberal thinkers throughout > the modern age. Moreover, the state will have to free itself from "outmoded" > restraints like limited government, individual rights (especially religious > liberty), and quaint notions of "toleration." If the gnostic liberal state is > to right all that is wrong with humanity, it must become what Giles of Rome > sought to make the medieval papacy: "a creature without a halter or bridle." > > > > Our Task Today > > At the beginning of this essay, I made the claim that we are not witnessing > the end of liberalism as the principal idiom and primum mobile of American > political life. What we are witnessing is the working out of the liberal > project in the distinctive cultural context of the late twentieth and early > twenty-first centuries. The ambient Christianity that had previously tempered > the more destructive tendencies within liberalism, and that had made it > conducive to Hittinger's three societies, has now given way to a form of > gnosticism that amplifies those very tendencies, and commensurately > undermines those three societies. > > > > Thus, our current condition is neither the result of a betrayal of > liberalism's political origins nor the ultimate fulfillment of its logic. > Rather, it is a historically specific configuration of liberalism that is the > result of the deletion of the Christian DNA from the genome of liberalism and > the insertion of some gnostic DNA in its place. This being the case, the task > before us now is not so much to critique liberalism itself as to challenge > the now-regnant gnosticism within which contemporary liberalism is embedded. > > > > > > Andrew Latham is a Professor of Political Science at Macalester College in > Saint Paul, Minnesota. He has published articles in Touchstone, First Things, > Commonweal, and Crisis, plus many academic articles, a couple of scholarly > books, and a novel, The Holy Lance (2015), dealing with the Third Crusade. > > > > > > > -- > -- > Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community > <[email protected]> > Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism > Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org > > --- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- -- Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community <[email protected]> Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group. 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