move against a powerful political figure despite his family connections.  By 
Daur Dosybiev in Almaty

political structure and election system have been portrayed as democratic, but 
the current head of state is the main beneficiary.  By Andrei Chebotarev in 

TAJIKS SEEK PERMANENT GATEWAY TO CHINA  Tajikistan’s isolated southeast has 
benefited from a new trade route to China, but locals say restrictions at the 
border crossing are making life harder than it needs to be.  By Saodat Asanova 
in Badakhshan and Dushanbe


entries to the Kurt Schork Awards in International Journalism is just two weeks 
away. Two annual prizes of $5,000 each are awarded - one to an international 
freelance print/internet-based reporter; and the second to a local journalist 
in the developing world. The deadline for receipt of emailed or posted entries 
is June 15th. 
The awards are being administered by IWPR, on behalf of the Kurt Schork 
Memorial Fund, with the two winners celebrated at an event to be held in London 
in November. A video of last year’s event hosted by Christiane Amanpour of CNN 
can be seen on IWPR’s website www.iwpr.net 
For details on how to apply electronically or by post, contact Alan Davis 
([EMAIL PROTECTED]) or click here 

closed in 2006, it donated its searchable Trial Reports Archive to IWPR in 
recognition of our own reporting work and to ensure these courtroom reports 
would remain available to the public. Milosevic and other ICTY Trial Reports as 
well as Sierra Leone Reports are now available at 

MIANEH is a new, independent web-based initiative run as a project by the 
Institute for War & Peace Reporting. Mianeh aims to be an open space for ideas, 
news and debate where writers in Iran can reach out to each other as well as to 
those outside the country who are interested in learning more about the vibrant 
and dynamic society that is Iran today. Go to <http://www.mianeh.net/> to find 
out more.

NEW PODCAST: THIS WEEK ON IWPR A regular audio programme produced by IWPR US, 
highlighting IWPR news and analysis on issues of conflict, human rights and 
international justice, written by our contributors around the world. To listen 
to the programme or for details on how to subscribe see 

IRAQ PHOTO DIARIES, NIGHT RAIDS: Peter van Agtmael documents the late-night 
raids carried out by American and Iraqi troops against the homes of suspected 
insurgents. This series of photographs was awarded a 2nd place in the General 
News Stories category at the World Press Photo Awards in 2007. 

NEWS BRIEFING CENTRAL ASIA is a new concept in regional reporting, comprising 
analysis and “news behind the news” in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Available at: www.NBCentralAsia.net 

**** www.iwpr.net 

REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA RSS: http://www.iwpr.net/en/rca/rss.xml 

TURKMEN RADIO: INSIDE VIEW is an IWPR radio training and broadcast project for 
Turkmenistan. View at: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=trk&s=p&o=-&apc_state=henh 

RECEIVE FROM IWPR: Readers are urged to subscribe to IWPR's full range of free 
electronic publications at: 

GIVE TO IWPR: IWPR is wholly dependent upon grants and donations. For more 
information about how you can support IWPR go to: 

**** www.iwpr.net 


The authorities move against a powerful political figure despite his family 

By Daur Dosybiev in Almaty

Married to the president and occupying a series of high-profile positions, 
Rahat Aliev seemed to be part of an untouchable inner circle in Kazak politics. 
But in the last two weeks he has gone from being ambassador to Austria to a 
wanted suspect, and his career now seems irreparable

Analysts say the arrest warrant for Aliev, formerly deputy head of Kazakstan’s 
intelligence agency, the National Security Committee, head of the presidential 
security service, and deputy foreign minister, is the culmination of a murky 
conflict pitting factions against each other within the political hierarchy 
created by President Nursultan Nazarbaev.

Aliev is married to the president’s elder daughter Dariga, a prominent 
politician with a seat in parliament and head of the Kazakstan Congress of 

On May 23, Kazakstan's interior ministry announced that Aliev had been charged 
in connection with the abduction and assault of two officials of Nurbank, in 
which he is a key shareholder. 

Abilmajen Gilimov, at the time chairman of Nurbank, and his deputy Joldas 
Timraliev, disappeared in January. After their release a day later, they 
resigned from the bank. Family members alleged that they had been beaten to 
force them to give up shareholdings in Nurbank and sign away the building. 

Ten associates of Aliev – including several who had worked for him in the 
presidential security service – were also charged on May 23. 

The interior ministry said investigations were also focusing on alleged links 
to organised crime and unspecified financial crimes.

The following day, the prosecutor general ministry suspended Aliev’s KTK 
television channel and newspaper Karavan from operating. The official reason 
was that they were not carrying enough material in Kazak, as they are legally 
required to do. But the media outlets had carried material that presented 
Aliev’s side of the story.

Aliev was packed off to Vienna in February after the kidnapping allegations 
surfaced, as ambassador to Austria and to the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, which Kazakstan hopes to chair in 2009.

But on May 26, after the criminal charges were brought against Aliev, Nazarbaev 
sacked him from both positions. 

The question now is whether he will return to face charges. On May 30, 
Kazakstan submitted a formal request to the Austrian authorities to extradite 
him. Stripped of his diplomatic immunity, he has now applied for political 

Aliev has previously denied any connection with the abductions, filing 
defamation suits against the wives of Gilimov and Timraliev for allegations 
they had made against him. 

In a statement circulated on May 29 in the Kazak media, Aliev suggested he was 
being victimised merely because he told his father-in-law in private that he 
too would like to be president one day. 

“A few months ago I told Nursultan Abishevich [Nazarbaev] that I’d decided to 
stand as a candidate in the next presidential election in 2012. It would be a 
natural progression for my political career,” he said. 

He said the charges against him were “open lawlessness and a return to the 
totalitarian past”. 

“As for the attack on the bank [ie the alleged abductions], I will say the 
following – the situation is becoming absurd in the extreme,” he said, listing 
a number of grave flaws in the way the interior ministry was conducting the 
case. “A case is being fabricated against me and people close to me.” 

Referring to the temporary closure of KTK and Karavan, he added, “At the same 
time, popular independent TV companies and newspapers are being closed down 
merely because they have covered the events that are happening.” 

Aliev has been a political thorn in Nazarbaev’s side for some time. In 2001, a 
group of businessmen believed to be in favour with the president wrote to the 
Kazak parliament accusing Aliev of attempting to move in on their businesses 
and assets. 

This year, Aliev and his father publicly embarrassed Nazarbaev by criticising 
an amendment to the constitution - now passed - which will allow him to stand 
for an unlimited number of terms in office.

That perceived disloyalty may have predisposed Nazarbaev not to back his 
son-in-law in the event of another public scandal. However, it seems that he 
was forced to take action by the interior ministry’s revelations, rather than 
choosing the timing himself.

The way the allegations came out and the swiftness with which the authorities 
moved to prosecute Aliev suggest that he has lost out in an ongoing war between 
competing political and business groups – all of them regime insiders, but with 
differing interests and allegiances.

These groupings consist of banks, financial institutions and industrial 
companies headed by high-profile figures with an inside track to the corridors 
of political power. 

On May 22, Aliev announced publicly that he was in possession of documents 
containing damaging information about the mayor of Almaty, Imangali 
Tasmagambetov, and Interior Minister Baurjan Mukhamejanov. 

By the following day, Gilimov was speaking on the state television channel 
Astana, alleging that it was Aliev personally, along with armed accomplices, 
who kidnapped him and Timraliev back in January and held them hostage for about 
24 hours, threatening to kill them if they did not sign over their bank assets. 

Criminal charges were brought against Aliev the same day.

On May 30, a group of leading businessmen, including the heads of three major 
banks and a number of successful companies, made a statement to the media 
expressing support for the president and attacking Aliev.

“Many of us have experienced his [Aliev’s] methods of doing business and using 
law-enforcement agencies to apply political pressure for his own ends. Any one 
of us could have been in the place of the kidnapped bankers,” said the 

According to local human rights advocate Yevgeny Zhovtis, the balance of power 
has clearly shifted away from those associated with Aliev to others, which are 
underlining their loyalty to the head of state.

“It is clear that there is a kind of consensus among the majority of groupings 
about the war against Aliev’s group. And as long as the president doesn’t 
change his mind for other reasons – such as family ties – Aliev’s political 
future is unenviable, to put it mildly,” he said. 

An official in the Almaty mayor’s office, who wished to remain anonymous, 
agrees that Aliev’s fate is sealed.

“He went too far,” he said. Referring to the reported rivalry between Aliev and 
other business factions, he said it was inevitable that one side was going to 
win, “They [both sides] were openly taking businesses away from each other, and 
you can’t do that and go unpunished. On this occasion, Aliev went after his 
father-in-law’s friends.”

A defiant Aliev has insisted that he remains a political player. 
“I want to make it clear that I am always going to be in politics. I’m going to 
do everything in my power to prevent the country sliding backwards into the 
totalitarian Soviet past,” he said in his statement. “I know I have many, many 
supporters in our country. I am convinced the future is ours, not yours, Mr 
With an international arrest warrant bearing his name and an extradition 
request filed in Vienna, Aliev’s immediate future looks unpromising. 

Yet there is still the matter of his family ties to the president, which some 
analysts think might end in a face-saving arrangement rather than a 
high-profile trial.

“It’s one thing to charge Aliev the official, but another thing to charge the 
husband of your eldest daughter,” commented political analyst Andrei 

Chebotarev thinks Aliev could be banished to some distant foreign posting, or 
if there is no rapprochement, reconfigure himself as an opposition leader in 

According to Eduard Poletaev, the chief editor of the Mir Yevrazii magazine, if 
Aliev were brought to trial, he might try to defend himself by making damaging 
claims against Nazarbaev and his entourage 

“Our leadership’s image is already shaky in the wake of ‘Kazakgate’ and the 
other corruption cases that have come to light,” said Poletaev, referring to 
the ongoing trial in the United State in which James Giffen, a former advisor 
to Nazarbaev, is accused of facilitating the payment of massive bribes by US 
oil companies to top Kazak officials.

But Poletaev thinks the very fact that so much is known about these allegations 
would reduce the impact of any new revelations Aliev might come up with, “so 
there’s no point in blackmailing anyone with such material”.

In the short term, said Poletaev, Aliev’s future may depend on the prosecution 
and trial of Aliev’s associates. “A lot depends on how quickly these people are 
brought into custody, and what they say,” he said.

Independent journalist Sergei Duvanov believes that Aliev’s fate is not sealed 
yet, as the case against him rests on statements made by injured parties and 
witnesses, and these could still be retracted or changed.

“I wouldn’t be surprised if the whole situation is reversed so that Aliev 
becomes the victim and other people the accused,” he said.

Daur Dosybiev is an IWPR contributor in Almaty.



Changes to the political structure and election system have been portrayed as 
democratic, but the current head of state is the main beneficiary.

By Andrei Chebotarev in Almaty

The constitutional changes which came into force in Kazakstan on May 21 have 
consolidated the president’s power, and do not represent significant progress 
towards democracy.

Political power remains excessively centralised, and the constitutional 
amendments largely amount to a redistribution of authority among branches of 

One important change is that Nursultan Nazarbaev, as Kazakstan’s first and so 
far only president, can seek re-election as many times as he wants. In other 
words, he can seek a new term in 2012 and again in future ballots until such 
time he himself decides it is time to step down.

Although the changes have been advertised as strengthening political pluralism 
and the legislature, Nazarbaev will be able to use the parliamentary majority 
of his party Nur Otan to dominate both the legislative process and the 
government. Nur Otan has considerable public influence, not least because civil 
servants are more or less compelled to join it, as are the employees of private 
companies whose owners are Nazarbaev supporters.

The president’s influence over lawmakers is also boosted because nine seats in 
the lower house or Majilis will now be nominated by the Assembly of Peoples of 
Kazakstan, over which he has influence, and he will also appoint 15 members to 
the upper chamber or Senate instead of seven as was the case before.

In all likelihood, the main reason why Nazarbaev has pushed these changes 
through is because since he was re-elected in 2005, he appears to have lost 
some of his grip on the political elite in particular, and developments in the 
country as a whole. 

Two clear signs of this were the murder of opposition politician Altynbek 
Sarsenbayuly in February last year and the current prosecution of the 
president’s son-in-law Rahat Aliev. Both incidents suggested not only that 
there was a crisis in the elite, but also that the authorities dealt poorly 
with such crises. 

This turbulence may have prompted Nazarbaev to seek to regain control and 
restore the balance of forces within the regime.

The removal of limitations on the number of times Nazarbaev can be president 
will take the pressure off him as the 2012 election approaches. Although he 
still has the option of not standing, the possibility that he might should 
defuse some of the infighting in the elite over the succession issue.

At the same time as bolstering his own powers, President Nazarbaev has tried to 
show the world that these constitutional reforms represent progress on 
political reforms and that the system is moving ever closer to international 
democratic standards. That is of particular importance as Kazakstan is bidding 
to chair the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2009.

Some of the changes have certainly met with approval from the international 
community as well as the domestic constituency. One big shift is that the 
Majilis will be expanded from 77 to 107 seats, and all will be electable by 
proportional representation using the party list system, except the nine that 
are coopted by the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakstan. 

Introducing proportional representation has some clear advantages. It will mean 
increased opportunities for political parties to take part in drafting 
legislation, and more chance that those parties that currently have no seats in 
the Majilis might be represented in future. Some parties may also try to adopt 
more distinct identities and start building up grassroots support.

However, the constitutional amendments fail to introduce mechanisms to ensure 
free and fair elections. Nor do they incorporate a proposal made by a 
government agency to lower the threshold for winning seats in parliament from 
seven to five per cent of the vote. Both omissions may make it harder for 
parties to win Majilis seats.

The use of a party-list system for almost all seats will prevent people from 
standing as independents.

The constitutional amendments largely failed to incorporate better protections 
for people’s civil and political rights and liberties, especially to defend 
them against unlawful actions committed by the state. 

One exception is a provision whose wording de facto abolishes the death 
penalty. Capital punishment will now only be applied in convictions for 
particularly brutal crimes during war time and terrorist attacks that result in 
fatalities. The downside is that this could foster a sense of impunity among 
criminals and result in an increase in murder and other serious crimes.

Another potential area of ambiguity is the introduction of rules requiring the 
approval of a court before a formal arrest can be made, and allowing the 
accused to appeal against the decision. On the one hand, the law-enforcement 
agencies now have a legal framework within which to operate, but on the other, 
the high level of corruption in the judicial system could lead to abuses where 
arrests are sanctioned in pursuit of personal vendettas or as part of a 
conspiracy between judges and police.

Overall, the constitutional reform has both pros and cons. The fact that 
changes have been made for the first time since 1998 – overcoming initial 
opposition and then procrastination on the part of the authorities – can be 
seen as a step forward in itself.

However, the changes were simply passed by parliament rather than by asking the 
nation by means of a referendum. Nor was there any attempt to engage the public 
in a debated on the proposed amendments. As a result, the people of Kazakstan – 
from whom state power nominally emanates – were sidelined once again.

All in all, this latest reform does not even approximate to a genuine exercise 
in democracy-building for Kazakstan. 

Andrei Chebotarev is a political scientist and director of the Alternativa 


Tajikistan’s isolated southeast has benefited from a new trade route to China, 
but locals say restrictions at the border crossing are making life harder than 
it needs to be.

By Saodat Asanova in Badakhshan and Dushanbe

Traders in Badakhshan are asking for the border crossing with China to be open 
more of the time so they can move freely back and forth and generate stronger 
economic growth in this remote mountain region of Tajikistan. 

The Tajik-China trade route, opened in 2004, runs between from Khorog, the 
administrative centre of Badakhshan province in southeastern Tajikistan, over a 
high-altitude plateau and then down into China, where it ends in the city of 
Kashgar, 700 kilometres away. 

But because conditions are so tough at the Kulma border crossing – located on a 
mountain pass 4,400 metres high – the gateway only stays open 15 days out of 
every month, while from November through April it is closed altogether.


The road has boosted external trade for Tajikistan, whose other neighbours are 
landlocked Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and created employment for 
many people in Badakhshan. Bilateral trade in goods going via Kulma has gone 
from zero to reach 400 million US dollars in 2006. The main direction of trade 
is westwards – cheap Chinese consumer goods sell well in Tajikistan’s markets.

Badakhshan accounts for 45 per cent of Tajikistan’s land area but the 
inhospitable mountain terrain means it is very sparsely populated, and 
infrastructure is poorly developed. 

In Soviet times the authorities would stockpile essential goods ahead of 
winter, when snowfalls cut the road from the capital Dushanbe, and Khorog can 
only be reached from Kyrgyzstan to the north. Declining economic conditions in 
post-independence Tajikistan made it harder to sustain Badakhshan, as the 
government’s priority was addressing economic problems in the more populated 
and easier-to-reach parts of the country. 

But independence eventually created opportunities for warmer relations with 
China, and the Khorog-Kashgar road created a new channel for the movement of 
“shuttle traders” – people moving back and forth across the border with 
consignments of consumer goods – which characterises so much of trade between 
Central Asia and western China.

The boom in trade belies the fact that the road is little more than a dirt 
track in places, and so high that travellers risk getting altitude sickness. 
Vehicles also suffer frequent problems because engines do not run well on 
rarefied air. As Chinese trucks usually travel in convoy, if one breaks down 
the entire column grinds to a halt.

In April, officials from Badakhshan and Kashgar agreed there was a need to 
rebuild the section running from Khorog to Murgab to cope safely with larger 


Residents of Badakhshan and the traders who use the border - both Tajik and 
Chinese - say the restricted opening times make it difficult to complete a 
round trip without getting stuck on the wrong side of an inhospitable frontier.

Most people here see the road and the traffic it has brought with it as an 
unmitigated success, but believe trade would really take off if the border 
crossing was kept open permanently. The regional government in Badakhshan has 
repeatedly urged the authorities in Dushanbe to open the route permanently.

The Badakhshan authorities have also recommended the opening of a Chinese 
consulate and a Tajik foreign ministry branch in Khorog to make it easier for 
locals to get visas. At the moment, Tajik traders have to travel 700 km in the 
other direction to collect a Chinese visa at the embassy in Dushanbe. Chinese 
and Tajik officials reached a verbal agreement to do this last year, but there 
are still documents to be drawn up to make this happen.

Boymamad Alibakhshev, head of the government department for investment and 
state property in Badakhshan, said that the opening restrictions are holding 
back trade.

“If the checkpoint functioned on a permanent basis, there would be an increase 
in Tajik-Chinese trade turnover, which has already increased sixfold in the 
last three years,” he told IWPR.

Khushomad Alidodov, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party’s branch in 
Badakhshan, said the local authorities’ unheeded appeals exemplified the lack 
of devolved power in Tajikistan. 

“The centralisation of government in this country means the Badakhshan 
authorities do not have powers to resolve issues at a local level,” he said.


Apart from the abundance of Chinese-made goods, the hotels, cafés and 
warehouses which have sprung up in Badakhshan are evidence of the boost to the 
region’s economy. Whenever the Kulma crossing is open, casual employment 

Some men find work loading freight on and off trucks for wages of 100 to 120 
somoni, up to 35 US dollars, a day, while others ferry passengers and goods as 
far as the border and back to Khorog. 

They cannot drive into China itself because of a clause in the agreement 
underpinning the crossing which stated that all goods vehicles have to travel 
laden. This disadvantages Tajik traders, who have little to sell and are 
therefore prevented from driving into China, while the Chinese are allowed to 
drive their own trucks to Khorog.

Khorog resident Meralisho Mamadov earns up to 600 dollars for each 15-day stint 
of driving work. 

“The opening of the road has simply been a miracle for me. Last year, I earned 
enough money not only to support my family, but also to send my children to 
university. This year, my son will work with me so he can build up his own 
capital,” he said.

Umed, a third-year student at Khorog university, earns up to 130 dollars for 
driving manufactured goods from Kulma all the way to Dushanbe.

“A rich businessman from the capital [Dushanbe] offered my friends and me a 
good wage if we’d drive his cars. The only thing we needed was a driving 
license. We pay for food ourselves while we’re on the road, and once we reach 
our destination we receive our pay. We manage two trips in each 15-day period,” 
he told IWPR.

Drivers like Umed sometimes have to wait several days at the border before 
their goods arrive on the other sides. They sleep in their cars or in yurts – 
traditional Kyrgyz tents which enterprising residents of Murgab, the nearest 
town, turn into makeshift hotels and canteens over the summer season.


Traders heading for China go as far as the Tajik checkpoint either in their own 
cars or in hired transport, walk across the frontier, and hire a Chinese car 
and driver on the other side. Then they have to move as quickly as they can to 
get their business done and get back before the border closes for two weeks. 

“When we go to China, most of entrepreneurs think less about buying goods than 
about getting everything done on time and coming back across the border so as 
to avoid additional costs,” said Badakhshan resident Gulbegim Alibakhsheva. 

According to another trader, Shavkat Otambekov, said getting caught out can be 
financially disastrous. 

“The expenses for a trip to Kashgar and back, including accommodation and food 
for a stay of several days in the town, come to about 250 dollars per person, 
if you economise. If you go to Urumchi [administrative centre of Xinjiang 
province], the costs go up to 500 dollars. But if you don’t get back in time, 
these expenses double,” Shavkat said.

Many traders fund their business activities by taking out loans, for example 
from a microfinance bank branch which the Aga Khan Fund, AKF, has set up in 
Khorog. The AKF, founded by the Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of the Ismaili 
branch of Islam, has been a major donor and development agency in Badakhshan, 
where local people are traditionally Ismaili rather than Sunni as in the rest 
of Tajikistan. 

A delayed return from China can upset a trader’s precarious financial planning. 

Madina Oripova, from the village of Barchid, took out a bank loan of around 
2,000 dollars before setting out for China on a purchasing trip.

“It was my first trip outside Tajikistan,” she said. “The people travelling 
with me helped me, but I found it hard to get my bearings there and had trouble 
with the language. I bought goods and loaded them up, but unfortunately, time 
ran out and the border was closed. 

“My goods ended up unsold, and I had to go into debt to pay off some of the 
bank loan. If the border had been open, this definitely wouldn’t have happened.”

The regular closures of the border crossing have an impact on the wider economy 
of Badakhshan, pushing up retail prices on local markets

“Whenever we don’t return from China on time, our income drops drastically and 
we have to raise the prices of the goods we sell,” said local businessman 
Nazrisho Mironov.

Not everyone wants to see the border opened all the time, as that would give 
the Chinese unrestricted access to Tajik markets, potentially swamping them 
with cut-price goods. 

Olga Saifulloeva, head of the economics faculty at Khorog university, agrees 
that Badakhshan will benefit from access to foreign markets and investment 

“If the highway functions permanently, the markets of Tajikistan will be 
inundated with low-quality goods, which goes against the interests of local 
manufacturers,” she said. “Restrictions should be imposed here to give local 
manufacturers a chance to sell their goods on the local market.”


In the meantime, many traders will continue to shy away from the obstacles of 
the Kulma crossing and opt for other, easier routes. 

Despite the growth in trade via Kulma, the bulk of Chinese goods still entering 
Tajikistan come from large wholesale markets in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan. 

Li Hin Wang has been selling cheap audio and video equipment at markets in 
Kyrgyzstan for the last three years, and when he heard about the Kashgar-Khorog 
route he considered moving his operation to Dushanbe. But he decided against it 
when, like so many others, he found his freight consignment held up at the 

“It would have been more profitable for me to work with Tajik partners on a 
permanent basis. As in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan, the people here are very smart 
and know about trading. But because of the rules at the border, I suffered 
enormous losses and couldn’t carry on. 

Sherkhon Azimov, a businessman from the Hatlon region of southern Tajikistan 
who travels to China to buy construction materials, still takes a long and 
costly detour via Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. The advantage is that he can travel 
by train, and whenever he arrives at the Kazak-Chinese border, he can be sure 
it will be open.

“At the moment I have no other option, because going by road via Badakhshan is 
too risky. Time is money for all my clients, and God knows how long you could 
be stuck on the border there,” he said.

Saodat Asanova is director of IWPR Tajikistan.

**** www.iwpr.net 

REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA provides the international community with a unique 
insiders' perspective on the region. Using our network of local journalists, 
the service publishes news and analysis from across Central Asia on a weekly 

The service forms part of IWPR's Central Asia Project based in Almaty, Bishkek, 
Tashkent and London, which supports media development and encourages better 
local and international understanding of the region.

IWPR's Reporting Central Asia is supported by the UK Community Fund. The 
service is published online in English and Russian. 

The opinions expressed in Reporting Central Asia are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily represent those of the publication or of IWPR.

REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA: Editor-in-Chief: Anthony Borden; Managing Editor: Yigal 
Chazan; Senior Editor: John MacLeod; Central Asia Programme Manager: Saule 
Mukhametrakhimova; Editor in Bishkek: Kumar Bekbolotov.

IWPR Project Development and Support: Executive Director: Anthony Borden; 
Strategy & Assessment Director: Alan Davis; Managing Director: Tim Williams.

**** www.iwpr.net 

IWPR builds democracy at the frontlines of conflict and change through the 
power of professional journalism. IWPR programs provide intensive hands-on 
training, extensive reporting and publishing, and ambitious initiatives to 
build the capacity of local media. Supporting peace-building, development and 
the rule of law, IWPR gives responsible local media a voice.

Institute for War & Peace Reporting
48 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 7831 1030  Fax: +44 (0)20 7831 1050

For further details on this project and other information services and media 
programmes, go to: www.iwpr.net 

ISSN: 1477-7924 Copyright © 2007 The Institute for War & Peace Reporting 

**** www.iwpr.net 

If you wish to change your subscription details or unsubscribe please go to:  

Reply via email to