On Thu, 2006-08-24 at 19:55 -0500, Klaus Weidner wrote: > This patch adds the boolean "allow_kernel_keyring_user_access" with the > goal of implementing an on/off switch for the kernel keyring as far as > unprivileged users are concerned. It defaults to true which corresponds > to the original behavior without this patch. > > The reason for the patch is that the kernel keyring is a fairly complex > piece of code that would need testing and documentation if it were > available in the evaluated configuration for LSPP (labeled security > protection profile) compliant systems, and since it's unlikely to > currently be useful on those systems it would greatly simplify things to > have a way to disable the feature for unprivileged users at runtime.
I'm confused, there isn't any unprivileged user access that is disabled by this policy, only login programs. Besides that, I really don't think this is needed because what you're saying is that you don't trust the key code. However, the code that enforces this policy is the code that you don't trust, so this policy wouldn't gain anything. -- Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC (410) 290-1411 x150 -- redhat-lspp mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/redhat-lspp
