This is an interesting example. (And I thank Eugene for his typically 
thoughtful answer.)  Can one distinguish between the illegitimate direct use of 
the product (to kill human beings) and the mere fact that the cupcake will be 
eaten at a wedding (or trust)?  Would we be comfortable if the single grocer in 
town refused to sell food to someone known to sympathize with the KKK?  I 
assume, though, that the civil rights laws was prohibits discriminating on 
grounds of race etc., and this should hold for sexual orientation as well.

Sandy

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 13, 2015, at 7:25 PM, K Chen <tzn...@gmail.com<mailto:tzn...@gmail.com>> 
wrote:

The various pharmaceutical companies refusing to sell certain drugs to death 
penalty states come to mind.

-Kevin Chen

On Thu, Aug 13, 2015 at 7:51 PM, Volokh, Eugene 
<vol...@law.ucla.edu<mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote:
               Sure, why not?  Say a grape grower refuses to sell to 
winemakers, or a pacifist widget maker refuses to sell to military contractors, 
or a restaurant refuses to deliver to abortion clinics?  See Rasmussen v. Glass 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993), 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=648897692635049631, which holds 
that, even if a city ordinance banning discrimination based on “creed” required 
restaurants to deliver to abortion clinics, there had to be a religious 
exemption from such an ordinance.  “Under the provisions of the Minneapolis 
ordinance, relator Glass [owner of the Beach Club Deli] has two choices. He can 
either associate with an entity that engages in conduct which he finds to be 
morally offensive [delivering to abortion clinics], thus compromising his 
conscience, or he can refuse and be found guilty of discrimination and fined.”

               Now these have to do with objections to sales to businesses, not 
sales to individuals – but I can’t see why they would be different for RFRA / 
state Free Exercise Clause purposes.  As to how the information would be 
obtained, I take it that many a business wouldn’t work very hard to investigate 
the matter, but when it learned that its products were used by a customer in 
ways it disapproved of, might stop selling them to that customer.

               Isn’t that how many of us would act if we were businesspeople, 
and we learned that some of our customers were using our products in ways we 
strongly disapproved of?  Want to buy our pillowcases?  Go right ahead.  Oh, 
wait, you’re the KKK and you want to use them for your hoods; sorry, your 
business isn’t welcome here.  Same if you learn your customers are using your 
products to kill animals (if you object to that), resell them to South Africa 
(if you objected to that back in the 1980s), and so on.  Some people take a 
“Hey, the product is out of our hands, none of our business” attitude, which I 
think is just fine.  But other people care more about the behavior of their 
customers (and for that matter of their suppliers) – indeed, many who praise 
“corporate social responsibility” support that general approach.  And when the 
business feels a religious objection in such a situation, any existing 
religious exemption regime would be implicated, wouldn’t it be?

               Eugene

From: 
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>]
 On Behalf Of Levinson, Sanford V
Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2015 7:20 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Colorado Cakeshop decision

A non-rhetorical question:  is there any model that would justify refusing to 
sell an in embellished product--say a cupcake--to someone whose potential 
use--at a same sex wedding, at a tryst with one's heterosexual lover, or 
whatever--you disapproved of on religious grounds?  An obvious question, of 
course, is how such information would be obtained. Could a sign indicate the 
exclusive list of cupcake-eligible customers and include, in addition to 
payment and appropriate demeanor, "adherence to the baker's views of sexual 
propriety"?

Sandy

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 13, 2015, at 4:27 PM, Volokh, Eugene 
<vol...@law.ucla.edu<mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote:
               I should add that it also concludes that the Colorado 
Constitution’s religious freedom guarantee follows the Smith model rather than 
the Sherbert/Yoder model, something that was less clear before.

               Eugene

From: 
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marty Lederman
Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2015 5:06 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Colorado Cakeshop decision

https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Court_of_Appeals/Opinion/2015/14CA1351-PD.pdf

Fairly straightforward.  Rejects free speech and free exercise claims.  (The 
case does not involve a refusal to bake a cake displaying any particular 
"content" -- the bakery refused to bake any cake for a same-sex wedding.)
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