I’ve decided that the real problem of liberalism started with Aristotle and his 
polis, which made a virtue of elitist intellectual tyranny. 

The alternative to politics as usual is something like “oikotics” — run the 
city like a family, for the flourishing of the inhabitants. With strict 
discipline, yes, but all in the service of self-sacrificing love. 

I’m not sure how to explain this to you, given how insane your own family was. 

I’d refer you to the fatherhood of God, but I get the sense that really isn’t 
part of your theology, even though it was central for Jesus...

E

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 3, 2019, at 12:51, Billy Rojas <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Ernie:
> 
> There is also the factor of the appeal of liberalism to the non-elite
> 
> because it offers the promise of a fair and just society. Therefore it is 
> realistic
> 
> -even when it isn't-  to sign on with the liberals as a means to further
> 
> one's self interests as a striver to better things.
> 
> 
> 
> What they don't tell you is that liberals also want to protect their elite 
> status.
> 
> This may conflict with the upward mobility aspirations of the strivers.
> 
> 
> 
> Etc.
> 
> 
> 
> The question is: What is better? Anything? 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Billy
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on 
> behalf of Centroids <[email protected]>
> Sent: Sunday, February 3, 2019 12:37 PM
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [RC] A fresh look at the history of liberalism and its 
> inconsistencies
>  
> Great article. I’ve been talking it up at the urban mobility conference I 
> attended, as it explains why so many liberals are violently opposed to 
> democratic reforms that impact their comfort and convenience. 
> 
> Sent from my iPhone
> 
> On Jan 30, 2019, at 13:01, Chris Hahn <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
>> Interesting article Billy.  Indeed, the word Conflicted, in the title, is 
>> appropriate.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> A political tradition with roots in paternalistic elitism, liberalism is 
>> nevertheless a product of the modern age and must ally itself with 
>> democracy. This alliance has produced many moments of profound ambivalence. 
>> Appeals to the people mix with fears of the people’s powers; despite the 
>> professed centrism of most liberals, modern history does not lack examples 
>> of liberals siding with authoritarians when faced by unpredictable radical 
>> democratic forces. And when calls to honor the public good bump up against 
>> self-interest, liberals often suffer a moment of queasiness that is usually 
>> salved by declaring a problem “complicated.”
>> 
>>  
>> 
>>  
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> From: [email protected] <[email protected]> On 
>> Behalf Of Billy Rojas
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2019 1:11 PM
>> To: Centroids Discussions <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Billy Rojas <[email protected]>
>> Subject: [RC] A fresh look at the history of liberalism and its 
>> inconsistencies
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Note: Large blank space in the article due to vagaries of copying
>> 
>> but only a minor inconvenience to reading the informative article,
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> BR note
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> ----------------------------------------------------------
>> 
>>  
>> 
>>  
>> 
>>  
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> The New Republic
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> The Conflicted Soul of Modern Liberalism
>> 
>> A new book traces the history of an idea—and shows what American liberals 
>> have lost.
>> 
>> By Warren Breckman
>> 
>> January 24, 2019
>> 
>> “In the United States at this time,” Lionel Trilling asserted in 1950, 
>> “liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual 
>> tradition.” A few years later, in his highly influential book The Liberal 
>> Tradition in America, the political scientist Louis Hartz would suggest that 
>> “the reality of atomistic social freedom” is “instinctive in the American 
>> mind.” Hartz construed liberalism narrowly as individualism and property 
>> rights, and he regarded these as the defining characteristics of American 
>> politics and culture. In turn, he took these as signs of an American 
>> exceptionalism, stemming from the absence of feudalism, as well as the 
>> weakness of both collectivism and a truly reactionary politics, in the 
>> nation’s history.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> THE LOST HISTORY OF LIBERALISM: FROM ANCIENT ROME TO THE TWENTY-FIRST 
>> CENTURY by Helena RosenblattPrinceton University Press, 368 pp., $35.00
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Statements like those of Trilling and Hartz expressed a short-lived belief 
>> that the long sweep of American history was anchored in an elemental 
>> centrist political consensus wherein extremes of the Left and Right could 
>> only be viewed as deviations from the norm. Few scholars today would accept 
>> this depiction or the ideological weight it bore in the mid-twentieth 
>> century. In truth, the term liberalism was not widely used for much of 
>> American history. As Helena Rosenblatt argues in her wide-ranging and 
>> important book, The Lost History of Liberalism, this is a history mainly to 
>> be told in Europe. On a continent thrown into tumult by the French 
>> Revolution and the expansionist ambitions of Napoleon Bonaparte, the term 
>> “liberalism” first appeared around 1812. Initially a term of abuse, 
>> liberalism was soon accepted as a self-description by reformist politicians 
>> and intellectuals in Britain and Western Europe. As a political term, 
>> “liberal” was rare, by contrast, in early nineteenth-century America.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> It was not until the early twentieth century that progressive intellectuals 
>> like the cofounder of The New Republic, Herbert Croly, began to popularize 
>> liberalism in America. Croly’s was a liberalism, Rosenblatt pointedly 
>> insists, that vigorously denounced laissez-faire economics and supported 
>> government intervention in the economy; its intellectual support came not 
>> from John Locke, America’s philosophical godfather in Hartz’s account, but 
>> from the so-called “social liberals” of late nineteenth-century Germany and 
>> Britain. A regular contributor to The New Republic, John Dewey, reinforced 
>> this direction in numerous articles in the 1930s, culminating in his 
>> assertion that there were “two streams” of liberalism. One was anchored in 
>> laissez-faire economics, worshipped the “gospel of individualism,” and 
>> served as a toady of big industry and banking. The other was humanitarian 
>> and open to government interventions and social legislation. American 
>> liberalism, wrote Dewey, stood for “liberality and generosity, especially of 
>> mind and character.”
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> American liberalism, wrote Dewey, stood for “liberality and generosity, 
>> especially of mind and character.”
>> 
>> Rosenblatt describes her book as, essentially, a “word history of 
>> liberalism”—a work tracing the variable meanings that lie behind the seeming 
>> stability of a word over time. Pursuit of this history leads Rosenblatt back 
>> to the ancient Roman Republic, where it was believed that liberty required 
>> more than the formal protections offered by the law; freedom demanded that 
>> citizens practice liberalitas, meaning “a noble and generous way of thinking 
>> and acting toward one’s fellow citizens.” Cultivating these qualities was 
>> the task and duty of the citizen, and the artes liberales were to be the 
>> educational forms that would aid in this task.
>> 
>> For almost two millennia, Rosenblatt contends, being liberal meant 
>> displaying the civic virtues. Clearly an aristocratic ethos, liberality in 
>> its Roman, medieval, and early modern forms supported the concept of 
>> noblesse oblige and, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the ideal 
>> of the gentleman who showed tolerance and munificence toward his inferiors. 
>> Below this hierarchical ideal of social relations, Rosenblatt detects 
>> gradual changes. The Protestant Reformation extended the virtue of 
>> generosity to the people as a whole, while Enlightenment thinkers began to 
>> speak not only of liberal individuals, but of liberal sentiments and ideas.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> With the age of revolutions came a sea change in the use of the term. The 
>> American Declaration of Independence and the Constitution ushered in an 
>> epoch when rights and liberties would no longer depend on the liberality of 
>> well-disposed sovereigns but would issue from a generous and free people 
>> legislating for itself. In Europe, struggles around the principles of the 
>> French Revolution added an even stronger political dimension. In the midst 
>> of a wave of revolutions in Spain, Sardinia, Naples, Portugal, and Greece in 
>> the 1810s and early 1820s, one hostile commentator perfectly summed up the 
>> change when he lamented that the word “liberal” no longer meant “a man of 
>> generous sentiments, of enlarged, expansive mind” but a person professing 
>> “political principles averse to most of the existing governments of Europe.”
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Liberalism emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution as both a 
>> political movement and a current of political thought, when individuals such 
>> as Benjamin Constant, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville often 
>> combined roles as politicians and theoreticians. As liberalism expanded, it 
>> produced a proliferation of meanings. Indeed, liberalism never had a unified 
>> doctrine, as Rosenblatt reminds us frequently. Sharp differences emerged 
>> among nineteenth-century liberals on fundamental issues. Should liberals 
>> support insurrectionary movements or work to reform existing governments? 
>> Can democracy, in its seemingly inevitable advance, be steered to avoid the 
>> tyranny of the majority while securing liberal values? Should women be 
>> enfranchised? Is liberalism compatible with European colonialism?
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Liberals were divided on each of these questions. The same was true of 
>> liberal opinions on religion and economics. John Locke’s famed “Letter on 
>> Toleration” set a theme for the Enlightenment, which embraced religious 
>> tolerance as a core liberal value. Strong affinities between the 
>> Enlightenment and liberality have produced a commonplace that liberals are 
>> indifferent or even hostile toward religion. Rosenblatt counters this by 
>> pointing repeatedly to liberals’ reliance on religion. Indeed, Locke’s 
>> toleration made place for the three major monotheistic religions but saw no 
>> place for atheism, because it lacked a transcendent authority.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> For many liberals, some sort of transcendent principle seemed necessary for 
>> the moral integrity of society. The faith of choice for many 
>> nineteenth-century liberals was Protestantism, or at least an open, 
>> non-hierarchical and even non-transcendental variant of Protestantism that, 
>> at its extreme, could shade over into the “religion of humanity” championed 
>> by a host of mid-nineteenth-century liberals including Mill, William Ellery 
>> Channing, Eugene Sue, Johann Bluntschli, and Edgar Quinet. [the concept and 
>> the exact phrase was invented by Auguste Comte, a one time disciple of Henri 
>> Saint-Simon] Not surprisingly, Catholicism was the frequent bête-noire of 
>> liberals such as these, sometimes even pushing them into very illiberal 
>> support of anti-Catholic policies. Catholicism responded in kind: Papal 
>> encyclicals denounced liberalism as a pestilence and an evil, mired in 
>> selfishness, materialism, and unbelief. It was not until the Second Vatican 
>> Council in 1965 that the Church would formally proclaim religious liberty a 
>> universal right “greatly in accord with truth and justice.”
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> In the economic sphere, liberals formed anything but a common front. To be 
>> sure, there were figures such as Frédéric Bastiat and Herbert Spencer who 
>> campaigned tirelessly for a minimal state and an unimpeded free market. But 
>> most nineteenth-century liberals were not doctrinaire champions of the free 
>> market, and they entertained a range of opinions about free trade and the 
>> extent of government intervention. John Stuart Mill is a particularly 
>> interesting case. In his young adulthood, Mill was a nondogmatic defender of 
>> laissez-faire, but as he aged, he witnessed the bevy of social problems that 
>> accompanied the growth of the industrial economy, and he became increasingly 
>> receptive to socialism. Ironically, an 1884 American abridgment of Mill’s 
>> Principles of Political Economy removed all references to the benefits of 
>> state intervention, thereby cementing a distorted image of Mill as a free 
>> marketeer just five years after the publication of Mill’s essays on 
>> socialism.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Rosenblatt says nothing about eighteenth and nineteenth-century German 
>> figures such as Pestalozzi, Goethe, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, who had a deep 
>> impact on Mill’s conception of human flourishing. Instead, she maintains 
>> that Germany’s great and largely neglected contribution to the history of 
>> liberalism came in the late nineteenth century, when activist intellectuals 
>> insisted on the compatibility of liberal values and state intervention aimed 
>> at creating the social preconditions of individual fulfillment. The impact 
>> of this so-called “New Liberalism” was considerable. In Germany, it 
>> reoriented a somewhat older tradition of paternalistic state action toward 
>> modern values; it helped shift a significant part of the German socialist 
>> movement away from revolution and toward reformism. In a trajectory that 
>> Rosenblatt does not trace, it is also the intellectual ancestor of the 
>> post-1945 German idea of the Sozialmarktwirtschaft (social market economy).
>> 
>> Only in the post-World War II era, Rosenblatt argues, did liberals begin to 
>> dispense with the notion of the public good.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The German ideas found many supporters in fin-de-siècle Britain, where 
>> William Gladstone had already done a lot to temper liberals’ habitual 
>> suspicions of the working-class masses. This was the form that appealed to 
>> Progressive-era American liberals like Croly and Dewey. The onset of World 
>> War I dealt a blow to the credibility of all things German, but the 
>> resonances of New Liberalism certainly continued in the New Deal.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Only in the post-World War II era, Rosenblatt argues, did liberals begin to 
>> dispense with the notion of the public good and reduce liberalism’s meaning 
>> to doctrinaire free market ideology and individualism. In a book attuned to 
>> the power of words, it is surprising that “neoliberalism” appears only once, 
>> in passing. Surely, the rise of neoliberalism, now charted in detail by 
>> several historians, is a crucial part of the story: After  all, it was 
>> neoliberalism, with its anti-statism, its reduction of human relations to 
>> transactional logic, and its fundamental belief in the invisible hand, that 
>> presided over the narrowing of liberalism’s meaning, even as neoliberalism 
>> steered those values toward the political right.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> In her long history of liberalism, Rosenblatt’s treatment of the twentieth 
>> century remains more or less restricted to showing the triumph of 
>> laissez-faire and individualist liberalism in America. Yet even in America, 
>> the “generous” stream of liberalism suggested by John Dewey persists—though 
>> it has undoubtedly been battered and bruised in recent decades. What is 
>> more, she gives relatively little attention to the fate of liberalism in 
>> twentieth-century France and Germany, even though, in the decades after 
>> World War II, France and West Germany were arguably the strongest 
>> embodiments of the older liberal traditions that she contrasts with post-war 
>> American liberalism. After all, both social democrats and Christian 
>> democrats in postwar France and West Germany sought to balance protection of 
>> individual rights with broad social agendas, aimed at ensuring some degree 
>> of fairness in economic arrangements.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Rosenblatt’s message for our own time is rather tepid. Clearly, she believes 
>> that a liberalism concentrated exclusively on the free market and individual 
>> rights is inadequate to a new era in which both liberalism and democracy are 
>> suffering renewed crises of legitimacy. “Liberalism, there are those who 
>> say, contains within itself the resources it needs to articulate a 
>> conception of the good and a liberal theory of virtue. Liberals,” she 
>> writes, “should reconnect with the resources of their liberal tradition to 
>> recover, understand, and embrace its core values.”
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> It is useful to be reminded that liberals have long insisted on generosity, 
>> the need for state intervention, and overarching conceptions of the public 
>> good. But can one convincingly designate these civic-minded qualities the 
>> core values of a political tradition that for two centuries has also 
>> repeatedly declared its allegiance to possessive individualism and the free 
>> market? Both sets of values seem equally to exist in the internally 
>> conflicted soul of modern liberalism.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Instead of leading us to a set of regenerative virtues, Rosenblatt’s account 
>> underscores the dilemmas that have chronically plagued liberalism. The 
>> history of liberalism brims with examples of fine-sounding appeals to the 
>> public good, but how is that to be determined and by whom? A political 
>> tradition with roots in paternalistic elitism, liberalism is nevertheless a 
>> product of the modern age and must ally itself with democracy. This alliance 
>> has produced many moments of profound ambivalence. Appeals to the people mix 
>> with fears of the people’s powers; despite the professed centrism of most 
>> liberals, modern history does not lack examples of liberals siding with 
>> authoritarians when faced by unpredictable radical democratic forces. And 
>> when calls to honor the public good bump up against self-interest, liberals 
>> often suffer a moment of queasiness that is usually salved by declaring a 
>> problem “complicated.”
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> The triumphalism of mid-century American liberals like Trilling and Hartz 
>> looks quaint measured against liberalism’s long history, which far from 
>> tracing an arc of progress has been marked by ruptures, setbacks, 
>> self-contradictions, and cringe-worthy instances of hypocrisy. That vexed 
>> history revisits us presently, although it is not clear whether the period 
>> we are entering threatens to bring illiberal democracy or undemocratic 
>> liberalism. The great German historian Friedrich Meinecke remarked in 1927, 
>> on the eve of a collapse he did not yet foresee, that liberalism’s “strength 
>> today is also its weakness”—“It is so fully absorbed into the entire 
>> organism of our life that it is either ignored or treated as self-evident.” 
>> Too easily taken for granted, liberalism can wither and die, as Meinecke and 
>> his countrymen were soon to learn. Perhaps the best defense against that 
>> fate is not to defend liberalism, but to champion the liberal sentiments 
>> that animate a much broader political spectrum.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> -- 
>> -- 
>> Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
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