On Thu, 2006-06-29 at 16:56 -0500, Darrel Goeddel wrote:
> This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
> additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming
> avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++----
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 50
> ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
> kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++----
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------
> 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Looks ok, although I'm not sure I'd have bothered renaming the old ones
(and I'm not sure why you add the new definitions here rather than in
the second patch).
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index f7883ec..c5cbd4d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -152,12 +152,17 @@ #define AUDIT_LOGINUID 9
> #define AUDIT_PERS 10
> #define AUDIT_ARCH 11
> #define AUDIT_MSGTYPE 12
> -#define AUDIT_SE_USER 13 /* security label user */
> -#define AUDIT_SE_ROLE 14 /* security label role */
> -#define AUDIT_SE_TYPE 15 /* security label type */
> -#define AUDIT_SE_SEN 16 /* security label sensitivity label */
> -#define AUDIT_SE_CLR 17 /* security label clearance label */
> +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_USER 13 /* security label user */
> +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE 14 /* security label role */
> +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE 15 /* security label type */
> +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN 16 /* security label sensitivity label */
> +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR 17 /* security label clearance label */
> #define AUDIT_PPID 18
> +#define AUDIT_OBJ_USER 19
> +#define AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE 20
> +#define AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE 21
> +#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW 22
> +#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH 23
>
> /* These are ONLY useful when checking
> * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index e98db08..40a9931 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -470,11 +470,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
> case AUDIT_ARG2:
> case AUDIT_ARG3:
> break;
> - case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> - case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
> if (IS_ERR(str))
> goto exit_free;
> @@ -611,11 +611,11 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_kru
> data->fields[i] = f->type;
> data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
> switch(f->type) {
> - case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> - case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> data->buflen += data->values[i] =
> audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
> break;
> @@ -654,11 +654,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct aud
> return 1;
>
> switch(a->fields[i].type) {
> - case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> - case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
> return 1;
> break;
> @@ -774,11 +774,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_ru
> * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
> for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
> switch (new->fields[i].type) {
> - case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> - case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
> &old->fields[i]);
> break;
> @@ -1537,11 +1537,11 @@ static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux
> for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
> struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
> switch (f->type) {
> - case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> - case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> return 1;
> }
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index b32ccfa..e183a6f 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -321,11 +321,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct tas
> if (ctx)
> result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op,
> f->val);
> break;
> - case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> - case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
> a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
> match for now to avoid losing information that
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index d82898c..112484f 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -1855,15 +1855,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u
> return -ENOTSUPP;
>
> switch (field) {
> - case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
> if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
> return -EINVAL;
> break;
> - case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> - case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
> if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1884,29 +1884,29 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u
> tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
>
> switch (field) {
> - case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
> if (!userdatum)
> rc = -EINVAL;
> else
> tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
> break;
> - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
> if (!roledatum)
> rc = -EINVAL;
> else
> tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
> break;
> - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
> if (!typedatum)
> rc = -EINVAL;
> else
> tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
> break;
> - case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> - case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
> break;
> }
> @@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid,
> /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
> without a match */
> switch (field) {
> - case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> switch (op) {
> case AUDIT_EQUAL:
> match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
> @@ -1968,7 +1968,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid,
> break;
> }
> break;
> - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> switch (op) {
> case AUDIT_EQUAL:
> match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
> @@ -1978,7 +1978,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid,
> break;
> }
> break;
> - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> switch (op) {
> case AUDIT_EQUAL:
> match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
> @@ -1988,9 +1988,9 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid,
> break;
> }
> break;
> - case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> - case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> - level = (field == AUDIT_SE_SEN ?
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> + level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ?
> &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
> switch (op) {
> case AUDIT_EQUAL:
>
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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