Howard Friedman writes: "Except for its greater attractiveness, why is
this different than prisons granting special religious diets-which many
routinely do? Or does the greater pressure to feign (or adopt) a particular
religious belief because of the attractiveness of the option make a
constitutional difference?"
Well, if we think that coercive pressure to participate in a religious
practice -- even at so mild a level as standing quietly while a speaker is
leading the audience is praying, and even when all that is lost if one doesn't
show up is the opportunity to go to one's graduation -- violates the
Establishment Clause, why wouldn't the same apply here?
Also, independently of coercion, might it be the case that mild
preferences for religious people over the nonreligious are permissible, but
that much more significant preferences (e.g., religious objectors don't have to
kill and to risk being killed in war, while nonreligious objectors do) are not
permissible?
Eugene
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