International Crisis Group (ICG) [Brussles and Jakarta]
10 Oct 2001

Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims

OVERVIEW

The destruction of the World Trade Centre and part of the Pentagon by
terrorists has again focused international attention on radical Muslims and
their potential to engage in acts of terrorism. Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida
organisation is said to have cells in 34 countries including the United
States, most European countries, and various countries in the Arab world.
Informed observers have also speculated that al-Qaida has a presence in
several Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, the Philippines and
Indonesia. At the very least it has been claimed that Osama bin Laden has
‘links’ with radical Islamic groups in these countries although the exact
nature of these links has not been specified.

The U.S.-led air strikes against military targets in Afghanistan –
accompanied by inevitable civilian casualties – have outraged public opinion
in largely Muslim Indonesia and presented President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s
government with a huge dilemma. Megawati recently completed a successful
visit to the U.S. and obtained President George W. Bush’s support for
increased economic assistance as well as a relaxation of restrictions on
military co-operation. Although the Indonesian government condemned the 11
September attacks and ‘pledged to cooperate with the international community
in combating terrorism’, it has refrained from endorsing the current U.S.-led
military campaign. On the one hand, the government does not want to prejudice
its economic relationship with the U.S. but, on the other, it cannot afford,
in the new democratic era, to ignore the sentiments of a large part of its
population.

In a statement issued on 8 October, the government ‘urged that the operations
that have started should truly be very limited in the use of force, in its
targets and in its timing, and thus reduce or minimise casualties among those
who are innocent’. Earlier, the government had warned that the U.S. response
should ‘be proportional, have precise targets, not exceed proper limits, and
avoid creating a new human tragedy’. The government also called on the UN to
adopt a collective response to the crisis.

During the weeks before the attacks on Afghanistan, radical Muslim
organisations had been rallying their supporters in the streets of Jakarta
and other major cities. After the air campaign began, demonstrations became
larger and more widespread. The main targets are the American embassy and its
consulates where demonstrators, carrying banners with slogans such as
‘America is the Great Terrorist’ and ‘Osama My Hero’, have burnt the U.S.
flag and chanted anti-American slogans. More ominously, some organisations
are threatening to carry out what they term ‘sweeping’ of U.S. citizens
together with citizens of allied nations. The aim of the ‘sweeping’ would be
to drive such foreigners out of Indonesia. The U.S. ambassador, Robert
Gelbard, publicly declared his lack of confidence in the police and permitted
embassy staff to leave Indonesia. So far demonstrations have been restrained
and relatively small. On the first two days after the raids on Afghanistan, a
thousand or more demonstrated at the U.S. embassy in Jakarta while smaller
numbers protested in other cities.

Although the radical Muslim organisations have taken the lead in opposing the
U.S. attacks on Afghanistan, their sentiments are widely shared within the
Muslim community. Leaders of the moderate Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and the
Mohamadiyah have issued statements condemning the American action and the
semi-official Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI – Indonesian Ulamas’ Council) has
called for the suspension of diplomatic relations with the U.S.. The foreign
affairs commission of the parliament has described the attack as ‘brutal’
and in conflict with international law and humanitarianism. The negative
reaction, however, is not limited to Muslim opinion and has also been
expressed by secular groups.

The government is naturally concerned that conflict in Afghanistan could
boost domestic support for Islamic radicalism. In recent years Indonesia has
experienced an increasing number of terrorist attacks – particularly
bombings. While by no means all terrorism can be linked to radical Muslims,
some attacks – such as those on churches – were quickly blamed on Muslim
groups. Two of the biggest bomb blasts – one aimed at the Philippine
ambassador to Indonesia and another at the Jakarta Stock Exchange building –
were also linked to Muslim groups. Much lower on the scale of violence,
radical Muslim vigilante groups have often taken the law into their own hands
by attacking night-clubs, gambling centres and brothels in various part of
Jakarta and in other cities, and in Central Java last year one group
attempted to drive American tourists from the city of Solo (also known as
Surakarta).

Muslims have also been involved in violent conflicts in various regions of
Indonesia. It is estimated that around 5000 people have been killed in
Muslim-Christian conflict in Maluku and North Maluku since January 1999;
hundreds have been killed in continuing Muslim-Christian violence in Poso in
Central Sulawesi; the separatist guerrillas of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM
- Aceh Freedom Movement) are Muslims fighting government forces in Aceh; and
Muslims have participated in dozens of smaller outbreaks of violence in other
parts of Indonesia.

International concern has been focussed on the possibility that Muslim
violence in Indonesia might be associated with terrorist organisations based
in the Middle East but so far, at least, there is little firm public evidence
to demonstrate such links. Several hundred Indonesians joined the Islamic
resistance to the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s and
others have apparently received ‘training’ in that country since then but
neither the numbers nor the nature of the ‘training’ are clear. It has also
been claimed that Osama bin Laden’s network has provided financial support to
a minority Muslim militia in Maluku. In any case, much of the violence in
Indonesia involving Muslims can be adequately explained in domestic terms –
although there is some evidence of limited involvement of foreigners.

As this paper will show, radical Islam in Indonesia is still quite weak and
the goal of its proponent of turning Indonesia into a state based on Islam is
far from achievement. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s democratic transition is
being accompanied by a crisis of lawlessness that has allowed many groups –
including radical Muslim groups – to flaunt the law by engaging in violent
behaviour with impunity. Needless to say, however, it is not only explicitly
Muslim groups that have been responsible for growing violence.

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International Crisis Group (ICG) [Brussles and Jakarta]
10 Oct 2001

Press release: Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims

JAKARTA/BRUSSELS, 10 October 2001: The U.S.-led air strikes against military
targets in Afghanistan - accompanied by inevitable civilian casualties - have
outraged public opinion in Indonesia. They have also presented President
Megawati Soekarnoputri's government with a huge dilemma: how to maintain its
relationship with the United States while not ignoring the sentiments of a
large part of its population.
In a new briefing paper, Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, the
International Crisis Group (ICG) provides a detailed assessment of recent
violence by radical Muslim groups in Indonesia and analyses the potential for
radicalism to spread. The paper concludes that while much of the population
is angered by the U.S. military campaign, radical Islam is still quite weak
and extremist groups have no chance of succeeding in their attempts to turn
Indonesia into an Islamic state.

In the past few years, there has been an increase in domestic terrorism in
Indonesia - particularly bombings. A series of attacks on churches, an
explosion at the Jakarta Stock Exchange, and an attempt to kill the
Philippines ambassador to Jakarta were all believed to be carried out by
Muslim extremists. Muslim vigilante groups have attacked night-clubs,
gambling dens and brothels. And several of the most violent communal
conflicts in Indonesia have a religious element. Thousands have died in
fighting between Christians and Muslims in Maluku and Sulawesi, while the
independence movement in Aceh also identifies with Islam.

However, there is little evidence that the violence in Indonesia is
associated with terrorist organisations in the Middle East or Central Asia.
ICG President Gareth Evans said: "Much of the violence in Indonesia can be
adequately explained in domestic terms. The driving force in much of this
conflict is also not directly religious, but entwined with ethnic, economic
and cultural grievance. And Indonesia's democratic transition is being
accompanied by a crisis of lawlessness that has allowed many groups -
including Muslim groups - to flout the law by engaging in violent behaviour
with impunity."

Nevertheless, the U.S. attacks in Afghanistan have given radicals the
opportunity to take the lead in expressing the concerns not only of their
followers, but also of moderate Muslims who, while supporting specific
anti-terrorism measures, are opposed to their country siding with the
military invasion of a Muslim nation. The risk of increased violence and
radicalism in Indonesia will therefore depend largely on how the U.S. and its
partners deal with Afghanistan. The more civilian casualties there are in the
military campaign, the more difficult it will be to contain Indonesia's
extremist groups.

Media contacts: Sascha Pichler or Katy Cronin at ICG Brussels, +32 2 536 00
70 or 64; [EMAIL PROTECTED]

This report and all other ICG publications are available on our website
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