The War Against the Humanities


RE: Article by Ross Douthat in NY Times


Centroids:

First, it would have been nice if Ross Douthat had used some other writer

to introduce his thesis; Auden, at least to the extent my knowledge is correct,

was a homosexual.  To refer to homosexuals in any positive sense is not

something I ever lower myself to do.  However, Douthat's story makes

important points that I cannot find any substitutes for.


His essay appears below, after a large blank space that I cannot get rid of.


Douthat's argument is summarized in the subtitle of his article:

New data on college majors confirms an old trend.

Technocracy is crushing the life out of humanism.



We are in the midst of what amounts to an all out war against the humanities.


Partly, as Douthat himself acknowledges, this is the result of what may be 
called

the "Babylonian captivity of the humanities."  The capture of the humanities by

the Cultural Marxist Left has led to increasing irrelevance of the entire field

as each discipline within it has become fodder for feminist crazies,

multi-culturalist loonies, environmentalist extremists, reverse racists

of various stripes,  transvestites and their bizarre proclivities,

homosexuals with their perversions and anti-heterosexual diatribes,

Muslims who pretend to be liberals to mask their closet fascism,

anti-Christian Atheists who wish to destroy every last church in America,

and so forth, a population of misfits  up and down the line who contribute

precisely nothing to the common good.


However, Douthat added, this is far from the whole story and, indeed, is only

a minor part of the picture.  To put a number on it, which Douthat does not do,

an educated guess is that this accounts for maybe 1/4th of the problem.

maybe even a third, but that is as far as this explanation can be taken.

Two thirds or even 75% has other  -structural-  sources.



Citing the research of Ben Schmidt, Douthat noted that:

"the years since the Great Recession have been “brutal for almost every major

in the humanities.” They’ve also been bad for “social science fields that most 
closely

resemble humanistic ones — sociology, anthropology, international relations and

political science.” Meanwhile the sciences and engineering have gained at

the expense of humanism, and with [such specializations as] sports management

and exercise studies..."



As Douthat continued:

Notably this trend is sharper among elite liberal arts colleges, the top thirty

in the US News and World Report rankings, where in the early 2000s the 
humanities

still attracted about a third of all students, but lately only get about a 
fifth. So it’s not just

a matter of the post-Great Recession middle class seeking more practical 
degrees to

make sure their student loans get repaid quickly; the slice of the American 
elite

that’s privileged enough and intellectually-minded enough to choose

Swarthmore or Haverford or Amherst over a state school or a research university

is abandoning Hermes for Apollo at the fastest clip."



Why?


That problem, said Douthat, is easy enough to understand:  " In an Apollonian 
culture,

eager for  “Useful Knowledge” and technical mastery and increasingly 
indifferent to memory

and allergic to tradition, the poet and the novelist and the theologian 
struggle to find

an official justification for their arts. And both the turn toward radical 
politics and

the turn toward high theory are attempts by humanists in the academy to supply

that justification — to rebrand the humanities as the seat of social justice and

a font of political reform, or to assume a pseudoscientific mantle that lets 
academics

claim to be interrogating literature with the rigor and precision of a lab tech 
doing dissection.


At the moment both efforts look like failed attempts."


In an effort to find out why, at one time, the humanities were fairly popular in
most universities, Douthat noted that the last period this was true, the era 
that started
under Eisenhower and ended with Kent State, was also a time when "mainline"
Protestant Christianity was still dominant in American culture. This was a 
version of
faith in which the mainline as well as Evangelicals still shared much of a 
common
morality and shared views about Jesus that were largely compatible with each 
other.
Christian faith was not about 'normalizing 'homosexuality, any such idea would 
have
been regarded as absurd at the time, it was not about patriarchal 'oppression,'
it was not about the evils of plastic bags or fossil fuels, it was all about
personal responsibility, about the finding a  sense of purpose in one's life,
it was about asking questions of your faith that mattered to you personally,.
and it was about the example of Jesus and his role in an historical drama
that is still being played out in the world and in countless private lives.

This does not mean that social concerns or environmental awareness are 
unimportant;
that isn't the point. What is the point is that as far as Christian faith as a 
living faith
is concerned, those are all secondary matters.  Which is precisely what the
so-called "liberal" churches have jettisoned in their lemming-like rush
to become ever so "relevant," in the process unwittingly driving out
entire populations of communicants who, before all else, want to focus
on Jesus and maybe, through reflection on Christ's life and words,
find solutions to personal problems that actually mean something to them
as individuals. And as members of families and of communities.

Which, as an aside, may be what explains why even Evangelical churches
have started to decline  -even if their rate of collapse is not nearly as bad
as among churches of the Religious Left.  For Evangelicals the problem
is their increasing  identification with the Republican Party,
something which the young are especially cognizant of and do not like.

Back in the era of the 1950s and 1960s, even some years into the 1970s,
some issues could be ignored because of the threat of Soviet-led Communism.
But that time has come and gone and nothing unites us now, not even
the threat of militant Islam  -which  leaders of both major parties
have gone to lengths to minimize,  to protect America's interests
in the Mid East and at the gas pump.

All of which still leaves us with the problem of the serious decline in the 
humanities
in America's colleges and universities.

The crux of the problem is high tech and, also important, student debt which 
has to
be repaid as soon as possible so that young adults can become fully functional
in modern society and afford such things as family formation.  But high tech
is anti-humanistic in substance and style and its leaders could care less
about Shakespeare or Beethoven or David Hume or anyone else
who, at one time, mattered greatly to just about everyone who
thought of themselves as educated men or women.

If there is one primary villain in this story  -there really are many similar 
villains-
it was James Conant, once the president of Harvard and someone, as Douthat said,
who was closely  associated with "the Apollonian transformation of the modern 
university,
its remaking as a scientific-technical  powerhouse with its old religious and 
humanistic
purposes hollowed out."  This dates to 1943, viz, the middle of WWII, when
it was regarded as essential for the war effort to focus on what works
and what can best help the country win the war.  But Conant's outlook
persisted long past the defeat of the Axis and into the Cold War
We still needed to know what works and what it takes
to defend ourselves from ruthless Communism.

WWII also brought about the beginnings of the computer age and, by the late 
1960s
the rise of what may be characterized as a computer culture  -at that time 
mostly located
in Massachusetts, Illinois, Armonk, and a still emergent Silicon Valley.  Now, 
of course,
that culture is pervasive, and has invaded hundreds of millions of personal 
lives
in the USA and billions around the world.

We can add some other factors that fed into the rise of computer culture with 
its disdain
for the humanities in general and religion in particular.  For example:


  *   The rise of Cultural Marxism in the late 1960s, with its emphasis on raw 
hedonism

viz, anything goes sexuality, anything goes drug experiences, and anything goes
values, most notably in the world of entertainment.  This movement, which
was centered on elite universities for its first decades, was anti-proletarian
and contributed to the shift away from the Democratic Party on the part
of the working class, first in the South but soon enough all over the map.


  *   The rise of libertarianism with its "anything goes" mentality generally,

with its anti-religion ethos because, needless to say,  religion always
takes the view that some kinds of behaviors are moral and some are immoral.
Libertarians do not recognize any differences in values since, so they insist,
everything reduces to questions of subjective personal choice, that is,
their view that there is no objective right and no objective wrong.


  *   The rise of the homosexual movement with its strong bias against 
Christian religion

and religion of almost any kind since, of course, traditionally, nearly all 
religions
have been highly critical of sodomy.


Yet, said Douthat, it all boils down to what Alan Jacobs wrote in a recent book
about Conant and his reforms at Harvard:  "In the end neither a Christian 
humanism
nor any other has been able to withstand the spirit of Conant, the spirit of 
technocratic
ambition, the spirit of truth-replaced-by-useful-knowledge, that rules today
not just in Washington and Silicon Valley but in much of academia as well"


And so we get as something akin to revealed truth the view that, to paraphrase
the title of non-related book, "everything I need to know about the humanities
I learned in grammar school."  We now live in a society populated by a majority
of cultural illiterates.  Which may exaggerate the problem but we all know
that the generalization is founded on undeniable truth.


What is the way out?  Here is Douthat's remedy:

"A hopeful road map to humanism’s recovery might include variations on ...older 
themes.
First, a return of serious academic interest in the possible (I would say 
likely) truth
of religious claims. Second, a regained sense of history as a repository of 
wisdom
and example rather than just a litany of crimes and wrongthink. Finally, a 
cultural recoil
from the tyranny of the digital and the virtual and the Very Online," that is,
from the implicit totalitarianism of high tech."

But is any of this enough to turn the tide?  Not hardly.  As much as I usually 
think highly
of Ross Douthat, in this case he is peddling bromides.  Instead of actual 
solutions
he gives us intellectual cheer leading. That is, exactly how can religion be 
seen again
as important for its truth claims?  Hint, it takes far more than wishing it was 
so.
And similarly for regaining a sense of the value of history.  And how can we
revolt against the tyranny of high tech when no-one in any kind of leadership 
role
in society is offering a reasoned critique of Silicon Valley and other computer
businesses and their effects on our culture?

The key to the problem is, so it seems to me, a new outlook that makes it clear
through hard evidence that, yes, indeed, the truth claims of religion matter a
a great deal, which is just about impossible for Evangelicals or traditional
Catholics or also Orthodox Jew sto make, since their worldviews are  
non-empirical.
Regardless, we need to dramatically rethink religion of all kinds, for me,
the way that Albert Schweitzer started doing in his seminal book
The Quest for the Historical Jesus.  Archie Bahm once started to do
something similar for Buddhism.  All of which, in any case, is the diametric
opposite of Karen Armstrong's interpretation of the world's religions
as petals of one flower, which is naive nonsense, and also the diametric 
opposite
of the kinds of literature produced in abundance by the Religious Right
with its unquestioning assumptions and studied disregard
of factual historical and other evidence.



History is also useful in many different ways, not least in terms of 
understanding

exactly why we have gotten to where we now are, in the midst of a cultural mess

of unprecedented proportions where right and wrong have become matters

of tribal politics and group identity   -with nearly  nothing grounded on

the real world effects of the values espoused by contending parties

or organizations.


Then there are the wonders of the Web and of high tech generally, where any 
opinions

on the Right or held by independent-minded political Independents are regarded

as morally wrong because, you see, all (ersatz) "truth" is the property

of the political Left.  And it does not matter that many of the heroes

of the Left are pathological liars  -viz Al Sharpton,  William Clinton,

Barack Obama, etc, and, besides, if you want a good example of a liar

on the Right, look no further than Donald Trump   -who has been characterized

by Bob Woodward as "incapable of telling the truth."


But the fact is that, at one time or another, high tech giants have deliberately

acted to censor or deny service to people who simply do not agree that the

the party line of the Democratic Party is not the truth and not something

worth believing in.  The worse examples of Leftist political bias in high tech

are found at Google, Facebook, and Apple, but the phenomenon

is just about everywhere.


This is to provide nothing more than a starting point, a few suggestions

about where we need to go.   But Douthat was right in principle.

The war against the humanities could get very interesting

very soon and be much worse than anyone now thinks

is remotely possible.



Billy R.



______________________________________


Oh, the Humanities!

New data on college majors confirms an old trend. Technocracy is crushing the 
life out of humanism.

[Ross Douthat]<https://www.nytimes.com/by/ross-douthat>

By Ross Douthat<https://www.nytimes.com/by/ross-douthat>

Opinion Columnist

  *   Aug. 8, 2018
  *
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[https://static01.nyt.com/images/2018/08/08/opinion/08douthat/merlin_142108422_d7c0b5a5-b061-42a2-be5e-b41f59ba24b0-articleLarge.jpg?quality=75&auto=webp&disable=upscale]

In the spring of 1946, W.H. Auden came to Harvard to read a 
poem<https://www.poemhunter.com/poem/under-which-lyre-3/> to the university’s 
Phi Beta Kappa chapter. Titled “Under Which Lyre: A Reactionary Tract for the 
Times,” the poem envisioned a postwar world in which, the war-god Ares having 
quit the field, public life would be dominated by a renewed contest between 
“the sons of Hermes” and “Apollo’s children” — the motley humanists against the 
efficient technocrats, the aesthetes and poets and philosophers and theologians 
against the managers and scientists and financiers and bureaucrats.


These two factions, Auden suggested, could ideally coexist: The Apollonian 
genius is for government and rule, and “the earth would soon, did Hermes run 
it,/Be like the Balkans.” But the Apollonian spirit, ever ambitious, cannot 
bear to leave the humanists to their poems and ideas and arguments, and so it 
seeks to expand its empire outward:

But jealous of our god of dreams,

His common-sense in secret schemes

To rule the heart;

Unable to invent the lyre,

Creates with simulated fire

Official art.

And when he occupies a college,

Truth is replaced by Useful Knowledge;

He pays particular Attention to Commercial Thought,

Public Relations, Hygiene, Sport,

In his curricula.


During his visit, Auden met James Conant, then the president of Harvard and a 
man associated with the Apollonian transformation of the modern university, its 
remaking as a scientific-technical powerhouse with its old religious and 
humanistic purposes hollowed out. “ ‘This is the real enemy,’ I thought to 
myself,” Auden wrote of the encounter. “And I’m sure he had the same impression 
about me.”

This anecdote appears near the end of “The Year of Our Lord 1943: Christian 
Humanism in An Age of Crisis,” a new 
book<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-year-of-our-lord-1943-9780190864651>
 by the Baylor professor Alan Jacobs. Auden is one of his main subjects; the 
others are T.S. Eliot, Simone Weil, Jacques Maritain and C.S. Lewis, a group of 
religious thinkers whose wartime writings Jacobs depicts as a sustained 
attempt, in the shadow of totalitarian ambition and liberal crisis, to offer “a 
deeply thoughtful, culturally rich Christianity” as the means to a postwar 
humanistic renewal in the West.


Jacobs also depicts their attempt as a failure, because in the end neither a 
Christian humanism nor any other has been able to withstand the spirit of 
Conant, the spirit of technocratic ambition, the spirit of 
truth-replaced-by-useful-knowledge, that rules today not just in Washington and 
Silicon Valley but in much of academia as well.


By coincidence, Jacobs’s interesting, depressing book has come out just after 
an interesting, depressing 
analysis<https://sappingattention.blogspot.com/2018/07/mea-culpa-there-is-crisis-in-humanities.html>
 of the steepening decline in the share of college students majoring in 
English, philosophy, religion, history and similar pursuits.


The analyst is a historian named Ben Schmidt, who just five years ago wrote an 
essay arguing that the decline of the humanities was overstated, that 
enrollment in humanistic majors had declined in the 1970s, mostly as women’s 
employment opportunities began switching to more pre-professional tracks, but 
that since then there has been a basic stability, at best a soft declension.


But now he’s revised his argument, because the years since the Great Recession 
have been “brutal for almost every major in the humanities.” They’ve also been 
bad for “social science fields that most closely resemble humanistic ones — 
sociology, anthropology, international relations and political science.” 
Meanwhile the sciences and engineering have gained at the expense of humanism, 
and with them sports management and exercise studies — the “hygiene” and 
“sport,” if you will, from Auden’s list of Apollonian concerns.

Notably this trend is sharper among elite liberal arts colleges, the top thirty 
in the US News and World Report rankings, where in the early 2000s the 
humanities still attracted about a third of all students, but lately only get 
about a fifth. So it’s not just a matter of the post-Great Recession middle 
class seeking more practical degrees to make sure their student loans get 
repaid quickly; the slice of the American elite that’s privileged enough and 
intellectually-minded enough to choose Swarthmore or Haverford or Amherst over 
a state school or a research university is abandoning Hermes for Apollo at the 
fastest clip.


Even this acceleration is no doubt partially driven by economic concerns: Elite 
college grads are by no means immune to feelings of precarity. But as with 
another, more literally humanistic pursuit — childbearing — that had seemed to 
stabilize after a post-1960s collapse but now is in decline again, the absence 
of a post-Great Recession bounce-back for the humanities suggests that the 
economic calamity of 2008 was a precondition but not the only cause, and that 
other cultural shifts had left the humanities ripe for another era of collapse.


In explaining those shifts many conservatives blame the humanists themselves, 
for being politicized and marching lock step to the left and for pursuing 
postmodernist obscurantism in their scholarship and prose. But I think it’s 
more useful to step back a bit and recognize both politicization and postmodern 
jargon as attempted solutions to a pre-existing problem, not the taproot of the 
crisis.


That problem is the one that Auden identified seventy years ago: In an 
Apollonian culture, eager for “Useful Knowledge” and technical mastery and 
increasingly indifferent to memory and allergic to tradition, the poet and the 
novelist and the theologian struggle to find an official justification for 
their arts. And both the turn toward radical politics and the turn toward high 
theory are attempts by humanists in the academy to supply that justification — 
to rebrand the humanities as the seat of social justice and a font of political 
reform, or to assume a pseudoscientific mantle that lets academics claim to be 
interrogating literature with the rigor and precision of a lab tech doing 
dissection.


At the moment both efforts look like failed attempts. But is there an 
alternative? Here I would dissent a little from the sternness of Jacobs’s 
pessimism, since I think the Christian humanists that he describes — and their 
secular and Jewish counterparts — had a little more short-run success than he 
suggests. There was real growth in humanities majors beginning in the 1950s 
(stronger among women than men, but present among both), and that indicator 
corresponded to a genuine mass interest, mediated by journalists and 
popularizers as well as academia, in pursuits that now seem esoteric and 
strictly elitist — poetry and public theology, classical music and abstract 
impressionism, the Great American novel and the high theory of French cinema 
and more.


What sustained this temporary cultural moment, middlebrow and crass in all 
sorts of ways but still more successfully humanistic than our own? Three 
forces, in particular, that are no longer with us. First, there was a stronger 
religious element in midcentury culture, visible both in the general postwar 
religious revival and in the particular theological-intellectual flowering that 
Jacobs’s subjects embodied, which rooted midcentury humanism in a metaphysical 
understanding of human life — an understanding that both ennobled acts of 
artistic creation and justified a strong interest in the human person’s 
interiority, his actual person as opposed to just his brain chemistry or social 
role.


Second, there was the example of a rival civilization, totalitarian Communism, 
in which the Apollonian model had been pushed to its materialist-utopian 
conclusion and discovered only a ruthless, inhuman dead end. And third, forged 
in response to the Communist threat, there was a sense of Western identity, 
Western historical tradition, that could be glib and propagandistic in a 
from-Plato-to-NATO style, but at its best let people escape the worst of late 
modern afflictions, the crippling chauvinism of the now.

This precise combination is not recoverable: Communism is dead (I think), the 
religious landscape of the 1950s is even deader, and the humanistic history of 
midcentury was Eurocentric in a way that a more globalized and multiracial 
society could neither embrace nor sustain.


But a hopeful road map to humanism’s recovery might include variations on those 
older themes. First, a return of serious academic interest in the possible (I 
would say likely) truth of religious claims. Second, a regained sense of 
history as a repository of wisdom and example rather than just a litany of 
crimes and wrongthink. Finally, a cultural recoil from the tyranny of the 
digital and the virtual and the Very Online, today’s version of the 
technocratic, technological, potentially totalitarian Machine that Jacobs’s 
Christian humanists opposed.


Auden’s poem closes with comic (but not really) advice for humanists: Thou 
shalt not sit/ With statisticians nor commit/A social science … Thou shalt not 
be on friendly terms/With guys in advertising firms … If thou must 
choose/Between the chances, choose the odd;/ Read The New Yorker, trust in God …

Imagine “social media” where “advertising” sits in the stanza and imagine an 
intellectual climate where the last piece of advice doesn’t seem like a 
contradiction in terms, and you’ve imagined the beginnings of humanism’s 
revival. May we live to see the day.

-- 
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Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
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