Here's my question about the Florida Supreme Court's decision,
http://www.flcourts.org/sct/sctdocs/ops/sc01-2206.pdf:
On pp. 18-19, the court says that: "The protection afforded to
the free exercise of religiously motivated activity under the FRFRA is
broader than that afforded by the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court for two interrelated reasons. First, the FRFRA expands the free
exercise right as construed by the Supreme Court in Smith because it
reinstates the Court's pre-Smith holdings by applying the compelling
interest test to neutral laws of general application. Second, under the
FRFRA the definition of protected 'exercise of religion" subject to the
compelling state interest test includes any act or refusal to act
whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief.
The legislative history of the FRFRA suggests that in order to state a
claim that the government has infringed upon the free exercise of
religion, a plaintiff must only establish that the government has placed
a substantial burden on a practice motivated by a sincere religious
belief."
But then, on p. 21, the court holds "that a substantial burden
on the free exercise of religion is one that either compels the
religious adherent to engage in conduct that his religion forbids or
forbids him to engage in conduct that his religion requires."
How can these two be reconciled? At first, the court says that
religious motivation is enough, and that it doesn't matter whether the
action or refusal to act is compelled by one's religious belief. But
then it holds that the question is whether the action is compelled or
forbidden (which means that refusal to act is compelled) by religious
belief. What am I missing here? Thanks,
Eugene
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