JackieTien97 commented on code in PR #19234:
URL: https://github.com/apache/iotdb/pull/19234#discussion_r4558423988
##########
iotdb-core/datanode/src/main/java/org/apache/iotdb/db/protocol/thrift/impl/DataNodeInternalRPCServiceImpl.java:
##########
@@ -1887,6 +1888,17 @@ public TSStatus executeCQ(TExecuteCQ req) {
}
executedSQL = String.join(" ",
s.constructFormattedSQL().split("\n")).replaceAll(" +", " ");
+ // Refresh the owner's READ_DATA scope for each CQ execution.
+ TSStatus status =
+ AuthorityChecker.checkAuthority(
Review Comment:
Addressed in 17d1fefc56 by keeping the existing semantics and making them
explicit. Explicit target columns keep ordinary SELECT INTO's positional
mapping, so partial READ_DATA still fails the window with 701 without writing
any column, and the scheduler retries the same window until access is restored
(catching up window by window under BLOCKED). The PR description now documents
this, and `testCQExecutionWithExplicitTargetReadDataPermission` /
`testCQExecutionWithExplicitTargetReadDataPermissionAlignByDevice` pin the 701
failure, the retry of the same window after re-granting, and the resulting rows.
##########
iotdb-core/datanode/src/main/java/org/apache/iotdb/db/protocol/thrift/impl/DataNodeInternalRPCServiceImpl.java:
##########
@@ -1887,6 +1888,17 @@ public TSStatus executeCQ(TExecuteCQ req) {
}
executedSQL = String.join(" ",
s.constructFormattedSQL().split("\n")).replaceAll(" +", " ");
+ // Refresh the owner's READ_DATA scope for each CQ execution.
+ TSStatus status =
+ AuthorityChecker.checkAuthority(
+ s,
+ new TreeAccessCheckContext(
+ session.getUserId(), session.getUsername(),
session.getClientAddress())
Review Comment:
Fixed in 17d1fefc56: the internal session is now supplied with
`AuthorityChecker.getUserId(req.getUsername()).orElse(-1L)`, which resolves the
TODO. `DataNodeInternalRPCServiceImplCQTest` verifies that the real user ID
reaches both the access-check context and the query execution session.
##########
iotdb-core/datanode/src/main/java/org/apache/iotdb/db/protocol/thrift/impl/DataNodeInternalRPCServiceImpl.java:
##########
@@ -1887,6 +1888,17 @@ public TSStatus executeCQ(TExecuteCQ req) {
}
executedSQL = String.join(" ",
s.constructFormattedSQL().split("\n")).replaceAll(" +", " ");
+ // Refresh the owner's READ_DATA scope for each CQ execution.
+ TSStatus status =
+ AuthorityChecker.checkAuthority(
+ s,
+ new TreeAccessCheckContext(
+ session.getUserId(), session.getUsername(),
session.getClientAddress())
+ .setSqlString(executedSQL));
+ if (status.getCode() != TSStatusCode.SUCCESS_STATUS.getStatusCode()) {
+ return status;
Review Comment:
Fixed in 17d1fefc56: `TreeAccessCheckVisitor.visitQuery` now keeps
`e.getMessage()` on `AuthException`, and `executeCQ` logs a WARN with the CQ
ID, owner, and status when authorization fails (new en/zh constant
`LOG_FAILED_TO_AUTHORIZE_CQ_ARG_FOR_USER_ARG_ARG_B436A81F`). The deleted-owner
step in `IoTDBCQExecIT` asserts a 301 status whose message contains the
username.
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