This piece (relative to lspp.41 kernel) constitutes the patchset submitted
upstream
2 weeks back. Has the following minor changes as compared to that upstream
version:
(WILL BREAK THIS UP AGAIN WHEN SUBMITTING UPSTREAM)
- Delete debugging statements and fix a BUG_ON in xfrm.c per Stephen's comments
- Optimized sock_copy for the non-security case as suggested by Herbert and
James.
- Added a comment for the sid member defined in flowi.
---
include/linux/security.h | 116 ++++++++-
include/net/flow.h | 5
include/net/sock.h | 9
net/core/flow.c | 7
net/core/sock.c | 2
net/key/af_key.c | 22 +
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 28 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 12 -
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 45 ++-
security/dummy.c | 28 ++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 34 ++
security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 1
security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 1
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 1
security/selinux/include/security.h | 2
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 22 +
security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 20 -
security/selinux/ss/mls.h | 20 +
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 48 ++++
security/selinux/xfrm.c | 198 ++++++++++++++---
20 files changed, 498 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-)
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/include/linux/security.h 2006-07-05
14:36:43.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/include/linux/security.h 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000
-0500
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/xfrm.h>
struct ctl_table;
@@ -795,6 +796,8 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
* which is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets.
* @sk_free_security:
* Deallocate security structure.
+ * @sk_clone_security:
+ * Clone/copy security structure.
* @sk_getsid:
* Retrieve the LSM-specific sid for the sock to enable caching of network
* authorizations.
@@ -806,9 +809,8 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
* used by the XFRM system.
* @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
* the user-level policy update program (e.g., setkey).
- * Allocate a security structure to the xp->selector.security field.
- * The security field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is
- * allocated.
+ * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security
+ * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated.
* Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context)
* @xfrm_policy_clone_security:
* @old contains an existing xfrm_policy in the SPD.
@@ -824,9 +826,14 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
* Database by the XFRM system.
* @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
* the user-level SA generation program (e.g., setkey or racoon).
- * Allocate a security structure to the x->sel.security field. The
- * security field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is
- * allocated.
+ * @polsec contains the security context information associated with a xfrm
+ * policy rule from which to take the base context. polsec must be NULL
+ * when sec_ctx is specified.
+ * @sid contains the sid from which to take the mls portion of the context.
+ * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
+ * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
+ * context to correspond to either sec_ctx or polsec, with the mls portion
+ * taken from sid in the latter case.
* Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal
context).
* @xfrm_state_free_security:
* @x contains the xfrm_state.
@@ -834,13 +841,26 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
* @xfrm_policy_lookup:
* @xp contains the xfrm_policy for which the access control is being
* checked.
- * @sk_sid contains the sock security label that is used to authorize
+ * @fl_sid contains the flow security label that is used to authorize
* access to the policy xp.
* @dir contains the direction of the flow (input or output).
- * Check permission when a sock selects a xfrm_policy for processing
+ * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing
* XFRMs on a packet. The hook is called when selecting either a
* per-socket policy or a generic xfrm policy.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @xfrm_state_pol_flow_match:
+ * @x contains the state to match.
+ * @xp contains the policy to check for a match.
+ * @fl contains the flow to check for a match.
+ * Return 1 if there is a match.
+ * @xfrm_flow_state_match:
+ * @fl contains the flow key to match.
+ * @xfrm points to the xfrm_state to match.
+ * Return 1 if there is a match.
+ * @xfrm_decode_session:
+ * @skb points to skb to decode.
+ * @fl points to the flow key to set.
+ * Return 0 if successful decoding.
*
* Security hooks affecting all Key Management operations
*
@@ -1292,6 +1312,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram) (struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata,
u32 *seclen);
int (*sk_alloc_security) (struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void (*sk_free_security) (struct sock *sk);
+ void (*sk_clone_security) (const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
unsigned int (*sk_getsid) (struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
@@ -1299,9 +1320,15 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*xfrm_policy_alloc_security) (struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct
xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
int (*xfrm_policy_clone_security) (struct xfrm_policy *old, struct
xfrm_policy *new);
void (*xfrm_policy_free_security) (struct xfrm_policy *xp);
- int (*xfrm_state_alloc_security) (struct xfrm_state *x, struct
xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
+ int (*xfrm_state_alloc_security) (struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+ u32 sid);
void (*xfrm_state_free_security) (struct xfrm_state *x);
- int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir);
+ int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_sid, u8 dir);
+ int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl);
+ int (*xfrm_flow_state_match)(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm);
+ int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
/* key management security hooks */
@@ -2786,6 +2813,11 @@ static inline void security_sk_free(stru
return security_ops->sk_free_security(sk);
}
+static inline void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ return security_ops->sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+}
+
static inline unsigned int security_sk_sid(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl,
u8 dir)
{
return security_ops->sk_getsid(sk, fl, dir);
@@ -2914,6 +2946,10 @@ static inline void security_sk_free(stru
{
}
+static inline void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+}
+
static inline unsigned int security_sk_sid(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl,
u8 dir)
{
return 0;
@@ -2936,9 +2972,16 @@ static inline void security_xfrm_policy_
security_ops->xfrm_policy_free_security(xp);
}
-static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct
xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+{
+ return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, sec_ctx, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 sid)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, sec_ctx);
+ return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, NULL, polsec, sid);
}
static inline void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
@@ -2946,9 +2989,25 @@ static inline void security_xfrm_state_f
security_ops->xfrm_state_free_security(x);
}
-static inline int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32
sk_sid, u8 dir)
+static inline int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32
fl_sid, u8 dir)
+{
+ return security_ops->xfrm_policy_lookup(xp, fl_sid, dir);
+}
+
+static inline int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_lookup(xp, sk_sid, dir);
+ return security_ops->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
+}
+
+static inline int security_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct
xfrm_state *xfrm)
+{
+ return security_ops->xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, xfrm);
+}
+
+static inline int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
flowi *fl)
+{
+ return security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, fl);
}
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
static inline int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct
xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
@@ -2965,7 +3024,14 @@ static inline void security_xfrm_policy_
{
}
-static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct
xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 sid)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -2974,10 +3040,28 @@ static inline void security_xfrm_state_f
{
}
-static inline int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32
sk_sid, u8 dir)
+static inline int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32
fl_sid, u8 dir)
{
return 0;
}
+
+static inline int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static inline int security_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl,
+ struct xfrm_state *xfrm)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static inline int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
flowi *fl)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/include/net/flow.h 2006-06-17
20:49:35.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/include/net/flow.h 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000
-0500
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ struct flowi {
#define fl_icmp_type uli_u.icmpt.type
#define fl_icmp_code uli_u.icmpt.code
#define fl_ipsec_spi uli_u.spi
+ __u32 sid; /* used by xfrm; see flow_sid.txt */
} __attribute__((__aligned__(BITS_PER_LONG/8)));
#define FLOW_DIR_IN 0
@@ -85,10 +86,10 @@ struct flowi {
#define FLOW_DIR_FWD 2
struct sock;
-typedef void (*flow_resolve_t)(struct flowi *key, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8
dir,
+typedef void (*flow_resolve_t)(struct flowi *key, u16 family, u8 dir,
void **objp, atomic_t **obj_refp);
-extern void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *key, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8
dir,
+extern void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *key, u16 family, u8 dir,
flow_resolve_t resolver);
extern void flow_cache_flush(void);
extern atomic_t flow_cache_genid;
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/include/net/sock.h 2006-07-05
14:36:37.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/include/net/sock.h 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000
-0500
@@ -968,6 +968,15 @@ static inline void sock_graft(struct soc
write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
}
+static inline void sock_copy(struct sock *nsk, const struct sock *osk)
+{
+ void *sptr = nsk->sk_security;
+
+ memcpy(nsk, osk, osk->sk_prot->obj_size);
+ nsk->sk_security = sptr;
+ security_sk_clone(osk, nsk);
+}
+
extern int sock_i_uid(struct sock *sk);
extern unsigned long sock_i_ino(struct sock *sk);
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/net/core/flow.c 2006-06-17 20:49:35.000000000
-0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/net/core/flow.c 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000 -0500
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ struct flow_cache_entry {
u8 dir;
struct flowi key;
u32 genid;
- u32 sk_sid;
void *object;
atomic_t *object_ref;
};
@@ -165,7 +164,7 @@ static int flow_key_compare(struct flowi
return 0;
}
-void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *key, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8 dir,
+void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *key, u16 family, u8 dir,
flow_resolve_t resolver)
{
struct flow_cache_entry *fle, **head;
@@ -189,7 +188,6 @@ void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *ke
for (fle = *head; fle; fle = fle->next) {
if (fle->family == family &&
fle->dir == dir &&
- fle->sk_sid == sk_sid &&
flow_key_compare(key, &fle->key) == 0) {
if (fle->genid == atomic_read(&flow_cache_genid)) {
void *ret = fle->object;
@@ -214,7 +212,6 @@ void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *ke
*head = fle;
fle->family = family;
fle->dir = dir;
- fle->sk_sid = sk_sid;
memcpy(&fle->key, key, sizeof(*key));
fle->object = NULL;
flow_count(cpu)++;
@@ -226,7 +223,7 @@ nocache:
void *obj;
atomic_t *obj_ref;
- resolver(key, sk_sid, family, dir, &obj, &obj_ref);
+ resolver(key, family, dir, &obj, &obj_ref);
if (fle) {
fle->genid = atomic_read(&flow_cache_genid);
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/net/core/sock.c 2006-07-05 14:36:37.000000000
-0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/net/core/sock.c 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000 -0500
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ struct sock *sk_clone(struct sock *sk, c
if (newsk != NULL) {
struct sk_filter *filter;
- memcpy(newsk, sk, sk->sk_prot->obj_size);
+ sock_copy(newsk, sk);
/* SANITY */
sk_node_init(&newsk->sk_node);
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/net/key/af_key.c 2006-06-17 20:49:35.000000000
-0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/net/key/af_key.c 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000 -0500
@@ -2704,6 +2704,9 @@ static int pfkey_send_acquire(struct xfr
#endif
int sockaddr_size;
int size;
+ struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *sec_ctx;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *xfrm_ctx;
+ int ctx_size = 0;
sockaddr_size = pfkey_sockaddr_size(x->props.family);
if (!sockaddr_size)
@@ -2719,6 +2722,11 @@ static int pfkey_send_acquire(struct xfr
else if (x->id.proto == IPPROTO_ESP)
size += count_esp_combs(t);
+ if ((xfrm_ctx = x->security)) {
+ ctx_size = PFKEY_ALIGN8(xfrm_ctx->ctx_len);
+ size += sizeof(struct sadb_x_sec_ctx) + ctx_size;
+ }
+
skb = alloc_skb(size + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2814,6 +2822,20 @@ static int pfkey_send_acquire(struct xfr
else if (x->id.proto == IPPROTO_ESP)
dump_esp_combs(skb, t);
+ /* security context */
+ if (xfrm_ctx) {
+ sec_ctx = (struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *) skb_put(skb,
+ sizeof(struct sadb_x_sec_ctx) + ctx_size);
+ sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_len =
+ (sizeof(struct sadb_x_sec_ctx) + ctx_size) / sizeof(uint64_t);
+ sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_SEC_CTX;
+ sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_doi = xfrm_ctx->ctx_doi;
+ sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_alg = xfrm_ctx->ctx_alg;
+ sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_len = xfrm_ctx->ctx_len;
+ memcpy(sec_ctx + 1, xfrm_ctx->ctx_str,
+ xfrm_ctx->ctx_len);
+ }
+
return pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, NULL);
}
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c 2006-06-17
20:49:35.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000
-0500
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_walk);
/* Find policy to apply to this flow. */
-static void xfrm_policy_lookup(struct flowi *fl, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8
dir,
+static void xfrm_policy_lookup(struct flowi *fl, u16 family, u8 dir,
void **objp, atomic_t **obj_refp)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static void xfrm_policy_lookup(struct fl
match = xfrm_selector_match(sel, fl, family);
if (match) {
- if (!security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol, sk_sid, dir)) {
+ if (!security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol, fl->sid, dir)) {
xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
break;
}
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static inline int policy_to_flow_dir(int
};
}
-static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(struct sock *sk, int dir,
struct flowi *fl, u32 sk_sid)
+static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(struct sock *sk, int dir,
struct flowi *fl)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_polic
int err = 0;
if (match)
- err = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol, sk_sid,
policy_to_flow_dir(dir));
+ err = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol, fl->sid,
policy_to_flow_dir(dir));
if (match && !err)
xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
@@ -785,19 +785,20 @@ int xfrm_lookup(struct dst_entry **dst_p
u32 genid;
u16 family;
u8 dir = policy_to_flow_dir(XFRM_POLICY_OUT);
- u32 sk_sid = security_sk_sid(sk, fl, dir);
+
+ fl->sid = security_sk_sid(sk, fl, dir);
restart:
genid = atomic_read(&flow_cache_genid);
policy = NULL;
if (sk && sk->sk_policy[1])
- policy = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, XFRM_POLICY_OUT, fl, sk_sid);
+ policy = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, XFRM_POLICY_OUT, fl);
if (!policy) {
/* To accelerate a bit... */
if ((dst_orig->flags & DST_NOXFRM) ||
!xfrm_policy_list[XFRM_POLICY_OUT])
return 0;
- policy = flow_cache_lookup(fl, sk_sid, dst_orig->ops->family,
+ policy = flow_cache_lookup(fl, dst_orig->ops->family,
dir, xfrm_policy_lookup);
}
@@ -955,13 +956,15 @@ int
xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, unsigned short
family)
{
struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo = xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(family);
+ int err;
if (unlikely(afinfo == NULL))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
afinfo->decode_session(skb, fl);
+ err = security_xfrm_decode_session(skb, fl);
xfrm_policy_put_afinfo(afinfo);
- return 0;
+ return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_decode_session);
@@ -981,14 +984,11 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk,
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
struct flowi fl;
u8 fl_dir = policy_to_flow_dir(dir);
- u32 sk_sid;
if (xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, family) < 0)
return 0;
nf_nat_decode_session(skb, &fl, family);
- sk_sid = security_sk_sid(sk, &fl, fl_dir);
-
/* First, check used SA against their selectors. */
if (skb->sp) {
int i;
@@ -1002,10 +1002,10 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk,
pol = NULL;
if (sk && sk->sk_policy[dir])
- pol = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, dir, &fl, sk_sid);
+ pol = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, dir, &fl);
if (!pol)
- pol = flow_cache_lookup(&fl, sk_sid, family, fl_dir,
+ pol = flow_cache_lookup(&fl, family, fl_dir,
xfrm_policy_lookup);
if (!pol)
@@ -1200,6 +1200,8 @@ int xfrm_bundle_ok(struct xfrm_dst *firs
if (fl && !xfrm_selector_match(&dst->xfrm->sel, fl, family))
return 0;
+ if (fl && !security_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, dst->xfrm))
+ return 0;
if (dst->xfrm->km.state != XFRM_STATE_VALID)
return 0;
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c 2006-06-17
20:49:35.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000
-0500
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(xfrm_address_t *daddr, x
*/
if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID) {
if (!xfrm_selector_match(&x->sel, fl, family) ||
- !xfrm_sec_ctx_match(pol->security,
x->security))
+ !security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, pol,
fl))
continue;
if (!best ||
best->km.dying > x->km.dying ||
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(xfrm_address_t *daddr, x
} else if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_ERROR ||
x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_EXPIRED) {
if (xfrm_selector_match(&x->sel, fl, family) &&
- xfrm_sec_ctx_match(pol->security,
x->security))
+ security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, pol,
fl))
error = -ESRCH;
}
}
@@ -402,6 +402,14 @@ xfrm_state_find(xfrm_address_t *daddr, x
* to current session. */
xfrm_init_tempsel(x, fl, tmpl, daddr, saddr, family);
+ error = security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, pol->security,
fl->sid);
+ if (error) {
+ x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
+ xfrm_state_put(x);
+ x = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (km_query(x, tmpl, pol) == 0) {
x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_ACQ;
list_add_tail(&x->bydst, xfrm_state_bydst+h);
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c 2006-07-05
14:36:43.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000
-0500
@@ -907,27 +907,40 @@ rtattr_failure:
return -1;
}
-static int copy_to_user_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int copy_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *s, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- if (xp->security) {
- int ctx_size = sizeof(struct xfrm_sec_ctx) +
- xp->security->ctx_len;
- struct rtattr *rt = __RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_SEC_CTX, ctx_size);
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = RTA_DATA(rt);
-
- uctx->exttype = XFRMA_SEC_CTX;
- uctx->len = ctx_size;
- uctx->ctx_doi = xp->security->ctx_doi;
- uctx->ctx_alg = xp->security->ctx_alg;
- uctx->ctx_len = xp->security->ctx_len;
- memcpy(uctx + 1, xp->security->ctx_str, xp->security->ctx_len);
- }
- return 0;
+ int ctx_size = sizeof(struct xfrm_sec_ctx) + s->ctx_len;
+ struct rtattr *rt = __RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_SEC_CTX, ctx_size);
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = RTA_DATA(rt);
+
+ uctx->exttype = XFRMA_SEC_CTX;
+ uctx->len = ctx_size;
+ uctx->ctx_doi = s->ctx_doi;
+ uctx->ctx_alg = s->ctx_alg;
+ uctx->ctx_len = s->ctx_len;
+ memcpy(uctx + 1, s->ctx_str, s->ctx_len);
+ return 0;
rtattr_failure:
return -1;
}
+static inline int copy_to_user_state_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_state *x, struct
sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (x->security) {
+ return copy_sec_ctx(x->security, skb);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int copy_to_user_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff
*skb)
+{
+ if (xp->security) {
+ return copy_sec_ctx(xp->security, skb);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int dump_one_policy(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, int count, void
*ptr)
{
struct xfrm_dump_info *sp = ptr;
@@ -1703,7 +1716,7 @@ static int build_acquire(struct sk_buff
if (copy_to_user_tmpl(xp, skb) < 0)
goto nlmsg_failure;
- if (copy_to_user_sec_ctx(xp, skb))
+ if (copy_to_user_state_sec_ctx(x, skb))
goto nlmsg_failure;
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/security/dummy.c 2006-07-05 14:36:43.000000000
-0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/security/dummy.c 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000 -0500
@@ -789,6 +789,10 @@ static inline void dummy_sk_free_securit
{
}
+static inline void dummy_sk_clone_security (const struct sock *sk, struct sock
*newsk)
+{
+}
+
static unsigned int dummy_sk_getsid(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir)
{
return 0;
@@ -810,7 +814,8 @@ static void dummy_xfrm_policy_free_secur
{
}
-static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x, struct
xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -823,6 +828,23 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_policy_lookup(stru
{
return 0;
}
+
+static int dummy_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int dummy_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state
*xfrm)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int dummy_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
static int dummy_register_security (const char *name, struct
security_operations *ops)
{
@@ -1018,6 +1040,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_free_security);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_clone_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_getsid);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1027,6 +1050,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_flow_state_match);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_alloc);
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/security/selinux/hooks.c 2006-07-05
14:36:43.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/security/selinux/hooks.c 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000
-0500
@@ -270,15 +270,13 @@ static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock
{
struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
- if (family != PF_UNIX)
- return 0;
-
ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
if (!ssec)
return -ENOMEM;
ssec->sk = sk;
ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sk->sk_security = ssec;
return 0;
@@ -288,9 +286,6 @@ static void sk_free_security(struct sock
{
struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
- if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX)
- return;
-
sk->sk_security = NULL;
kfree(ssec);
}
@@ -2935,6 +2930,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(st
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
@@ -2943,6 +2939,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(st
isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
isec->initialized = 1;
+ if (sock->sk) {
+ sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec->sid = isec->sid;
+ }
+
return selinux_netlbl_socket_create(sock, family, isec->sid);
}
@@ -3336,7 +3337,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(s
if (err)
goto out;
- err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb, &ad);
out:
return err;
@@ -3426,6 +3427,15 @@ static void selinux_sk_free_security(str
sk_free_security(sk);
}
+static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock
*newsk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+ newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
+ newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
+}
+
static unsigned int selinux_sk_getsid_security(struct sock *sk, struct flowi
*fl, u8 dir)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
@@ -3439,6 +3449,10 @@ static unsigned int selinux_sk_getsid_se
if (isec)
sock_sid = isec->sid;
+ else {
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sock_sid = sksec->sid;
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
return sock_sid;
@@ -3582,7 +3596,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
goto out;
- err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb, &ad);
out:
return err;
@@ -4399,6 +4413,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinu
.socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
.sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
.sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
+ .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
.sk_getsid = selinux_sk_getsid_security,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -4408,6 +4423,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinu
.xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
.xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
.xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
+ .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+ .xfrm_flow_state_match = selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match,
+ .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
#endif
};
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
2006-06-17 20:49:35.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h 2006-07-05
14:38:51.000000000 -0500
@@ -909,6 +909,7 @@
#define ASSOCIATION__SENDTO 0x00000001UL
#define ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM 0x00000002UL
#define ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT 0x00000004UL
+#define ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
2006-06-17 20:49:35.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
2006-07-05 14:39:17.000000000 -0500
@@ -239,3 +239,4 @@
S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto")
S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, "recvfrom")
S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, "setcontext")
+ S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, "polmatch")
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/security/selinux/include/objsec.h 2006-07-05
14:36:43.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/security/selinux/include/objsec.h 2006-07-05
14:38:51.000000000 -0500
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ struct netif_security_struct {
struct sk_security_struct {
struct sock *sk; /* back pointer to sk object */
+ u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */
};
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/security/selinux/include/security.h
2006-06-17 20:49:35.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/security/selinux/include/security.h 2006-07-05
14:38:51.000000000 -0500
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *
int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
u16 tclass);
+int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
+
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR 1 /* use xattr */
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS 2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g.
devpts/tmpfs */
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK 3 /* use task SIDs, e.g. pipefs/sockfs
*/
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h 2006-06-17
20:49:35.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h 2006-07-05
14:38:51.000000000 -0500
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
* SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks
*
* Author : Trent Jaeger, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+ * Updated : Venkat Yekkirala, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
*/
#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
@@ -9,9 +10,14 @@
int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx
*sec_ctx);
int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
-int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx
*sec_ctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx
*sec_ctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid);
void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_sid, u8 dir);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy
*xp,
+ struct flowi *fl);
+int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm);
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl);
/*
* Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
@@ -37,17 +43,21 @@ static inline u32 selinux_no_sk_sid(stru
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
-int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
-int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad);
u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
#else
-static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff
*skb)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff
*skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/security/selinux/ss/mls.c 2006-07-05
14:36:43.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/security/selinux/ss/mls.c 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000
-0500
@@ -219,26 +219,6 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb
}
/*
- * Copies the MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
- */
-static inline int mls_copy_context(struct context *dst,
- struct context *src)
-{
- int l, rc = 0;
-
- /* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
- for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
- dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[l].sens;
- rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
- &src->range.level[l].cat);
- if (rc)
- break;
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
* Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
* `context' based on the string representation in
* the string `*scontext'. Update `*scontext' to
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/security/selinux/ss/mls.h 2006-07-05
14:36:43.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/security/selinux/ss/mls.h 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000
-0500
@@ -24,6 +24,26 @@
#include "context.h"
#include "policydb.h"
+/*
+ * Copies the MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_copy_context(struct context *dst,
+ struct context *src)
+{
+ int l, rc = 0;
+
+ /* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[l].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
+ &src->range.level[l].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context);
void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext);
int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/security/selinux/ss/services.c 2006-07-05
14:36:43.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/security/selinux/ss/services.c 2006-07-05
14:38:51.000000000 -0500
@@ -1827,6 +1827,54 @@ out:
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
+ * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
+ */
+int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
+{
+ struct context *context1 = NULL;
+ struct context *context2 = NULL;
+ struct context newcon;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ *new_sid = sid;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+ if (!context1) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_mls_copy: unrecognized SID "
+ "%d\n", sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
+ if (!context2) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_mls_copy: unrecognized SID "
+ "%d\n", mls_sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ newcon.user = context1->user;
+ newcon.role = context1->role;
+ newcon.type = context1->type;
+ rc = mls_copy_context(&newcon, context2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+
+out_unlock:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
struct selinux_audit_rule {
u32 au_seqno;
struct context au_ctxt;
--- linux-2.6.17.i686.vanilla/security/selinux/xfrm.c 2006-06-17
20:49:35.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17.i686/security/selinux/xfrm.c 2006-07-05 14:38:51.000000000
-0500
@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@
* Authors: Serge Hallyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
* Trent Jaeger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
*
+ * Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+ *
+ * Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
+ *
* Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
@@ -68,10 +73,10 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_x
}
/*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a socket can be used
- * with the corresponding xfrm_sec_ctx and direction.
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
+ * a xfrm policy rule.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_sid, u8 dir)
{
int rc = 0;
u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
@@ -85,27 +90,129 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xf
sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
}
- rc = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ((dir == FLOW_DIR_IN) ? ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM :
- ((dir == FLOW_DIR_OUT) ? ASSOCIATION__SENDTO :
- (ASSOCIATION__SENDTO | ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM))),
+ rc = avc_has_perm(fl_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
+ NULL);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
+ * the given policy, flow combo.
+ */
+
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy
*xp,
+ struct flowi *fl)
+{
+ u32 state_sid;
+ u32 pol_sid;
+ int err;
+
+ if (x->security)
+ state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
+ else
+ state_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+ if (xp->security)
+ pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid;
+ else
+ pol_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return 0;
+
+ return selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, x);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow
+ * can use a given security association.
+ */
+
+int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+
+ /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
+ if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) {
+ if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
+ return 0;
+
+ sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+ }
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(fl->sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
+ NULL)? 0:1;
+
return rc;
}
/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
+ */
+
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
+{
+ struct sec_path *sp;
+
+ fl->sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ if (skb == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ sp = skb->sp;
+ if (sp) {
+ int i, sid_set = 0;
+
+ for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
+ if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+
+ if (!sid_set) {
+ fl->sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+ sid_set = 1;
+ }
+ else if (fl->sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
* CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
*/
-static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct
xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid)
{
int rc = 0;
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+ char *ctx_str = NULL;
+ u32 str_len;
+ u32 ctx_sid;
+
+ BUG_ON(uctx && pol);
+
+ if (pol)
+ goto from_policy;
BUG_ON(!uctx);
- BUG_ON(uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX);
+
+ if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
+ return -EINVAL;
if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -145,9 +252,40 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(st
return rc;
+from_policy:
+ BUG_ON(!pol);
+ rc = security_sid_mls_copy(pol->ctx_sid, sid, &ctx_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(ctx_sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
+ str_len,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+ if (!ctx) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+
+ ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+ ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+ ctx->ctx_sid = ctx_sid;
+ ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
+ ctx_str,
+ str_len);
+
+ return rc;
+
out:
*ctxp = NULL;
kfree(ctx);
+ kfree(ctx_str);
return rc;
}
@@ -161,7 +299,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfr
BUG_ON(!xp);
- err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, NULL, 0);
return err;
}
@@ -204,13 +342,14 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfr
* LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
* xfrm_state.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx
*uctx)
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx
*uctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid)
{
int err;
BUG_ON(!x);
- err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, pol, sid);
return err;
}
@@ -299,38 +438,30 @@ u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct
* we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
* gone thru the IPSec process.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
int i, rc = 0;
struct sec_path *sp;
+ u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sp = skb->sp;
if (sp) {
- /*
- * __xfrm_policy_check does not approve unless xfrm_policy_ok
- * says that spi's match for policy and the socket.
- *
- * Only need to verify the existence of an authorizable sp.
- */
for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
- if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
- goto accept;
+ if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+ sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
- /* check SELinux sock for unlabelled access */
- rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, NULL);
- if (rc)
- goto drop;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
-accept:
- return 0;
-
-drop:
return rc;
}
@@ -341,7 +472,8 @@ drop:
* If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
* checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
int rc = 0;
@@ -361,7 +493,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec
}
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL);
+ ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
if (rc)
goto drop;
--
redhat-lspp mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/redhat-lspp
