You may be right, in a technical sense.  The Court limited itself to the
RFRA claim.  But the case suggests to me that the Court would probably
not be receptive to a claim on the (landmarks preservation) merits made
by the Church.  I am not remembering the aftermath of the case very
well, but it seems to me that the Church basically lost, on the merits.
Finally, if I am remembering the cases correctly, objections to
landmarking by churches usually fail, even though landmarking imposes
burdens on the churches. 

-----Original Message-----
From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Tuesday, January 17, 2006 1:26 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Pilgrim Baptist Church

        I'm not sure I quite understand -- why would it answer that
question?  If I recall correctly, this issue wasn't passed on by the
Court.

        Eugene

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of 
> Newsom Michael
> Sent: Tuesday, January 17, 2006 10:18 AM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: Pilgrim Baptist Church
> 
> 
> Doesn't Boerne answer the question posed in your second paragraph?
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> Sent: Monday, January 16, 2006 11:59 AM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: Pilgrim Baptist Church
> 
>     Marty makes an excellent point here.  I think (though I'm 
> not sure that Marty does) that it would be outrageous if, 
> when a state *does* rebuild all buildings, or help rebuild 
> them, or provides other services short of rebuilding (e.g., 
> taxpayer-paid internal sprinkler installation, partly 
> subsidized earthquake retrofitting, etc.), it nonetheless 
> excluded churches, synagogues, homes that are used for 
> regular synagogue meetings or Bible study, and the like.  Yet 
> surely there is a risk here that the state is indeed 
> preferring religious buildings; even if there's no deliberate 
> desire to help religion because religion is somehow good, 
> many people who are trying to evaluate a building's 
> "historic" status may well be understandably influenced by 
> that building's being religious, since religious buildings 
> are often seen as especially important to a community and to 
> the community's history.
> 
>     Yet would this go the other way, too?  Would landmarking 
> ordinances that *burden* the property owner, by barring it 
> from reconstructing the building, thus be per se 
> unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause when applied 
> to churches and the like, on the theory that there's no 
> neutrality here?
> 
>     Eugene
> 
> 
> 
> Marty Lederman writes:
> 
> Nevertheless, even if the sort of "formal neutrality" rule 
> espoused in Thomas's Mitchell plurality becomes the governing 
> doctrine, as I think it will, these cases are still 
> difficult, because there's nothing neutral, or objective, 
> about the decision to fund the rebuilding of the Pilgrim 
> Baptist Church.  Illinois presumably does not rebuild all 
> buildings destroyed by fire, or all "community services" 
> buildings, or all churches, for that matter.  The decision to 
> rebuild this particular structure is very subjective, and 
> discretionary.  I suppose it's possible that the decision to 
> fund would be made completely without regard to the 
> building's status as a church, but that seems unlikely,
> no?:  Isn't it at least a strong possibility that the state 
> would not pledge a million dollars if the building had never 
> been a synagogue and church?  And if its religious status is 
> part of the reason for the pledge, isn't that a form of 
> religious favoritism that is problematic under the EC, even 
> if the Thomas view prevails? 
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