On Mon, 30 Jul 2007 23:43:55 +0330, "Mehdi Hassanpour"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Thank you Travis & Erik,
> My very big problem now is, I'm confused how to start a new keyring
> Erik, all sites & stuff that we keep their Login keys in your
> revelation have a password recovery solution! Maybe they don't think
> that "it's too easy to break (anyone can find out your mothers maiden
> name, to take one example)".
Eschewing my personal dislike for those schemes*...
1) Most web accounts are not hugely valuable. It doesn't matter if
someone cracks the password on my nethack.alt.org account, and plays
the game as me. Accordingly, that site uses telnet, which is totally
insecure -- it passes the password in plaintext across the Internet,
where anyone can read it. What's good enough for one application is
_not_ automatically good enough for other applications. A keyring can
have all sorts of passwords, from worthless to very valuable -- and
because of this, it needs to be as secure as possible (since some users
will undoubtedly store extremely valuable passwords in it).
2) Those sites that are important (e.g., banks) have other methods to
reduce the likelihood of forgotten-password abuse. Specifically, if I
enter my mother's maiden name, I do *not* get access to my account --
my password gets reset, and I either get the new password in my e-mail
(which, presumably, only I have access to), snail mail (which, barring
mail theft, only I have access to), or via callback (or call-in) to the
bank from my home telephone (which, barring break-in or phreaking, only
I have access to). None of this is possible with Revelation, since
it's not a service, there is no central place that stores or grants
access to your data, and the key/passphrase are not kept in escrow.
> I wish you could think over a solution or give an attention to users
> that there is NO way to recover the master password before they start
> using revelation!
Would such a warning seriously have stopped you from losing your
password, or from using Revelation in the first place? Take a few
minutes to think about it honestly.
Now, I'm going to tell you that you should perform regular backups,
and to test those backups on a (less) regular basis. Also, you should
always lock your computer when you're away from it. Furthermore, if a
Windows user, you should perform consistent virus and malware checks.
For any operating system, you should also consistently update your
software. Additionally, you should probably use a firewall. And of
course, you should change your passwords at regular intervals, and
never re-use or give your passwords to others. Last, but not least, you
should verify your trust in the integrity and security of a file server
and file publisher before downloading and running any executable from
How many of those do you know you should be doing? How many of them,
from the ones you know you should be doing, do you fully understand the
consequences of not doing? Of those you understand the consequences of
not doing, how many of them do you still not do?
There's no shame in not understanding or not doing all the things on
that list -- even I don't do all that, despite knowing what the
consequences can be. My point in all this is that while a warning
-could- be tacked on somewhere, I doubt that it would do much good,
aside from giving the dev(s) the ability to say "I told you so." That,
and an unencrypted backup copy, will get you your data back. :/
* I hate "secret questions" with a passion, because they do reduce
security. I *always* use Revelation to generate a really long password
to fill these questions in with, and then store this data in
Revelation, along with the real password. However, there are better,
technical reasons why such a scheme cannot be implemented with equal
security in Revelation, my personal loathing of such a system aside.