I’ve decided that the real problem of liberalism started with Aristotle and his polis, which made a virtue of elitist intellectual tyranny.
The alternative to politics as usual is something like “oikotics” — run the city like a family, for the flourishing of the inhabitants. With strict discipline, yes, but all in the service of self-sacrificing love. I’m not sure how to explain this to you, given how insane your own family was. I’d refer you to the fatherhood of God, but I get the sense that really isn’t part of your theology, even though it was central for Jesus... E Sent from my iPhone > On Feb 3, 2019, at 12:51, Billy Rojas <[email protected]> wrote: > > Ernie: > > There is also the factor of the appeal of liberalism to the non-elite > > because it offers the promise of a fair and just society. Therefore it is > realistic > > -even when it isn't- to sign on with the liberals as a means to further > > one's self interests as a striver to better things. > > > > What they don't tell you is that liberals also want to protect their elite > status. > > This may conflict with the upward mobility aspirations of the strivers. > > > > Etc. > > > > The question is: What is better? Anything? > > > > > > Billy > > > > > > > > From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on > behalf of Centroids <[email protected]> > Sent: Sunday, February 3, 2019 12:37 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [RC] A fresh look at the history of liberalism and its > inconsistencies > > Great article. I’ve been talking it up at the urban mobility conference I > attended, as it explains why so many liberals are violently opposed to > democratic reforms that impact their comfort and convenience. > > Sent from my iPhone > > On Jan 30, 2019, at 13:01, Chris Hahn <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Interesting article Billy. Indeed, the word Conflicted, in the title, is >> appropriate. >> >> >> >> A political tradition with roots in paternalistic elitism, liberalism is >> nevertheless a product of the modern age and must ally itself with >> democracy. This alliance has produced many moments of profound ambivalence. >> Appeals to the people mix with fears of the people’s powers; despite the >> professed centrism of most liberals, modern history does not lack examples >> of liberals siding with authoritarians when faced by unpredictable radical >> democratic forces. And when calls to honor the public good bump up against >> self-interest, liberals often suffer a moment of queasiness that is usually >> salved by declaring a problem “complicated.” >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From: [email protected] <[email protected]> On >> Behalf Of Billy Rojas >> Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2019 1:11 PM >> To: Centroids Discussions <[email protected]> >> Cc: Billy Rojas <[email protected]> >> Subject: [RC] A fresh look at the history of liberalism and its >> inconsistencies >> >> >> >> Note: Large blank space in the article due to vagaries of copying >> >> but only a minor inconvenience to reading the informative article, >> >> >> >> BR note >> >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The New Republic >> >> >> >> The Conflicted Soul of Modern Liberalism >> >> A new book traces the history of an idea—and shows what American liberals >> have lost. >> >> By Warren Breckman >> >> January 24, 2019 >> >> “In the United States at this time,” Lionel Trilling asserted in 1950, >> “liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual >> tradition.” A few years later, in his highly influential book The Liberal >> Tradition in America, the political scientist Louis Hartz would suggest that >> “the reality of atomistic social freedom” is “instinctive in the American >> mind.” Hartz construed liberalism narrowly as individualism and property >> rights, and he regarded these as the defining characteristics of American >> politics and culture. In turn, he took these as signs of an American >> exceptionalism, stemming from the absence of feudalism, as well as the >> weakness of both collectivism and a truly reactionary politics, in the >> nation’s history. >> >> >> >> THE LOST HISTORY OF LIBERALISM: FROM ANCIENT ROME TO THE TWENTY-FIRST >> CENTURY by Helena RosenblattPrinceton University Press, 368 pp., $35.00 >> >> >> >> Statements like those of Trilling and Hartz expressed a short-lived belief >> that the long sweep of American history was anchored in an elemental >> centrist political consensus wherein extremes of the Left and Right could >> only be viewed as deviations from the norm. Few scholars today would accept >> this depiction or the ideological weight it bore in the mid-twentieth >> century. In truth, the term liberalism was not widely used for much of >> American history. As Helena Rosenblatt argues in her wide-ranging and >> important book, The Lost History of Liberalism, this is a history mainly to >> be told in Europe. On a continent thrown into tumult by the French >> Revolution and the expansionist ambitions of Napoleon Bonaparte, the term >> “liberalism” first appeared around 1812. Initially a term of abuse, >> liberalism was soon accepted as a self-description by reformist politicians >> and intellectuals in Britain and Western Europe. As a political term, >> “liberal” was rare, by contrast, in early nineteenth-century America. >> >> >> >> It was not until the early twentieth century that progressive intellectuals >> like the cofounder of The New Republic, Herbert Croly, began to popularize >> liberalism in America. Croly’s was a liberalism, Rosenblatt pointedly >> insists, that vigorously denounced laissez-faire economics and supported >> government intervention in the economy; its intellectual support came not >> from John Locke, America’s philosophical godfather in Hartz’s account, but >> from the so-called “social liberals” of late nineteenth-century Germany and >> Britain. A regular contributor to The New Republic, John Dewey, reinforced >> this direction in numerous articles in the 1930s, culminating in his >> assertion that there were “two streams” of liberalism. One was anchored in >> laissez-faire economics, worshipped the “gospel of individualism,” and >> served as a toady of big industry and banking. The other was humanitarian >> and open to government interventions and social legislation. American >> liberalism, wrote Dewey, stood for “liberality and generosity, especially of >> mind and character.” >> >> >> >> American liberalism, wrote Dewey, stood for “liberality and generosity, >> especially of mind and character.” >> >> Rosenblatt describes her book as, essentially, a “word history of >> liberalism”—a work tracing the variable meanings that lie behind the seeming >> stability of a word over time. Pursuit of this history leads Rosenblatt back >> to the ancient Roman Republic, where it was believed that liberty required >> more than the formal protections offered by the law; freedom demanded that >> citizens practice liberalitas, meaning “a noble and generous way of thinking >> and acting toward one’s fellow citizens.” Cultivating these qualities was >> the task and duty of the citizen, and the artes liberales were to be the >> educational forms that would aid in this task. >> >> For almost two millennia, Rosenblatt contends, being liberal meant >> displaying the civic virtues. Clearly an aristocratic ethos, liberality in >> its Roman, medieval, and early modern forms supported the concept of >> noblesse oblige and, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the ideal >> of the gentleman who showed tolerance and munificence toward his inferiors. >> Below this hierarchical ideal of social relations, Rosenblatt detects >> gradual changes. The Protestant Reformation extended the virtue of >> generosity to the people as a whole, while Enlightenment thinkers began to >> speak not only of liberal individuals, but of liberal sentiments and ideas. >> >> >> >> With the age of revolutions came a sea change in the use of the term. The >> American Declaration of Independence and the Constitution ushered in an >> epoch when rights and liberties would no longer depend on the liberality of >> well-disposed sovereigns but would issue from a generous and free people >> legislating for itself. In Europe, struggles around the principles of the >> French Revolution added an even stronger political dimension. In the midst >> of a wave of revolutions in Spain, Sardinia, Naples, Portugal, and Greece in >> the 1810s and early 1820s, one hostile commentator perfectly summed up the >> change when he lamented that the word “liberal” no longer meant “a man of >> generous sentiments, of enlarged, expansive mind” but a person professing >> “political principles averse to most of the existing governments of Europe.” >> >> >> >> >> >> Liberalism emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution as both a >> political movement and a current of political thought, when individuals such >> as Benjamin Constant, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville often >> combined roles as politicians and theoreticians. As liberalism expanded, it >> produced a proliferation of meanings. Indeed, liberalism never had a unified >> doctrine, as Rosenblatt reminds us frequently. Sharp differences emerged >> among nineteenth-century liberals on fundamental issues. Should liberals >> support insurrectionary movements or work to reform existing governments? >> Can democracy, in its seemingly inevitable advance, be steered to avoid the >> tyranny of the majority while securing liberal values? Should women be >> enfranchised? Is liberalism compatible with European colonialism? >> >> >> >> Liberals were divided on each of these questions. The same was true of >> liberal opinions on religion and economics. John Locke’s famed “Letter on >> Toleration” set a theme for the Enlightenment, which embraced religious >> tolerance as a core liberal value. Strong affinities between the >> Enlightenment and liberality have produced a commonplace that liberals are >> indifferent or even hostile toward religion. Rosenblatt counters this by >> pointing repeatedly to liberals’ reliance on religion. Indeed, Locke’s >> toleration made place for the three major monotheistic religions but saw no >> place for atheism, because it lacked a transcendent authority. >> >> >> >> For many liberals, some sort of transcendent principle seemed necessary for >> the moral integrity of society. The faith of choice for many >> nineteenth-century liberals was Protestantism, or at least an open, >> non-hierarchical and even non-transcendental variant of Protestantism that, >> at its extreme, could shade over into the “religion of humanity” championed >> by a host of mid-nineteenth-century liberals including Mill, William Ellery >> Channing, Eugene Sue, Johann Bluntschli, and Edgar Quinet. [the concept and >> the exact phrase was invented by Auguste Comte, a one time disciple of Henri >> Saint-Simon] Not surprisingly, Catholicism was the frequent bête-noire of >> liberals such as these, sometimes even pushing them into very illiberal >> support of anti-Catholic policies. Catholicism responded in kind: Papal >> encyclicals denounced liberalism as a pestilence and an evil, mired in >> selfishness, materialism, and unbelief. It was not until the Second Vatican >> Council in 1965 that the Church would formally proclaim religious liberty a >> universal right “greatly in accord with truth and justice.” >> >> >> >> In the economic sphere, liberals formed anything but a common front. To be >> sure, there were figures such as Frédéric Bastiat and Herbert Spencer who >> campaigned tirelessly for a minimal state and an unimpeded free market. But >> most nineteenth-century liberals were not doctrinaire champions of the free >> market, and they entertained a range of opinions about free trade and the >> extent of government intervention. John Stuart Mill is a particularly >> interesting case. In his young adulthood, Mill was a nondogmatic defender of >> laissez-faire, but as he aged, he witnessed the bevy of social problems that >> accompanied the growth of the industrial economy, and he became increasingly >> receptive to socialism. Ironically, an 1884 American abridgment of Mill’s >> Principles of Political Economy removed all references to the benefits of >> state intervention, thereby cementing a distorted image of Mill as a free >> marketeer just five years after the publication of Mill’s essays on >> socialism. >> >> >> >> Rosenblatt says nothing about eighteenth and nineteenth-century German >> figures such as Pestalozzi, Goethe, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, who had a deep >> impact on Mill’s conception of human flourishing. Instead, she maintains >> that Germany’s great and largely neglected contribution to the history of >> liberalism came in the late nineteenth century, when activist intellectuals >> insisted on the compatibility of liberal values and state intervention aimed >> at creating the social preconditions of individual fulfillment. The impact >> of this so-called “New Liberalism” was considerable. In Germany, it >> reoriented a somewhat older tradition of paternalistic state action toward >> modern values; it helped shift a significant part of the German socialist >> movement away from revolution and toward reformism. In a trajectory that >> Rosenblatt does not trace, it is also the intellectual ancestor of the >> post-1945 German idea of the Sozialmarktwirtschaft (social market economy). >> >> Only in the post-World War II era, Rosenblatt argues, did liberals begin to >> dispense with the notion of the public good. >> >> >> >> The German ideas found many supporters in fin-de-siècle Britain, where >> William Gladstone had already done a lot to temper liberals’ habitual >> suspicions of the working-class masses. This was the form that appealed to >> Progressive-era American liberals like Croly and Dewey. The onset of World >> War I dealt a blow to the credibility of all things German, but the >> resonances of New Liberalism certainly continued in the New Deal. >> >> >> >> Only in the post-World War II era, Rosenblatt argues, did liberals begin to >> dispense with the notion of the public good and reduce liberalism’s meaning >> to doctrinaire free market ideology and individualism. In a book attuned to >> the power of words, it is surprising that “neoliberalism” appears only once, >> in passing. Surely, the rise of neoliberalism, now charted in detail by >> several historians, is a crucial part of the story: After all, it was >> neoliberalism, with its anti-statism, its reduction of human relations to >> transactional logic, and its fundamental belief in the invisible hand, that >> presided over the narrowing of liberalism’s meaning, even as neoliberalism >> steered those values toward the political right. >> >> >> >> In her long history of liberalism, Rosenblatt’s treatment of the twentieth >> century remains more or less restricted to showing the triumph of >> laissez-faire and individualist liberalism in America. Yet even in America, >> the “generous” stream of liberalism suggested by John Dewey persists—though >> it has undoubtedly been battered and bruised in recent decades. What is >> more, she gives relatively little attention to the fate of liberalism in >> twentieth-century France and Germany, even though, in the decades after >> World War II, France and West Germany were arguably the strongest >> embodiments of the older liberal traditions that she contrasts with post-war >> American liberalism. After all, both social democrats and Christian >> democrats in postwar France and West Germany sought to balance protection of >> individual rights with broad social agendas, aimed at ensuring some degree >> of fairness in economic arrangements. >> >> >> >> Rosenblatt’s message for our own time is rather tepid. Clearly, she believes >> that a liberalism concentrated exclusively on the free market and individual >> rights is inadequate to a new era in which both liberalism and democracy are >> suffering renewed crises of legitimacy. “Liberalism, there are those who >> say, contains within itself the resources it needs to articulate a >> conception of the good and a liberal theory of virtue. Liberals,” she >> writes, “should reconnect with the resources of their liberal tradition to >> recover, understand, and embrace its core values.” >> >> >> >> It is useful to be reminded that liberals have long insisted on generosity, >> the need for state intervention, and overarching conceptions of the public >> good. But can one convincingly designate these civic-minded qualities the >> core values of a political tradition that for two centuries has also >> repeatedly declared its allegiance to possessive individualism and the free >> market? Both sets of values seem equally to exist in the internally >> conflicted soul of modern liberalism. >> >> >> >> Instead of leading us to a set of regenerative virtues, Rosenblatt’s account >> underscores the dilemmas that have chronically plagued liberalism. The >> history of liberalism brims with examples of fine-sounding appeals to the >> public good, but how is that to be determined and by whom? A political >> tradition with roots in paternalistic elitism, liberalism is nevertheless a >> product of the modern age and must ally itself with democracy. This alliance >> has produced many moments of profound ambivalence. Appeals to the people mix >> with fears of the people’s powers; despite the professed centrism of most >> liberals, modern history does not lack examples of liberals siding with >> authoritarians when faced by unpredictable radical democratic forces. And >> when calls to honor the public good bump up against self-interest, liberals >> often suffer a moment of queasiness that is usually salved by declaring a >> problem “complicated.” >> >> >> >> The triumphalism of mid-century American liberals like Trilling and Hartz >> looks quaint measured against liberalism’s long history, which far from >> tracing an arc of progress has been marked by ruptures, setbacks, >> self-contradictions, and cringe-worthy instances of hypocrisy. That vexed >> history revisits us presently, although it is not clear whether the period >> we are entering threatens to bring illiberal democracy or undemocratic >> liberalism. The great German historian Friedrich Meinecke remarked in 1927, >> on the eve of a collapse he did not yet foresee, that liberalism’s “strength >> today is also its weakness”—“It is so fully absorbed into the entire >> organism of our life that it is either ignored or treated as self-evident.” >> Too easily taken for granted, liberalism can wither and die, as Meinecke and >> his countrymen were soon to learn. Perhaps the best defense against that >> fate is not to defend liberalism, but to champion the liberal sentiments >> that animate a much broader political spectrum. >> >> >> >> -- >> -- >> Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community >> <[email protected]> >> Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism >> Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org >> >> --- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> -- >> -- >> Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community >> <[email protected]> >> Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism >> Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org >> >> --- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- > -- > Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community > <[email protected]> > Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism > Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org > > --- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- > -- > Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community > <[email protected]> > Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism > Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org > > --- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- -- Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community <[email protected]> Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community" group. 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