I think Mark is clearly right when he talks about generally recognized
religious doctrines in part because we know as an empirical matter that
individuals who hold these beliefs are capable of engaging in first rate
scientific work, practicing medicine with great skill, and doing all kinds of
other work that requires scientific knowledge and expertise.
Eugene's question focuses on less conventional and less common religious
beliefs, however. One answer to the problem of the individual who holds
uncommon religious beliefs who is nominated to a position of authority is that
we can look at the individual's life and accomplishments as a check on our
concern about his religious beliefs being inconsistent with the position to
which he has been appointed. Typically leadership positions are offered to
people with considerable experience and accomplishments in their field. If
unconventional religious beliefs have not interfered with their professional
responsibilities and accomplishments for 25 years or so, there seems little
reason to believe that they would suddenly become inconsistent with their
ability to preform their professional responsibilities when appointed to a
leadership position.
I think the harder question is whether unconventional religious beliefs should
preclude an individual from entry level positions when the individual's beliefs
(in the abstract) may seem inconsistent with the responsibilities they would
assume in the position they are seeking and we have no track record to offset
such concerns. The answer to that question may be contextual -- depending for
example on the consequences of the individual's failure to perform his job in a
competent way.
Alan Brownstein
________________________________________
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark [mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu]
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:06 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics; Law & Religion issues for Law
Academics
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
If scientists want public support for their effort -- support that I for one am
happy to give even if it means taxes are somewhat higher than they otherwise
would be -- then scientists need to show that they do not consider most of us
to be fools. If belief in the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith
in the US disqualifies one from leading a scientific effort because it somehow
shows that the person cannot be trusted to do honest science, then science is,
in Dickens' phrase "a ass -- a idiot." (Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, speaking
not of science but of the law.) There have been many very distinguished
scientists who have had such beliefs, and I think it is bigotry to disqualify
such persons from scientific positions. Or perhaps we now should discard the
results of the human genome project, because Francis Collins led the effort,
and of course the results cannot be reliable.
A scientist might reasonably ask whether a candidate for such a position would
use methodological naturalism in carrying out his or her duties. I doubt that
Francis Collins ever thought that God would send a miracle to make up for
sloppy treatment of DNA samples, or that he set up a program to look for hidden
biblical messages in the base sequences of human DNA. But naturalism as a
method is far different from naturalism as a belief system; to require
naturalism as a belief system is indeed to impose a religious test.
Mark Scarberry
Pepperdine
________________________________
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thu 8/6/2009 4:35 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
I appreciate Eric’s suggestion, but I wonder whether it works. I
take it that the response to “But all our instruments show that there’s no
elephant or turtle down there” would be the same as the response to “But all
our experience with medicine tells us that there can’t be a virgin birth or a
resurrection” – “Well, this is a special miracle that can’t be tested with your
instruments / that doesn’t fit with our experience.” I’m not sure one can
easily distinguish the two.
But even if one does draw the line that Eric suggests, say the
person says “The world used to rest on the back of four elephants, which rest
on a turtle. But not long ago that changed, and that’s why our instruments
can’t perceive this now.” Would our view of the person’s general
trustworthiness really change, on the grounds that now he’s saying something
that isn’t currently testable with current observations?
Likewise, the quantum mechanics rationale doesn’t strike me as
working, either. If it turned out that an NIH candidate believes in werewolves
(perhaps with some religious explanation), and explains his belief on the
grounds that there’s a probability, however infinitesimal, that he’ll turn into
a werewolf, would you be satisfied about his qualities? What if you heard this
from a doctor that you were considering going to – wouldn’t you think you might
be safer in someone else’s hands?
As to the aether theory, I don’t know what the view was at the
time; I suspect that it wasn’t viewed so firmly that anyone who disagreed would
be seen as a crank. But say that it was, and that therefore people who
rejected the theory were wrongly condemned and discriminated against. That’s
surely bad. Yet does our uncertainty about what’s right, and our recognition
that time has upset many fighting faiths, mean that we just have to
categorically ignore a person’s seemingly unsound scientific views when he’s
being considered for a high government post? Remember, the question isn’t
whether to throw someone in prison for his views about elephants and turtles
(though in extreme cases, we do lock someone up as insane if we see his views
as “delusions,” for instance if the person really believes that he’s Napoleon)
– it’s whether we should consider the views in deciding whether to trust the
person with a great deal of discretionary authority.
Eugene
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Eric Rassbach
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 3:51 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
Isn’t one of the lines to draw whether the idea is scientifically testable or
not? We can make scientific observations now about whether the world rests
upon turtles, but we cannot observe the birth of Christ.
Also query whether the “natural order” we’ve been discussing isn’t overly
Newtonian in its assumptions. Quantum mechanics allows us to calculate the
non-zero probabilities, however infinitesimal, of events we might otherwise
hold to be outside the standard rules of nature.
Finally, would it have been right for someone in the late 19th century to take
pretty negative views of someone who didn’t buy into an aether theory? For the
government to impose legal detriments on that person?
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
I do think this raises a troublesome question for those of us who
recognize the importance of religious toleration, and yet have to evaluate
people’s qualities for various purposes. Say someone sincerely tells us that
he thinks the world literally rests on the back of four elephants, which rest
on the back of a turtle. When told that this is inconsistent with various
facts about the world, elephants, and turtles, he says that this is an artifact
of some special treatment by divine forces, which allows evasion of the normal
rules of the universe. I take it that our first reaction would be to take a
pretty negative view of the person.
And that the person believes this for religious reasons wouldn’t displace our
doubts, I think. Even if we have reason to think that he’s been a perfectly
good geneticist, we might wonder whether he’s the best person to promote to a
rather different job that involves a broad range of choices about health
science funding. Maybe we have some sort of ethical or constitutional
obligation to set aside our worries, and draw a sharp line between beliefs that
a person says are “outside the natural order” and those that he says relate to
the natural order. But it seems to me that setting them aside at least runs
against our first common-sense reactions, and might in fact not be sound.
>From there we can shift the hypothetical. What if the person
believes the world is 6000 years old, and that people used to live nearly 1000
years, and that all the contrary evidence is miracles produced by God to test
our faith? What if he doesn’t take such a view, but believes that there have
been several departures from the standard rules of nature in the past several
thousand years, such as a virgin birth, a resurrection, and the like?
My sense is that we would indeed draw lines between these examples.
It is certainly significant to me that very many smart, thoughtful, and
suitably scientific skeptical people are believing Christians, and that (I
suspect) many fewer such smart, thoughtful, and skeptical people are
Young-Earthers or people who literally accept certain Hindu creation myths.
But it’s not easy for me to figure out how to translate that sort of sensible
distinction into a legal or constitutional rule, or even a broadly acceptable
principle of political ethics.
Eugene
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Anthony Decinque
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 2:26 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
To be clear, I did not make that characterization. I was repeating Mr.
Harris's argument. (My view would be different.)
Again, I don't want to get into a religious argument (I don't think it's the
point of this list) but Mr. Harris's argument was different: Even if the
virgin birth is outside the natural order, the question Mr. Harris pushes on is
"how does Mr. Collins know that X event happened?" In other words, since Mr.
Collins is claiming that the natural order was suspended on a certain date at a
certain place, he is the one who should have to provide evidence for that
assertion. I think that this the "failure of skepticism" Mr. Harris is
referring to.... I refer you to his piece for his arguments instead of my
clumsy paraphrasing.
All that aside, I wanted to assume that "his views [are] antithetical to the
values underlying science," not just characterize them that way. Assuming that
they are, what result? Is it discrimination to say that someone's religious
views undercut values that are needed in a job?
I think the faith-healer hypothetical was more on target, but doesn't have the
full flavor of the argument. A faith-healer, I suppose, never accepts
conventional medicine. (Mr. Harris is arguing that) Mr. Collins is like a
part-time faith healer.
The doctor-who-prays response is helpful. What about a doctor who was
excellent on the job, but sometimes denounced accepted fields of medicine off
the job?
A
On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 5:03 PM, Douglas Laycock
<layco...@umich.edu<mailto:layco...@umich.edu>> wrote:
It is you who are begging the question. The question is whether religious
faith and scientific commitment are inherently inconsistent. You assumed the
answer to that question when you characterized his views as antithetical to the
values underlying science.
The virgin birth, if it happened, was outside the natural order. Has any said
or done anything unscientific in or about the course of his scientific work,
when he is talking about things within the natural order? Has he said or done
anything allegedly anithetical to science other than state and promote his
religious beliefs?
A faith healer who refuses medical treatment could not be Surgeon General. An
excellent physician who does everything medically indicated, and also prays for
cures and believes that God sometimes answers those prayers, could be Surgeon
General.
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