I didn't say that the Greens are not potentially burden as company
directors -- indeed, that's exactly what I've argued the case is about,
rather than being about corporate free exercise or shareholder rights:

http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/01/hobby-lobby-part-v-whose-religious.html


On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 2:17 PM, Scarberry, Mark <
mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu> wrote:

> The "just like wages" characterization is highly contested and, at least
> if pushed to its logical conclusion,  unsustainable. As to the shareholder
> issue, almost everyone these days owns property through trusts; anyone who
> has substantial assets and wants to avoid probate will do so. So it's not
> surprising that the Greens are not personally shareholders but rather
> trustees of the trusts that hold the shares (if I understand the facts
> correctly). Their rights are implicated as beneficial owners and as
> controlling persons, by way of their being trustees of their family trust
> and also officers and directors who personally take actions on behalf of
> the corporation. As for them not being required to provide the coverage
> they object to, because they can just leave their employees out in the
> Obamacare cold, and pay a fine, there is a strong argument that the law
> still creates a substantial burden. I think we've discussed that issue at
> length.
>
> Mark
>
> Mark S. Scarberry
> Pepperdine University School of Law
>
>
> Sent from my iPad
>
> On Jun 10, 2014, at 10:09 AM, "Marty Lederman" <lederman.ma...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> I agree with Mark's correction that the complaint of the Greens is not
> that their employees' use of contraceptive burdens their religion.
>
> But it's also not that they have to "buy insurance that specifically
> covers the drugs."  For thing, the law doesn't require HL to offer an
> employee health insurance plan at all.  For another, the Greens aren't
> shareholders, and therefore aren't "buying" anything.  Hobby Lobby, Inc.
> --as opposed to the Greens-- is contracting for an insurance plan -- but of
> course that plan is not made available to their employees gratis; it is a
> part of their compensation package, provided in exchange for their labor,
> just like wages.
>
> The nature of the way in which the Greens are alleged to be required to
> act in violation of any religious obligations, therefore, is not at all
> obvious.
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 12:55 PM, Scarberry, Mark <
> mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu> wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> I think you don't understand, or are ignoring, the point of view of the
>> Hobby Lobby parties. They don't object to employees buying what the Hobby
>> Lobby parties consider to be abortifacient drugs. I don't think they
>> monitor what their employees do with wages or would take any action against
>> employees who buy or use such drugs. They object to being required
>> themselves to take an action specifically related to abortion -- buying
>> insurance that specifically covers the drugs. You might object to buying a
>> gun for an employee, even though the recipient would be the one who uses
>> it. You might, if you were a pacifist, object to being drafted to serve as
>> an army medic or supply clerk, even though you would not be killing anyone
>> but merely be advancing the army's operations.
>>
>> I understand that some people object to this characterization, but it
>> doesn't move the discussion forward to just assume that it isn't the
>> position taken by the objectors in Hobby Lobby.
>>
>> Mark
>>
>> Mark S. Scarberry
>> Pepperdine University School of Law
>>
>> Sent from my iPad
>>
>> > On Jun 9, 2014, at 2:35 PM, "mallamud" <malla...@camden.rutgers.edu>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > There is some authority for not preferring religion over non-religion.
>> > I do not think religious people should get exemptions reasons not
>> > connected to the practice of their religion (church services, prayer,
>> > lighting candles, sacrificing chickens etc.) To me many requests sound
>> > like "I think it is wrong for religious reasons" and therefore other
>> > people should not engage in that behavior.  E.g. I will not pay my taxes
>> > because taxes pay for killing people.  No one is asking the owners of
>> > Hobby Lobby to engage in activities that they believe offend their
>> > religion; they are seeking not to pay employees in such a way that
>> > certain contraceptives would be covered.  The decision to use or not use
>> > the contraceptives is the employees'.  One difficulty is that the courts
>> > are loath to inquire into to the closeness of the connection of the
>> > claim to the religious belief.  But without limits exemptions will
>> > become legion.
>> >
>> > Exemptions usually involve some unfairness.  That would be mitigated if
>> > religious exemptions were limited to the actual practice of religion
>> > rather than attempts to impose beliefs on others through refusing to
>> > comply with general laws. Smith is a good example and, as we know, does
>> > not stop you from sacrificing chickens because people in the community
>> > are offended.  Take it outside the church or home and give exemptions to
>> > general laws and that will create problems if the exemptions become wide
>> > enough to make it seem that religious folks have general privileges in
>> > society that secular folks do not.  Cf. Affirmative action.
>> >
>> > I noted previously Scalia's citation (in during oral argument) of the
>> > overwhelming majority extending the VRA as evidence that the law was not
>> > carefully considered. During RFRA's passage and thereafter I focused on
>> > conservatives articulating the issue as one in which the Supreme Court
>> > disrespected religion, and those on the other side of the spectrum
>> > articulated the Smith decision as having disrespected constitutional
>> > rights.  From discussion about Scalia with lawyers and non-lawyers, I
>> > cannot help thinking that a dislike of Scalia contributed to one side's
>> > support of RFRA.
>> >
>> >                                                                    Jon
>> >
>> >
>> >> On 2014-06-09 17:00, Steven Jamar wrote:
>> >> “nones”?
>> >> Huh.  I knew that was a thing, but didn’t really expect to see it
>> >> here.
>> >>
>> >> Steve
>> >>
>> >> On Jun 9, 2014, at 4:49 PM, mallamud <malla...@camden.rutgers.edu>
>> >> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> I agree with Alan's statement below, stated better than I did.  I
>> >>> would add that we now do/should include the nones within the system.
>> >>>
>> >>>                  Jon
>> >>>
>> >>>> On 2014-06-08 22:36, Alan Brownstein wrote:
>> >>>> If divisive means that people will be upset by a substantive
>> >>>> decision
>> >>>> than Eugene is clearly correct. I have always thought the issue was
>> >>>> whether a decision was one that provoked political divisions along
>> >>>> religious lines in the sense that if government could promote
>> >>>> religion
>> >>>> (or interfere with religion) religious groups would have an
>> >>>> additional
>> >>>> incentive to organize and mobilize as religious groups in order to
>> >>>> make sure that it was their faith that the government promoted and
>> >>>> that it was not their faith that was subject to government
>> >>>> interference. Placing a church-state issue beyond the scope of
>> >>>> political decision-making by subjecting it to constitutional
>> >>>> constraints avoided (or at least mitigated) these kinds of
>> >>>> political/religious divisions.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> There is probably a better term for this concern than divisiveness.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Alan Brownstein
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> ________________________________________
>> >>>> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
>> >>>> [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
>> >>>> [vol...@law.ucla.edu]
>> >>>> Sent: Sunday, June 08, 2014 4:54 PM
>> >>>> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
>> >>>> Subject: "Divisiveness"
>> >>>>
>> >>>>       I agree very much with Tom on this point.  In most
>> >>>> controversies, both sides are acting in ways that could plausibly
>> >>>> be
>> >>>> labeled as "divisive."  Government religious speech may be seen as
>> >>>> "divisive," because it may alienate members of other religious
>> >>>> groups;
>> >>>> but prohibitions on such speech, or litigation seeking such
>> >>>> prohibition, may be as divisive or more so.  A pro-Hobby-Lobby
>> >>>> decision might be divisive, but an anti-Hobby-Lobby decision might
>> >>>> be
>> >>>> divisive.  Indeed, academic criticism of a pro-Hobby-Lobby decision
>> >>>> (or an anti-Hobby-Lobby decision) might be divisive -- and so was
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> implementation of the mandate without a broad religious exemption,
>> >>>> as
>> >>>> Tom points out.  The Employment Division v. Smith regime can be
>> >>>> seen
>> >>>> as divisive -- but the RFRA regime, or the Sherbert regime, which
>> >>>> makes controversial judicially implemented religious accommodations
>> >>>> possible, can apparently be divisive, too.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>       Indeed, in my experience, most people -- I speak generally
>> >>>> here, and not with a focus on this list -- can easily see the
>> >>>> potential "divisiveness" of decisions they dislike on substantive
>> >>>> grounds, but don't even notice the divisiveness of decisions they
>> >>>> think are sound.  After all, if one thinks a decision is sound,
>> >>>> it's
>> >>>> easy to view those who disagree as just unreasonable, so that their
>> >>>> feelings of alienation don't really count (since they deserved to
>> >>>> lose, and are now just being sore losers).
>> >>>>
>> >>>>       Of course,
>> >>>>
>> >>>>       Eugene
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Tom Berg writes:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> I get those arguments, but they don't really seem to rest on a
>> >>>>> ruling for Hobby
>> >>>>> Lobby being "divisive"--they rest on it being (assertedly)
>> >>>>> substantively wrong.
>> >>>>> One could just as easily charge the Obama administration with
>> >>>>> being "divisive"
>> >>>>> (undermining "harmony," to use Jon's term) by adopting the mandate
>> >>>>> in the first
>> >>>>> place. (See Rick Garnett's piece on why arguments about
>> >>>>> divisiveness should do
>> >>>>> only very limited work in religion cases.)
>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
>> >>>> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
>> >>>> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed
>> >>>> as
>> >>>> private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that
>> >>>> are
>> >>>> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can
>> >>>> (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
>> >>>> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
>> >>>> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed
>> >>>> as
>> >>>> private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that
>> >>>> are
>> >>>> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can
>> >>>> (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
>> >>>
>> >>> _______________________________________________
>> >>> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
>> >>> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
>> >>> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
>> >>>
>> >>> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed
>> >>> as private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that
>> >>> are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can
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>> >>
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> Prof. Steven D. Jamar                     vox:  202-806-8017
>> >> Director of International Programs, Institute for Intellectual
>> >> Property and Social Justice http://iipsj.org
>> >> Howard University School of Law           fax:  202-806-8567
>> >> http://sdjlaw.org
>> >>
>> >> Nothing worth doing is completed in our lifetime,
>> >> Therefore, we are saved by hope.
>> >> Nothing true or beautiful or good makes complete sense in any
>> >> immediate context of history;
>> >> Therefore, we are saved by faith.
>> >> Nothing we do, however virtuous, can be accomplished alone.
>> >> Therefore, we are saved by love.
>> >> No virtuous act is quite as virtuous from the standpoint of our
>> >> friend or foe as from our own;
>> >> Therefore, we are saved by the final form of love which is
>> >> forgiveness.
>> >>
>> >> Reinhold Neibuhr
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
>> >> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
>> >> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
>> >>
>> >> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as
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>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
>> > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
>> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
>> >
>> > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as
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>> _______________________________________________
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>>
>
> _______________________________________________
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>
> _______________________________________________
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