WELCOME TO IWPR'S REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA, No. 641, February 4, 2011

COMMENT

KAZAK EARLY ELECTION PRESENTED AS DEMOCRATIC OPTION  President Nazarbaev offers 
“lesson in democracy” by dropping plans to extend current term, but slips in an 
early election instead.  By Aitolkyn Kourmanova

WINTER GAS SHORTAGES IN UZBEKISTAN  Citizens of gas-rich state rig up 
wood-burners as fuel cuts take winter toll.  By IWPR Central Asia

TAJIKS TRADE LAND FOR FRIENDSHIP WITH CHINA  Critics say granting land to China 
"unconstitutional", but consensus view is that diplomats secured best possible 
deal.  By Aslibegim Manzarshoeva

TAJIK GOVERNMENT TARGETS “ILLEGAL” MOSQUES  Authorities worry about radical 
Islam, but look set to shut down rural community mosques in the process.  By 
Aslibegim Manzarshoeva

**** NEW 
************************************************************************************

LATEST PROJECT REVIEWS: http://iwpr.net/make-an-impact/project-reviews 

VACANCIES: http://iwpr.net/what-we-do/vacancies 

**** IWPR RESOURCES 
******************************************************************

CENTRAL ASIA PROGRAMME HOME: http://www.iwpr.net/programme/central-asia 

CENTRAL ASIA RADIO: http://iwpr.net/programme/central-asia/central-asia-radio 

NEWS BRIEFING CENTRAL ASIA: 
http://iwpr.net/programme/news-briefing-central-asia 

CENTRAL ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS: 
http://iwpr.net/programme/central-asia-human-rights-reporting-project 

STORY BEHIND THE STORY: http://iwpr.net/report-news/the-story-behind-the-story 

BECOME A FAN OF IWPR ON FACEBOOK
http://facebook.com/InstituteforWarandPeaceReporting 

FOLLOW US ON TWITTER 
http://twitter.com/iwpr 

**** http://iwpr.net/ **********************************************************

DONATE TO IWPR: http://iwpr.net/donate 

**** http://iwpr.net/ **********************************************************

COMMENT

KAZAK EARLY ELECTION PRESENTED AS DEMOCRATIC OPTION

President Nazarbaev offers “lesson in democracy” by dropping plans to extend 
current term, but slips in an early election instead. 

By Aitolkyn Kourmanova

Kazak president Nursultan Nazarbaev’s surprise announcement of an early 
election allows him to neatly sidestep a proposal to let him rule until 2020 
without seeking a popular mandate. 

Nazarbaev issued a decree on February 4 setting the election date for April 3, 
just two months away. The previous day, he had approved legislative elections 
allowing him to call snap elections.

Supporters of Nazarbaev, who has governed Kazakstan since before it became 
independent in 1991, ran a campaign to gather signatures in favour of holding a 
referendum on prolonging his current term in office until 2020, obviating the 
need for the election scheduled next year. (See Kazak Parliament to Rule on 
Extending President’s Term.)

Campaigners gathered over five million signatures, more than half the 
voting-age population and far more than the 200,000 needed to trigger a 
referendum. But on January 31, Kazakstan’s Constitutional Court rejected plans 
for a referendum as unconstitutional.

Nazarbaev then presented his own plan for an early election as the best 
possible alternative.

“Instead of a dilemma that divides our society – a referendum or an election – 
I am proposing a formula that will unite us; I am proposing to hold an early 
presidential election,” he said in an address to the nation.

He said the decision not to hold a referendum was “a historic lesson in 
democracy, about staying true to the constitution”.

When the referendum campaign got going in January, opposition and civil society 
groups in Kazakstan as well as the United States government and the European 
Union warned that it would be a setback for democracy.

Nazarbaev’s alternative plan was thus designed to create the impression that he 
adhering to democratic principles and the Kazak constitution.

In reality, it does not reflect a democratic impulse. If anything, it says more 
about him as a tactician who tries to stay one step ahead of any development 
that may present a threat to his solid grip on power.

All he has done is changed the method by which he pursues his ultimate aim of 
staying in power for as long as possible.

There are no signs that the current political set-up is moving in the direction 
of greater democracy. Last year, for example, Nazarbaev’s position was 
consolidated when he was awarded special status as “Leader of the Nation”, 
granting him considerable privileges even if he does step down as president.

The referendum campaign has also furnished him with a second political vehicle, 
in addition to the governing Nur Otan party. Coalition Kazakstan-2020, an 
umbrella group uniting over 600 organisations, had its trial run driving the 
campaign to gather millions of signatures and present the referendum as the 
real will of the people.

Kazakstan’s leadership has made it clear it intends to follows its own 
particular version of democracy, which includes putting pressure on the 
opposition, free media, and civil society groups.

It is hard to expect political liberalisation from a leadership that believes 
the country will plunge into revolution if people are granted too much freedom.

But why was so much effort put into the referendum campaign, only for the 
president to turn his back on it?

There are several possible reasons, one being that the idea of allowing 
Nazarbaev to rule without renewing his mandate may have begun looking 
distinctly unappealing in light of the recent turbulence in the Middle East.

The street protests that toppled the autocratic ruler of Tunisia and plunged 
Egypt into crisis have shaken any belief that resource-rich, predominantly 
Muslim countries have placid, accepting populations. These events have shown 
that as well as Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan – where presidents were brought 
down in “colour revolutions” – other kinds of state are also susceptible to 
popular unrest.

Domestic factors may also have played a part. Some hardline figures in 
Nazarbaev’s entourage may have been keen on the referendum as a way of 
perpetuating a system that provides them personally with power and wealth.

It is quite plausible that the wave of international criticism of the 
referendum plan forced the president to rethink and become more receptive to 
the arguments made by other supporters that such a patently undemocratic move 
was unnecessary when the right kind of election could deliver the same result.

The answer to why an election at such short notice is desirable is simpler. 
Nazarbaev is keen to secure victory now, at a time when he feels his position 
is strong, and avoid possible unpleasant surprises that a later election might 
bring.

Apart from anything else, holding an election so soon leaves potential 
opponents with hardly any time to prepare a campaign.

Although oil revenues have helped cushion the blow, the Kazak economy has been 
weakened by the impact of the global financial problems. Public protests are no 
longer confined to opposition groups, but increasingly involve various 
categories of people including investors in failed companies, people who cannot 
meet high mortgage payments, and the growing number of unemployed.

These circumstances require the government to take tough action to restore 
economic stability. But that will involve some painful medicine that will not 
go down well with the voters.

It is worth recalling that when an early election was called in 1999, it was 
swiftly followed by unpopular measures necessitated by economic crisis.

Nazarbaev was elected president of newly-independent Kazakstan in 1991, and a 
referendum five years later extended that first term until December 2000. The 
election was brought forward by nearly two years to January 1999 just as 
Kazakstan began to feel the effects of financial turmoil in Russia in 1998. a 
couple of months after the election, the government was forced to devalue the 
national currency.

Kazakstan’s massive oil revenues have undoubtedly allowed President Nazarbaev 
to maintain stability for many years. But having the spending-power to keep 
people off the streets cannot be used as an excuse for endlessly avoiding the 
serious political reforms that are needed.

The 18-year leadership of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev reminds us that 
preserving a political system in a state of stagnation can have disastrous 
consequences. Long-serving presidents are not in themselves a guarantee of 
long-term political stability.

Aitolkyn Kourmanova is IWPR Country Director in Kazakstan.

The views expressed in this article are not necessarily the views of IWPR.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.


WINTER GAS SHORTAGES IN UZBEKISTAN

Citizens of gas-rich state rig up wood-burners as fuel cuts take winter toll.

By IWPR Central Asia

Despite abundant reserves of natural gas, Uzbekistan is struggling with 
supplies to domestic consumers, forcing many to improvise heating and cooking 
facilities to get them through the winter.

Experts say the authorities prioritise export sales over domestic consumers, 
making supplies intermittent in parts of Uzbekistan where temperatures dip well 
below zero.

Used to hardship, Uzbekistan’s residents are finding inventive ways of coping.

“Temperatures at night are currently 15 degrees below zero, and there’s a 
strong wind,” a farmer in Khorezm, a north-western region of Uzbekistan. 
“People are heating their stoves with ‘guzpaya’, dried-up cotton stalks. We’re 
also buying low-grade coal which doesn’t give off much heat.”

Salim, a 40-year-old father of four from Margilan, in the eastern Fergana 
region, found another way of dealing with the gas cuts. Copying his neighbours, 
he laid bricks in his main room, leaving a space where he burns wood to create 
a heated floor. The family does its cooking on a stove running on gas cylinders.

Another Margilan resident, who gave her name as Nargiza, has a wood-burning 
stove inside her apartment, a typical solution in towns where multi-storey 
apartments have their gas supply cut off for several hours every day.

“We installed it several years ago and now we all gather in that room to get 
warm,” she said.

Like many apartment owners, Nargiza has to cook outside on an open fire.

Uzbekistan has substantial reserves of natural gas and produces more than 60 
billion cubic metres a year. Some is exported to Russia and to neighbouring 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but official statistics show that most is consumed 
within the country.

Experts blame the chronic shortages on a number of factors, some of them to do 
with infrastructure.

The mains supply network is crumbling due to underfunding, leading to numerous 
leaks, and there are not enough storage facilities to ensure a steady supply 
over winter, when demand shoots up.

“The country has sufficient natural gas, but the problem is that the equipment 
is old; the gas distribution system doesn’t use modern technology,” an analyst 
in Tashkent said, adding that installing new pump technology was vital, as the 
flow of gas through the pipes slowed when the weather was cold.

Funding problems are aggravated by retail customers failing to pay their gas 
bills.

But the root of the problem, experts say, is that the authorities are less 
interested in ensuring a steady supply to the domestic market than in meeting 
commitments for the lucrative export market.

As the government runs short of revenues, it is increasingly reliant on 
revenues from gas and the other main export item, cotton.

A manager with a municipal utilities agency in Tashkent complained that any 
unused gas in storage was sold off to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan instead of 
being retained for the winter period. This was done by the city mayor’s office, 
“but is of course agreed with higher authorities”, he said.

Despite the hardships caused by gas supply cuts, protests are rare because 
people fear harassment or arrest.

A 60-year-old resident of Khorezm region who gave his name as Ahmed recalled 
how local residents wrote to their local government and staged a demonstration 
about the cuts.

“The police immediately came and demanded that we disperse,” Ahmed said, adding 
that the more vocal protesters were summoned for questioning by the National 
Security Service. “They came back silent and reticent. Since then, we haven’t 
complained for fear of reprisals. We just wait for spring.”

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.


TAJIKS TRADE LAND FOR FRIENDSHIP WITH CHINA

Critics say granting land to China "unconstitutional", but consensus view is 
that diplomats secured best possible deal. 

By Aslibegim Manzarshoeva

The government of Tajikistan has come under fire for agreeing to hand over a 
slice of territory to neighbouring China, but some independent commentators 
agree with officials who say it was the best possible deal in the 
circumstances, especially given the importance of maintaining good relations 
with Beijing.

Tajikistan’s parliament ratified a border demarcation agreement with China on 
January 12, in the process signing away 1,100 square kilometres of borderland 
in the remote south-eastern region of Badakhshan. Only two members, from the 
opposition Islamic Rebirth Party, IRP, voted against the bill.

Like Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, the newly-independent state of Tajikistan found 
itself heir to a territorial dispute that first Tsarist Russia and then the 
Soviet Union never resolved with China, concerning the precise line that the 
frontier should follow through largely inaccessible mountain zones.

Initially the Chinese stuck to their claim to 28,500 sq km of land – a fifth of 
Tajikistan’s territory. But the final agreement reached in 2002 gives China 
1,100 sq km, just four per cent of what it had been asking for.

Analysts say it has taken Tajikistan over eight years to ratify the deal 
because of the technical complexity of marking out a boundary along 800 km of 
difficult mountain territory, a task that defeated Tsarist and Chinese 
officials in the 1880s.

Officials say ratification marks a definitive end to uncertainty over the 
long-running territorial question and consolidate the growing relationship with 
Beijing, already a major investor in Tajikistan’s cash-strapped economy. All 
that comes at the relatively painless price of losing some unproductive land 
along the remote frontier.

Addressing parliament on the day of the vote, Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi 
called the agreement “a major victory for Tajik diplomacy”.

Foreign ministry spokesman Davlat Nazri noted that China is now Tajikistan’s 
second biggest trading partner after Russia, and investment and government 
grants from Beijing are playing a significant role in creating new 
infrastructure such as roads, tunnels and power lines.

The leader of the Communist Party, Shodi Shabdolov, was among the majority who 
voted for ratification in parliament. He views it as a “major geopolitical 
victory”, because it will facilitate growing overland trade links with China – 
important for Tajikistan, a landlocked state with transit routes through 
sometimes difficult neighbours Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.

Sukhrob Sharipov, head of the Institute for Strategic Studies, which is 
attached to the Tajik president’s office, insisted the deal was advantageous 
for the country. Unlike the old Soviet Union, small Tajikistan was not in a 
position to shrug off Chinese pressure, so it was an achievement to reach an 
agreement in which Beijing retreated so far from its initial claim.

“I see it as a pragmatic solution,” Sharipov said. “Our country has secured the 
stability and inviolability of its borders for many decades to come.”

Like many analysts, Rashid Ghani Abdullo said it made sense to cede the 
frontier lands as they are uninhabited, unsuitable for commercial development, 
and located in a barren high-altitude plateau.

Critics of the move cite a constitutional provision that Tajikistan’s national 
territory is inviolable, and claim the deal betrays that principle.

IRP leader Kabiri said one of the reasons the constitutional issue was so 
important was that any breach could set a dangerous precedent. Tajikistan still 
has unresolved demarcation issues with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, with disputed 
pockets of land and unclear boundary sections.

“The most important thing is that we don’t provide an opening to other 
neighbours with whom we still have unsolved issues,” Kabiri said. “We must 
proceed on the basis that the borders we had since the Soviet period are 
definitive and cannot be subject to alteration.”

Overall, though, Kabiri admitted that it had been a difficult call for Tajik 
diplomats and had at least cleared up a nagging dispute, so people should now 
live with it.

Shams Gulmamadov of the Sipar lawyers’ association raised another 
constitutional matter – because Badakhshan has the status of “autonomous 
region”, the national authorities cannot redraw its boundaries without first 
winning approval from the provincial elected assembly.

In Badakhshan itself, there was some grumbling about the land deal, but no 
public protests, unlike 2008 when demonstrations in the main town Khorog were 
partly about plans to transfer some land to another Tajik region.

“Of course it’s clear to an outside observer that financial considerations came 
first. Tajikistan has borrowed a lot of money from China and now it’s time to 
pay up,” Khorog resident Oshur Imombekov said. “But I wonder what our 
grandchildren will say about it in a hundred years’ time?”

In the Tajik capital Dushanbe, a man who gave his name as Akbar complained 
about the lack of consultation.

“Why do the authorities appeal to people to express a view when they need it… 
but when they give our land away to others, they don’t ask us whether we 
agree?” he asked.

Aslibegim Manzarshoeva is an IWPR-trained journalist in Tajikistan.

The views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of IWPR.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.


TAJIK GOVERNMENT TARGETS “ILLEGAL” MOSQUES

Authorities worry about radical Islam, but look set to shut down rural 
community mosques in the process.

By Aslibegim Manzarshoeva

A government campaign to shut down unofficial mosques in Tajikistan appears to 
be driven by fears some of them may be used to preach Islamic fundamentalism. 
But critics warn that indiscriminate closures will leave many rural communities 
without a local mosque simply because they have not gone through a formal 
registration process.

At the beginning of January, ten mosques were shut down by the city authorities 
in the capital Dushanbe, on the grounds that they were operating unlawfully.

The authorities cite a law on religion passed in 2009 which included the 
requirement that only purpose-built premises can qualify as places of worship, 
and set specific criteria for whether a community is entitled to build one. The 
law also sparked a process where religious institutions of all kinds had to 
re-register with the government.

In this predominantly Muslim country, 3,700 mosques have already been granted 
registration, as have 74 premises belonging to other faiths such as the Russian 
Orthodox Church.

The fate of some mosques remains uncertain as they have either not applied for 
registration or their applications are still pending. In the Darvaz district of 
southeast Tajikistan, for example, the future of 28 mosques is hanging in the 
balance. Eleven of the applied for registration before the January 1 deadline 
passed, while the other 17 did not and are thus liable to be closed.

Although Darvaz is in Badakhshan, where most communities belong to the Ismaili 
branch of Islam, the people here are Sunni Muslims like the rest of Tajikistan. 
It is also borders on northern Afghanistan, which Taleban insurgents have 
increasingly been infiltrating from their traditional strongholds in the south 
of that country.

“There are various reasons why the authorities are worried [about the area]. 
One is that Darvaz is next door to the Rasht area where some alarming events 
unfolded recently,” religious affairs expert Sadi Yusifi said, referring to 
clashes between government troops and suspected Islamic militants last year. 
(See Tajik Authorities Struggle to Quell Militants on this.) “Another is the 
fact that Darvaz is a strategic area that connects Badakhshan with the rest of 
the country, and that borders on Afghanistan. So it’s natural that the 
increasing number of mosques and the rise in religious sentiment there should 
become a focus of attention for the authorities.”

Analysts say the Tajik government is nervous about the risks posed by Islamic 
radical groups and wants to get a grip on how mosques are run, removing those 
that operate without permission and cutting down on the number that have 
appeared in the two decades that Tajikistan has been independent.

“The authorities view the increasing number of mosques as incompatible with the 
secular nature of the state, in other words as the Islamisation of society’s 
cultural traditions,” a commentator who asked to remain anonymous said. “It’s a 
phenomenon that has recently become very noticeable in certain regions – for 
instance, where weddings and other events are accompanied by sermons and no 
music is played.”

The authorities have avoided talking about threats posed by Islamic radicalism, 
and instead focus on the need to follow procedures and regulations.

In Dushanbe, an official from the religious affairs department in the mayor’s 
office insisted that the aim was not to close places of worship, but simply to 
ensure that buildings were used for their proper purposes. He cited cases where 
shops and cafes had been turned into mosques without the requisite application 
being filed with the authorities,

The deputy head of the national-level Committee for Religious Affairs, Mavlon 
Mukhtorov, said some of the mosques in Darvaz had made errors in their 
applications for registration, but these could be corrected and they would be 
allowed to stay open until a final decision was taken.

The government crackdown has met with some supporters among the analyst 
interviewed for this report.

Islamic affairs analyst Farrukh Umarov argued that there was nothing wrong with 
attempting to rein in the proliferation of mosques, and said everyone should 
follow the same rules when it came to putting up new buildings.

To counter suggestions that the Tajik government was in some way hostile to 
Islam, Umarov pointed out that Qatar and other Arab states were providing 
funding for a mosque in Dushanbe that will be the largest in Central Asia once 
it is completed.

However, the government clampdown also has its critics, who say the rural 
mosques now under threat provide a useful service to remote communities, and it 
would be better to help them comply with official regulations rather than 
shutting them down.

Jura Nazriev, chief editor of the local newspaper, Darvoz, said many villages 
in Darvaz district were too far from the nearest town for people to be able to 
get there if their local mosques closed, especially since mountain roads were 
closed throughout the winter.

Residents of Darvaz are unhappy at the prospect of no longer having somewhere 
to meet for prayer.

One man who gave his name as Karim said, “They say the mosques are operate 
illegally, but I’m not interested in the law. I am obliged by Sharia [Islamic 
law] to pray five times daily, so I’m against any kind of arguments from the 
authorities about closing mosques down.”

Muhiddin Kabiri, who heads the opposition Islamic Rebirth Party, says he agrees 
that mosques should register with the proper authorities. “But they need to be 
helped to do so, and not subjected to bans and restrictions,” he added.

Kabiri believes the tough line on religious issues being driven by hardliners 
in government.

“It seems to me that at the moment, it’s the hawks who have the upper hand in 
determining the relationship with religion; they like attacking things,” he 
said.

There is certainly evidence that government is worried about the ways Islam is 
practiced. This month, the government’s religious affairs committee announced 
that it was working with theCouncil of Clerics, the state-approved Islamic 
structure in Tajikistan, to compiling a list of some 60 topics deemed suitable 
for sermons, and will soon distribute the list to the imams or prayer-leaders 
of mosques across the country.

The Asia Plus news agency reported earlier in January that police in Dushanbe 
detained about 30 men who had beards, and photographed and fingerprinted them 
before releasing them. Police said the measures were part of a sweep designed 
to uncover extremists.

Late last year, the authorities ordered hundreds of Tajiks studying at 
madrassas and Islamic universities abroad to return home, warning that they 
were at risk of falling prey to advocates of terrorism and extremism. (See 
Tajikistan: Islamic Students Told to Come Home.)

Aslibegim Manzarshoeva is an IWPR-trained journalist in Tajikistan.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central 
Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the 
European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and 
Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.

**** http://iwpr.net/ **********************************************************

REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA provides the international community with a unique 
insiders' perspective on the region. Using our network of local journalists, 
the service publishes news and analysis from across Central Asia on a weekly 
basis.

The service forms part of IWPR's Central Asia Project based in Almaty, Bishkek, 
Tashkent and London, which supports media development and encourages better 
local and international understanding of the region.

IWPR's Reporting Central Asia is supported by the UK Community Fund. The 
service is published online in English and Russian. 

The opinions expressed in Reporting Central Asia are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily represent those of the publication or of IWPR.

REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA: Editor-in-Chief: Anthony Borden; Managing Editor: Yigal 
Chazan; Senior Editor and Acting Central Asia Director: John MacLeod; Central 
Asia Editor: Saule Mukhametrakhimova.

IWPR PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT: Executive Director: Anthony Borden; Head 
of Programmes: Sam Compton.


**** http://iwpr.net/ **********************************************************

IWPR – Giving Voice, Driving Change

IWPR - Europe, 48 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT, UK
Tel: +44 20 7831 1030

IWPR – United States, 1325 G Street, NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20005, 
United States
Tel: +1 202 449 7717

1515 Broadway, 11th Floor, New York, New York 10036, United States
Tel: +1 212 520 3950

Stichting IWPR Nederland, Eisenhowerlaan 77 K, 2517 KK Den Haag, The Netherlands
Tel: +31 70 338 9016

For further details on this project and other information services and media 
programmes, go to: http://iwpr.net/

ISSN: 1477-7924 Copyright © 2009 The Institute for War & Peace Reporting 

**** http://iwpr.net/ **********************************************************




This electronic mail message and any attached files are intended solely for the 
named recipients and may contain confidential and proprietary business 
information of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) and its 
affiliates. If you are not the named addressee, you should not disseminate, 
distribute or copy this e-mail.

Institute for War & Peace Reporting. 48 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT, UK. 
Registered with charitable status in the United Kingdom (charity reg. no: 
1027201, company reg. no: 2744185); the United States under IRS Section 
501(c)(3); and The Netherlands as a charitable foundation.

Reply via email to