WELCOME TO IWPR'S REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA, No. 614, June 9, 2010

PROTESTS GATHER PACE IN KAZAKSTAN  More and more groups voicing concerns 
through public protests.  By Andrei Grishin

TAJIK CELLPHONE CONTROVERSY  Why has the president taken against the ubiquitous 
mobile phone?  By Jahongir Boboev

TAJIKS CALL FOR DISASTER RELIEF  People displaced by flooding say help not 
reaching them fast enough.  By Biloli Shams

TAJIK POLIO OUTBREAK STRAINS RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA  Moscow and Dushanbe fall 
out over restrictions to prevent disease spreading.  By Jahongir Boboev

TRANSITIONAL LEADER TO STEER KYRGYZ THROUGH TROUBLED TIMES  Roza Otunbaeva 
becomes Central Asia’s first female head of state, although only for an interim 
period.  By Pavel Dyatlenko

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PROTESTS GATHER PACE IN KAZAKSTAN

More and more groups voicing concerns through public protests.

By Andrei Grishin

Public protests in Kazakstan are no longer confined to opposition groups, but 
increasingly involve various categories of people badly hit by economic crisis, 
analysts say. 

Analysts say the demands made by these diverse protest groups are becoming more 
overtly political, and more aligned with the agenda of the country’s formal 
opposition. Nor are the protests restricted to the capital Astana or the 
financial centre Almaty.

Three recent demonstrations show the diversity of concerns raised by 
protesters. One recent rally, on May 10, was staged by around 50 shareholders 
in a building company that had collapsed – like many others – as a result of 
the ongoing financial crisis. They assembled outside the government building in 
Astana to protest about what they felt was the unfair way housing had been 
distributed to investors as compensation for apartments that were never built.

The protest was dispersed by riot police.

Two days, the city of Kokchetav in the north of the country was the scene of a 
demonstration by several dozen market traders angry at the closure of a local 
bazaar. This incident ended in a fight with police and 25 arrests.

In April, around 70 residents of Shanyrak, a squatters’ settlement on the 
outskirts of Almaty, clashed with police who tried to stop them entering the 
city mayor’s offices. They were trying to get into a meeting taking place to 
discuss the legalisation of land – a matter of vital concern to squatters, who 
have built homes but are denied registration by the authorities who say they 
have no right to be there.

Increasingly, interest groups are working hand in hand with the opposition. A 
May Day protest held in Almaty by the Narodovlastie (People Power) bloc, which 
includes the Alga and Communist parties, was also attended by investors in 
failed companies, farmers and people having difficulty with mortgage payments.

The rally of some 500 people was held on private property, but in a now 
familiar pattern the event ended in a confrontation with police, who cordoned 
off streets and prevented the protesters dispersing.

The same day, police in Almaty also confronted protestors outside Temirbank, 
whose homes were subject to repossession because they had missed mortgage 
payment. After shattering glass jars to symbolise Kazakstan’s troubled banking 
system, they resisted police and prevented them from detaining their leaders.

Analysts say that since April, the police response has got much tougher. 
Previously, they often let demonstrations run their course without wading in to 
break them up.

To find out more about what drives the new-style protests, IWPR interviewed 
Ainur Kurmanov, a leading figure in the interest-based groups that have emerged 
out of the economic crisis. Kurmanov heads the Socialist Resistance group and 
is also active in two other movements, Talmas and Kazakstan-2012. In April, he 
was jailed for 15 days after being found guilty of organising a demonstration 
without the required approval from the authorities.

“Social tension is spreading to more and more groups in society,” he said. “At 
the moment, we are on the third wave of the crisis – whereas in 2007 and 2008, 
it affected the financial sector, its impact is now being felt in the real 
economy, with declining production and rising unemployment…. The end of last 
year and the start of this one saw a new wave of bankruptcies affecting 
individual businessmen and small enterprises.”

Action by investors who feel cheated comes at a time of continuing tensions in 
large industrial firms, Kurmanov said, citing three-week strike staged in early 
March by several thousand oil workers in Janaozen, in the western Mangyshlak 
region, to demand better pay and new management.

The strike was called off after a compromise was agreed, but despite this, 21 
people were taken to court and fined for holding an illegal strike action.

Kurmanov believes business and political power are so intertwined in Kazakstan 
that when labour or other disputes occur, the government acts not as 
independent arbiter but as protector of its commercial allies, and equates 
social concerns with political opposition.

“The authorities will always protect their own interests,” he said. “So people 
have no other way of defending their rights than staging public protests.”

Political analyst Eduard Poletaev points out that events in neighbouring 
Kyrgyzstan, where popular unrest on April 6-7 swept Kurmanbek Bakiev from the 
presidency, have made officials in Kazakstan more worried about of protests.

“The authorities are on their guard – they view them with suspicion,” he said.

In theory, Kazakstan respects the right of assembly, but in practice 
demonstrations are being routinely dispersed

In Almaty, anyone wishing to hold a demonstration must apply for permission to 
the city government.

Oleg Sidorov, an official with the mayor’s administration, explained that under 
a city bylaw, such public events can only take place at one designated venue, 
on the square behind the Sary Arka cinema. “If a request is submitted for a 
different venue, it will automatically be turned down,” he said.

At the same time, Sidorov insisted that there was no policy of refusing 
permission for public protests, and only one in five applications had been 
turned down since the beginning of the year.

Andrei Grishin is a staff member at the Kazakstan Bureau for Human Rights and 
Rule of Law.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.
The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.


TAJIK CELLPHONE CONTROVERSY

Why has the president taken against the ubiquitous mobile phone?

By Jahongir Boboev

Despite widespread poverty, Tajikistan has seen a boom in mobile phones in 
recent years. Competition among provider firms has slashed call charges, and 
mobile networks get round all the difficulties of a crumbling landline 
infrastructure.

It therefore came as a surprise when President Imomali Rahmon announced at the 
end of April that mobile phones were a health risk and their overuse should be 
discouraged.

At an April 30 cabinet meeting, the president instructed the health ministry to 
inform the public – especially the younger generation – about the health risks 
posed by handheld phones.

A week earlier, the president had identified another drawback of mobile phone 
use. He said there were over a million phone owners in Tajikistan, each 
spending between 50 and 600 somonis a month (from 11 to 135 US dollars) on 
calls. That amount of money, he said, was “a drain on the financial resources 
of every Tajik family”.

The president’s comments sparked a series of programmes on state television 
highlighting the physical effects of using mobiles too much.

The next step was taken by the authorities in Dushanbe and other towns, who 
placed restrictions on billboard advertising by mobile companies. Many adverts 
were taken down within the space of a few days.

The move caused consternation, and not only among mobile providers and 
advertising companies.

Economist Hojimuhammad Umarov said the ban was absurd and illegal. “It violates 
the fundamental principle of a market economy – free competition,” he said.

“We were surprised at news of the ban on advertising mobile companies, said 
Kakhor Aminov, an economist at the Asian Development Bank mission in Dushanbe. 
“It goes against all international standards and market economic principles.”

Shodi Shabdolov, the Communist Party leader and a member of parliament, pointed 
out that the president never called for any kind of ban, just moderation in the 
use of phones.

“If a company is advertising legally, no one can prohibit or even restrict 
this,” he added.

Tajikistan’s liberal mobile phone market means it now has six provider 
companies, most of them set up with foreign investment. Russian phone companies 
hold majority shares in two and China has a controlling stake in another.

Competition has brought prices down and allowed technological advances – 
Tajikistan was the first Central Asian state to introduce 3G services.

An advertising ban, if introduced formally, would hit advertisers as much as 
the phone companies.

“Adverts by these companies account for a large proportion of our budget,” said 
Marat Mamadshoev, chief editor of the Asia Plus newspaper. “We aren’t planning 
to abandon this advertising – at least, not until a court rules that we cannot 
carry it.”

This is not the first time the authorities have tried to curb mobile phone use. 
In 2008, on President Rahmon’s recommendation, parliament ruled that 
schoolchildren and college students must not carry their phones on them during 
lessons.

Shokirjon Hakimov, an opposition politician and legal expert, suspects the 
government has a hidden agenda – to limit public access to easy communications.

“It’s no secret that the authorities are fearful of this [mobile phone] area 
expanding,” he said. “Suffice it to recall that the world found out about 
events in Kyrgyzstan [April 2010 revolt] and Iran [2009 protests] through 
mobile phone communications.”

For others, such regulations are merely an unwarranted intrusion into private 
life, similar to other decrees banning excessive spending on weddings and 
funerals, and forbidding teachers from having gold teeth.

“Sadly, the experience of recent years shows that the moment the president 
makes some critical remark on any subject, parliament or another agency 
immediately try to curb constitutionally guaranteed civil rights and freedoms, 
by amending the law or other forms of legislation,” said Faizinisso Vohidova, a 
human rights activist from the northern town of Khujand. “In Tajikistan, as the 
proverb goes, if you ask for someone’s turban, they’ll bring you his head. So 
the president only has to suggest using mobile phones in moderation, and the 
authorities immediately introduce a ban.”

Jahongir Boboev is the pseudonym of a journalist from Tajikistan.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.


TAJIKS CALL FOR DISASTER RELIEF

People displaced by flooding say help not reaching them fast enough.

By Biloli Shams

As the Tajik government asks the international community for emergency funding 
following flash floods and mudflows in the south of the country, people 
affected by the disaster say help is chaotic and slow in coming.

The Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team, REACT, a coalition of 
government agencies and international relief organisations, said 16 people died 
when torrential rains caused a mudflow and flooding along the river Tebalay in 
and around the town of Kulob on May 7.

REACT’s figure, published in a May 10 situation report, was slightly higher 
than the 13 deaths reported by Sukhrobshohi Farrukhshoh, a spokesman for the 
Kulob mayor’s office.

The emergency response centre in Kulob said 600 homes were completely 
destroyed. Other reports indicated that many more were damaged, and thousands 
of people in the surrounding countryside lost livestock and crops buried under 
the mud.

Tajikistan’s permanent representative at the United Nations, Sirojiddin Aslov, 
submitted a formal request for assistance on May 14, two days after his 
government issued a general appeal for 5.3 million US dollars in relief aid.

In a statement on the flooding on May 19, REACT said two tent camps had been 
set up in Kulob within a week of the disaster, and relief items distributed to 
those who moved there.

However, some of the people affected complained of delays in handing out 
humanitarian aid, and told IWPR the effort was not being coordinated properly.

Three of Bozorgul Qurbonova’s five children died in the mudflow – boys aged 
seven and five years and a seven-month-old baby.

Now, she said, “The distribution of food and tents is chaotic. Some of the 
families who suffered the most don’t have tents yet, and they haven’t had 
either flour or foodstuffs, just two or three cushions and blankets.”

Like many households in this part of Tajikistan, an extended family of around 
30 people lived under one roof. But they have been given just one tent which 
can accommodate a maximum of ten.

“They’re promising us a tent. We are waiting, and as you can see it’s raining. 
My two other children have high temperatures that aren’t going down,” she said.

Journalist Rajabi Mirzo visited the area and reported that aid distribution was 
slow.

“They say the lists of people affected aren’t ready yet. But that’s not the 
fault of the people who need help right now,” he said.

Khalil Nasrulloev, 80, whose house was completely destroyed, said the aid 
effort had not reached him yet.

“We were visited by the [relief] commission only once, but apart from two 
quilts, we haven’t been given any help. Every day they bring in aid and 
distribute food and flour, but nothing is given to us,” he said.

Nasrulloev said the explanation he was given was that the road to the area 
where he lives had not been repaired yet.

Farrukhshoh of the mayor’s office accepted that there had been difficulties in 
getting aid through because roads had been destroyed. But he told IWPR, “Since 
May 13 we’ve started regulating the help we’re giving to all the residents 
affected, so that humanitarian aid, tents and other kinds of relief are 
delivered to all.”

Some residents said that if they had been given adequate warning, lives would 
have been saved. One female resident said the Kulob branch of the emergency 
response ministry should have contacted colleagues in the neighbouring Shurabad 
and Muminabad districts, through which the mudflow passed first, to assess how 
serious the situation was.

The head of the government’s emergency response agency for Khatlon region, 
Abdusattor Khushvakhtov, said it had been impossible to give advance warning as 
the local branches of his organisation were understaffed and underequipped. 
They only had one staff member in Shurabad and Muminabad, who had no way of 
communicating.

“The national Committee for Emergency Situations still hasn’t bought phones or 
hand-held radios to give to our staff,” he said. “That was the main reason why 
our staff in Muminabad and Shurabad were unable to call their colleagues in 
Kulob and update them.”

Others felt the disaster was just waiting to happen, as the bed of the river 
Tebalay, especially where it runs through the town of Kulob in the form of a 
canal, had not been dredged for years.

An elderly man who gave his name as Sadullo said that since Tajikistan became 
independent in 1991, no work had been done to clear out the sediment and debris 
carried down the river in previous mudflows.

Rahmatullo Karimov, head of the irrigation repair section at Tajikistan’s land 
improvement and water management ministry, accepts that the river, which forms 
a canal as it flows through Kulob town, has not been cleared properly, and said 
this was due to lack of funding.

“Since the Soviet Union collapsed, the money hasn’t been allocated in nearly 19 
years,” he said. “It’s clear that if this structure [Tebalay riverbed] had been 
cleared even once over that period, the population of these streets in the town 
wouldn’t have suffered. Another reason is the lack of modern machinery. We have 
machinery, but not much of it, and most of it dates from Soviet times and isn’t 
fit for use.”

Safarmad Valiev, who heads a private construction company, agrees that canal 
dredging has been inadequate, but argues that even if it had been done, it 
would not have reduced the damage caused by the flooding.

The Tebalay canal section is too narrow to cope with a surge in the water flow, 
and would need to be widened to allow this, he said.

Biloli Shams is an IWPR-trained journalist in southern Tajikistan.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.


TAJIK POLIO OUTBREAK STRAINS RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Moscow and Dushanbe fall out over restrictions to prevent disease spreading.

By Jahongir Boboev

Moscow’s tough response to an outbreak of polio in Tajikistan has created some 
tension between the two nations, as Dushanbe ask for restrictions to be lifted.

The outbreak was spotted in April after doctors recorded an unusually high 
number of cases of with acute flaccid paralysis, a loss of muscle tone which is 
a symptom of the poliomyelitus virus. By May 16, the Tajik health ministry said 
there were 83 confirmed cases of polio, including one death. The following day, 
the World Health Organisation, WHO, gave a higher figure of 129 confirmed 
cases. The outbreak is concentrated in and around the capital Dushanbe and in 
the southern Katlon oblast in the south-western part of the country.

This is the first outbreak of the disease in Tajikistan since the last case was 
registered in 1997.

Poliomyelitis is a highly contagious disease affecting the nervous system and 
sometimes resulting in paralysis. It mainly affects children and is transmitted 
through contaminated food, drinking water and faeces.

The WHO said two rounds of a nationwide vaccination campaign for children under 
six had been completed, with a third due to take place in the first five days 
of June.

Concerned at the prospect of transmission via imported food or the hundreds of 
thousands of Tajik nationals who travel to Russia for work, Moscow took action 
at the beginning of May.

On May 2, it banned imports of Tajik nuts and dried fruit. The Russian consumer 
and health agency Rospotrebnadzor said these food items were a particular 
concern since they are consumed without being cooked. 

Four days later, Moscow it introduced a travel ban for children from Tajikistan 
under the age of six until the end of the immunisation campaign. 
Rospotrebnadzor head Gennady Onitschenko said the ban became necessary after a 
nine-month-old baby who arrived from Tajikistan to the Siberian city of Irkutsk 
wsa diagnosed with polio.

For Tajikistan, the food ban was a particular blow as dried fruit and nuts are 
an important export.  

On May 6, Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi handed Russian ambassador 
Yury Popov a note requesting an end to the import restrictions. The Tajik 
authorities argue that the nuts and fruit are safe as they come from the 
northern Soghd region, where no cases of polio have been recorded.

Dushanbe and Moscow also disagreed publicly over a decision to bring Russian 
children home until the danger had passed. Most of them are the children of 
personnel stationed at a permanent Russian military base in Tajikistan.

In an interview to a Russian radio station on May 11, Onitschenko said his 
agency had asked the Tajik authorities to provide every possible assistance to 
allow the children to leave swiftly. But he said obstructions had been placed 
in the way, and suggested that this was an attempt by the Tajiks to get the 
food ban lifted.

Tajik foreign ministry spokesman Davlat Nazriev denied the allegation, saying 
there were no obstacles to anyone leaving the country.

The Russian embassy in Dushanbe, meanwhile, tried to calm troubled waters by 
saying any travel problems were due not to obstructionism, but to the May 8-10 
public holiday in Tajikistan commemorating the end of the Second World War.

The acrimonous exchanges over how to respond to the polio outbreak reflect 
wider frustrations in Tajikistan’s relationship with Moscow.

Political analysts in Tajikistan interviewed by IWPR suggested the Russians had 
ulterior motives for coming down hard over the polio issue. They believed it 
might have something to do with the ongoing construction of the giant Roghun 
hydroelectric dam. Russian companies withdrew from the project two years ago 
following contractual disagreements, and Uzbekistan has more recently been 
urging Moscow to back its own opposition to the plan, which it fears will 
deprive the region of water.

Dodojon Atovulloev, a Tajik opposition member in exile, drew comparisons with 
other instances in which Russia has imposed bans on former Soviet states when 
political relations deteriorate. As examples he cited wine from Georgia and 
Moldova and milk from Belarus.

Arkady Dubnov, a journalist in Moscow who specialises in Central Asian affairs, 
dismisses such suggestions, arguing that relations between Russia and 
Tajikistan are in fairly good shape. He believes the problems stemmed from an 
overreaction by Onitschenko, who should not be seen as a mouthpiece for the 
Kremlin.

Jumaboy Sanginov, who heads the parliamentary faction of  the governing 
People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan, agreed that Moscow should not be 
accused of politicising the matter. A doctor by profession, Sanginov said 
Tajikistan should own up to its own failure to do enough to prevent the polio 
outbreak.

“The reason it has spread in Tajikistan is that in the past, not all residents 
of this country have been vaccinated,” he said.

Firuz Saidov, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic Studies, linked to the 
Tajik president’s office, added, “We did indeed fail to spot the spread of the 
polio virus in Tajikistan, and that’s a minus point for our healthcare system.”

Jahongir Boboev is a pseudonym for journalist in Tajikistan.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway. 

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.


TRANSITIONAL LEADER TO STEER KYRGYZ THROUGH TROUBLED TIMES

Roza Otunbaeva becomes Central Asia’s first female head of state, although only 
for an interim period.

By Pavel Dyatlenko

The appointment of Roza Otunbaeva as head of state for a transition period of a 
year and a half is an attempt to ensure Kyrgyzstan has a strong hand on the 
tiller until the planned political reforms have taken root.

The reasons for elevating Otunbaeva, named as acting prime minister in the 
administration that came to power in early April, are understandable. There 
are, however, also a number of problems and potential pitfalls associated with 
the decision.

The interim government took control following the popular unrest of April 6 and 
7, which swept former president Kurmanbek Bakiev from power.

Under a decree issued on May 19, cabinet chief Otunbaeva becomes head of state 
until December 31 next year. That means the presidential election that had 
earlier been scheduled to coincide with a parliamentary ballot this October is 
now postponed by one year.

Otunbaeva will continue performing the functions of prime minister until a new 
one is appointed after the October election.

As political analyst Elmira Nogoibaeva notes, this new role is intended to be a 
stabilising factor, given the multiplicity of threats facing the country. She 
believes it will give Kyrgyzstan’s leaders some breathing-space until October, 
when a new parliament will be elected and a government formed.

Otunbaeva’s appointment still needs to be approved in a nationwide referendum 
on June 27, in which the electorate will also be asked to back an all-new 
constitution that shifts the balance of power away from the presidency to 
parliament. To be confirmed, she will need the support of at least 50 per cent 
of people who vote.

At a May 11 press conference, deputy prime minister Omurbek Tekebaev, who has 
been put in charge of the constitutional reform process, announced that the 
turnout required to make the referendum valid was being cut from 50 to 30 per 
cent of the electoral roll. He said there were parts of the country such as 
Batken in the far southwest where turnout was generally low, and there was also 
a whole chunk of the electorate unlikely to vote – about a quarter were working 
abroad, and another 25 per cent within Kyrgyzstan were living somewhere other 
than their registered domicile.

Asked what the plan was if voters turned the appointment down, government 
spokesman Farid Niazov said the interim administration was confident this would 
not happen, as both official and independent opinion polls showed that people 
felt positively about Otunbaeva.

If successful, Otunbaeva will become the first female president in Central Asia.

The rationale for appointing a transitional president is clear. It will open 
the way to addressing many of the issues the government is now struggling with. 
In the present constitution, the post of president carries more weight than 
that of prime minister, especially an acting one. For instance, the president 
has powers to direct and deploy the military and police.

Decisions emanating from the head of state will thus have greater legitimacy.

The interim government is still struggling to restore law and order in the face 
of a series of challenges since it came to power.

On May 19, there was an outbreak of violence in the southern city of Jalalabad, 
as crowds of Kyrgyz youths tried unsuccessfully to storm a university 
associated with the ethnic Uzbek community. The confrontation left two people 
dead and dozens injured. This incident came less than a week after supporters 
of Bakiev temporarily seized control of provincial government offices in three 
southern regions, Jalalabad among them.

On April 19, five people died and 40 were injured as police battled several 
hundred people who had seized and laid claim to land around the village of 
Mayevka, on the northern outskirts of Bishkek.

The appointment also avoids potential problems arising from running 
presidential and parliamentary election campaigns simultaneously, as only the 
latter will now take place. Finally, foreign relations will become easier to 
manage as the Kyrgyz state will have a head with a clear mandate.

All these considerations seem to have been taken into account when Otunbaeva 
was appointed. But that is not to say the road ahead will be free of trouble.

Once concern has to be that the decision was made with a narrow circle of 
interim leaders, without other political forces being involved.

Then there is the matter of Otunbaeva’s name appearing alone on the referendum 
ballot paper. The lack of an alternative choice must inevitably cast a shadow 
over the administration’s legitimacy.

Technically, however, the appointment does not break any law, even there is no 
precedent for this interim government and therefore no legal arrangements 
governing the way it should operate.

Another big question is whether the plan will actually work – whether Otunbaeva 
will be able to provide the kind of strong, cohesive leadership the interim 
authorities are clearly hoping for.

It remains to be seen whether Otunbaeva will be able to gather support from 
political groupings outside her current allies. Kyrgyz politics is based around 
strong personalities who command authority from a substantial power-base. 
Formal political institutions are weak; they exist nominally but do not wield 
real power. Thus, it is not enough merely to be a well-known government 
official. Politicians have to be influential and respected as individuals if 
they want to secure backing for their policies across the political spectrum.

Otunbaeva is certainly an experienced politician and enjoys a reputation as a 
good negotiator. She comes originally from the south of Kyrgyzstan, but is not 
associated with any particular tribal group.  

Although she was formerly an ambassador and foreign minister, she does not have 
a lot of practical experience of administration. Much of her time was spent 
abroad, so her connections within Kyrgyzstan were weakened. The question is 
whether she has managed to revive these over the past three years, when she was 
a member of parliament with the opposition Social Democratic Party.

She will faces challenges even within the interim administration of which she 
is part. As the parliamentary race draws closer, the unity displayed by leaders 
from the different political parties represented there may begin to crumble, 
and rivalries will emerge.

Finally, Otunbaeva will be judged by her government’s success in turning the 
economy around.

Following the April unrest, neighbouring Kazakstan and Uzbekistan closed their 
borders with Kyrgyzstan, cutting its foreign trade by more than 50 per cent and 
hammering the domestic economy. Kazakstan reopened its frontier on May 20 , but 
the Uzbek one is still shut.

Unless significant economic progress is made, Otunbaeva’s legitimacy as a 
president could be rapidly eroded, and Kyrgyzstan’s impoverished people might 
consider yet another change of leadership.

For Otunbaeva herself, the new post seems to have far more drawbacks than 
pluses. By taking on the interim role, she automatically excludes herself from 
running for a full five-year presidential when the election comes round next 
year. She has also had to leave the Social Democratics in order to demonstrate 
her political neutrality.

The interim presidency places an enormous burden of responsibility on her 
shoulders. It also carries with it the real risk that she will be held 
personally responsible if things go wrong.

Given current levels of political instability, Otunbaeva has virtually no room 
to make mistakes. Any outbreak of violence would risk plunging the country into 
civil war, leading to the collapse of the state and the loss of its sovereignty.

Pavel Dyatlenko is a political analyst with the Polis Asia think-tank in 
Bishkek.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway. 

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.

**** www.iwpr.net 
********************************************************************

REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA provides the international community with a unique 
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The service forms part of IWPR's Central Asia Project based in Almaty, Bishkek, 
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IWPR's Reporting Central Asia is supported by the UK Community Fund. The 
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