Let me make two related points.

1.      People who dislike Phelps' group may do so for a variety of
reasons, some reasons being principled, some being tactical or strategic
only.

2.      There is a powerful psychological link between gays and the
Phelps group's conduct at the funeral of fallen warriors, and it is
this: an anti-gay backlash could result because if it weren't for gays,
or the "gay agenda," whatever that is, Phelps' group would not be
causing such pain and harm.  In other words, gay people may well be the
target.  Gay people might be viewed as the cause of the outrageous
behavior at funerals. Have any of the families who have been affronted
said anything positive about gays?  And if so, how often has this
happened?

The connection between the two points is clear: a tactical objection to
the Phelps group might merely be that its behavior is not the best way
-- in the view of the tactical objector -- to stir up an anti-gay
backlash.

I make a similar point in a forthcoming article: liberal evangelical
Protestants (and this includes secular rationalist Protestants) might
have a complex, but essentially tactical objection to proselytizing
techniques employed by pietistic evangelical Protestants: namely that
while it is good that such proselytizing might bring non-Protestants
into the pan-Protestant nomos, such proselytizing thereafter becomes
counterproductive from the point of view of liberal evangelical
Protestants because they believe -- rationalists that they are, or tend
to be -- that conversion of the mind is the only way that they will
build up their numbers, and the appeals of pietistic evangelical
Protestants, with their emphasis on the heart and the soul, hinder
conversion of the mind.

I can't really respond to Eugene's proposed perspective because I do not
think that we agree as to what is at stake.  There is an ideological
asymmetry in the fact and experience of violence, both formal and
informal, in the United States.  Violence is visited far more by those
on the political right on those on the political left than is the
reverse case.  (This is so, in my opinion, because the political right
is largely united in its views on race whereas the political left is
more often than not divided.  The political right has greater cohesion,
therefore, which enables it better to practice violence against those
that it dislikes.  There are, of course, other factors that contribute
to the asymmetry, not least of which might be that Americans lean
towards the political right, and not the left.) 

Stimulating violence against African-Americans or against gays, longtime
victims of such violence, calling directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, for the use or application of violence, given the reality of
the patterns of violence in America, is not something that ought to be
protected under the banner of "free speech."

I can't read the First Amendment as privileging bullying or worse.  The
speech-conduct distinction can be easily manipulated to encourage
bullying and the like.  By the same token it can be manipulated to
discourage such behavior.  I prefer the second course, not the first.  I
am not saying that Eugene means to encourage bullying, but the practical
consequences of his approach might lead to that unfortunate result.

The relevance of Romer and Lawrence is, in my view, this:  the cases
attempt, among other things, to hold the line against fomenting violence
-- both formal and informal -- against gay people.         

I share the views of many who have spoken on the Westboro matter arguing
that we ought to be able to protect mourning and grief from the likes of
the Phelps group.  Indeed, I have said so myself in so many words.  But,
above and beyond that, I think that the real target of the Phelps group
is gay people, and that real desire is to foment an anti-gay backlash.
It is the second point that I had failed to make in earlier posts and I
wish to correct that mistake now.  The real issue is violence -- formal
or informal -- against gays and whether the First Amendment gets in the
way of trying to contain such violence.

   

-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, November 02, 2007 6:47 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Is First Amendment viewpoint-discriminatory against
antigayspeech?


        OK, let me present it from a different perspective:  Many
traditionalist Christians have argued that civil rights victories for
the gay rights movement mean losses for traditionalist Christians -- in
particular, loss of free speech and the right to spread their religious
views.  Many have responded that this isn't so, or is at least
overstated:  That of course Christians can keep their free speech rights
and the rights to spread their religious views, and gays and lesbians
can have the right to sexual autonomy, the right to marry free of
government constraint, and so on.

        But I take it that Michael disagrees:  His view is that Romer
and Lawrence should indeed lead the Court to uphold restrictions on
antigay speech, which I take it would include antigay religious
teachings.  Moreover, I take it that the assertedly compelling
government interest in protecting gays is *much* more jeopardized by
mainstream antigay teachings (even when they are comparatively politely
framed), from groups such as traditionalist Protestants, Catholics,
Muslims, and orthodox Jews, than by Phelps' gang of kooks (which if
anything would lead to some extra sympathy for gay rights, by tying
extremist antigay bigotry to extreme anti-Americanism).  So under his
rationale, the Court should uphold general bans on anti-gay-rights
teachings, including religious teachings.

        If that's right, then weren't the traditionalist Christian views
who complained about the gay rights movement, and in particular about
the indirect consequences of its validation in cases such as Romer and
Lawrence, quite prescient?  If Michael's views are to prevail, then it
really is a question of choosing whose rights we protect -- the sexual
autonomy and equality of gays and lesbians, or the free speech and the
religious speech rights of traditionalist Christians.  When the first
group wins, the second loses (again, if Michael's views are to be
accepted).

        Eugene

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of 
> Newsom Michael
> Sent: Friday, November 02, 2007 12:41 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: Is First Amendment viewpoint-discriminatory 
> against antigay speech
> 
> No, not remarkable.  
> 
> Viewpoint neutrality is a chimera and an illusion, in my 
> opinion.  I do agree that the Court is not likely to agree, 
> but that does not mean that the Court is right, but merely 
> that the Court has spoken -- wrongheadedly.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of 
> Volokh, Eugene
> Sent: Friday, November 02, 2007 2:56 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: Is First Amendment viewpoint-discriminatory 
> against antigay speech
> 
> 
>       Wow, that really is a remarkable First Amendment 
> position:  The government is constitutionally permitted to 
> ban antigay speech (all antigay speech? some antigay speech? 
> only antigay speech at funerals?), but I take it 
> constitutionally forbidden from banning progay speech, 
> anticapitalist speech, anti-Christian speech, and so on.  
> Might as well chuck all the Court's pretensions to viewpoint 
> neutrality out the window if that sort of exception is 
> accepted (though fortunately I can't count a single vote for 
> it on today's Court).
> 
>       Eugene 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Newsom 
> > Michael
> > Sent: Friday, November 02, 2007 11:29 AM
> > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > Subject: RE: Is First Amendment viewpoint-discriminatory against 
> > antigay speech
> > 
> > David has it right: a compelling governmental interest in 
> protecting a 
> > discrete and insular minority -- one that is routinely victimized.
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of David Cruz
> > Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2007 8:12 PM
> > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > Subject: RE: Is First Amendment viewpoint-discriminatory against 
> > antigay speech
> > 
> > I too found that comment a little cryptic.  If Michael meant to be 
> > doctrinal rather than just attitudinally predictive, my 
> guess would be 
> > that he didn't mean that a different First Amendment rule 
> would apply, 
> > but that those decisions might somehow justify a conclusion that 
> > there's a compelling governmental interest present.  But it 
> wasn't at 
> > all clear to me, so perhaps Michael might clarify.
> > 
> > David B. Cruz
> > Professor of Law
> > University of Southern California Gould School of Law Los 
> Angeles, CA 
> > 90089-0071 U.S.A.
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, 
> > Eugene
> > Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2007 4:43 PM
> > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > Subject: Is First Amendment viewpoint-discriminatory 
> against antigay 
> > speech
> > 
> >     I'm puzzled -- do Romer and Lawrence really justify not just 
> > protection of gays against governmental discrimination, but a 
> > different First Amendment rule for antigay speech than for 
> > pro-gay-rights speech or a wide range of other speech?
> > 
> >     Eugene
> > 
> > Michael Newsom writes:
> > 
> > > That said, I have no idea of what the Court would do with
> > this case,
> > > but my guess is that the Court would overturn the jury 
> verdict 5-4, 
> > > although Kennedy, on the strength of Romer and Lawrence, 
> might vote 
> > > with the moderates and the case would come out the other
> > way, 5-4 to
> > > uphold the jury verdict (although the punitive damages might be 
> > > reduced, the Court likely to send a signal, I think, in 
> the Valdez 
> > > case that it is prepared to rein in punitive damages).
> > _______________________________________________
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