If the technology he's developing is comparable in nature to that of a
Google Search Appliance, then I could see how this would be the case.
For example, the internal index may use database schemas (or data) that
should not be accessible to the customer. Additionally, any PHP/CGI/etc
code loaded on the machine would be good to have hidden from prying eyes
to prevent code theft.
If I were building something akin to a Google Search Appliance, i.e.
something that you bring into an isolated network, plug it in, then
treat it as a "black box" appliance, then I would probably be asking the
same questions he's asking. However, I doubt even the Googles of the
world go to the extreme of actually encrypting the hard disk just to
protect the data and code. A well-engineered firewall and system
configuration that prevents access to confidential data and code is
probably enough to keep most casual observers out. Anybody nefarious
enough to rip the hard disk out of the box to try and get to the data is
probably determined enough to get around any encryption scheme that
would be implemented.
Companies that purchase "black box" servers like this aren't in the
business of stealing code...that's why they buy a "black box", turn it
on, and expect it to "just work".
Paul Krizak 7171 Southwest Pkwy MS B400.2A
Advanced Micro Devices Austin, TX 78735
Linux/Unix Systems Engineering Desk: (512) 602-8775
Silicon Design Division Cell: (512) 791-0686
John Summerfield wrote:
Ahmed Kamal wrote:
oh! No, the hardware is *not* my concern. It's the data! Let me quickly
recap. Let's try points this time
- The Linux system I build will be on someone else's network (mostly
other
potentially hostile companies)
- The system provides a web interface to a database that users should
access
& use
- The users should not be able to steal/mount the disk, to dump my
database
or look at my code
- I know such setup will never be 100% secure, I just need to make
stealing
the data as hard as possible
Hope that's clear. I apologize if I was not too clear earlier
Nothing you've said so far tells me why you must have confidential data
on local storage or why you can't run these "kiosk" machines of a server
located in a secure location.
On Jan 18, 2008 5:46 PM, J E <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Jan 18, 2008, at 10:27 AM, John Summerfield wrote:
Ahmed Kamal wrote:
Perhaps I misused the word "kiosk" and was not clear describing the
role of
the nodes. They will not be on my network. They will be on someone
else's
network (some other company, or some other organization). The nodes
will be
providing network services (Custom databases, accessible through a
browser),
sometimes some ldap services.
Again, the people around the machine should use it as intended, no
one
should be able to steal/mount the disk to dump data (at least not
easily)
I think we need better information about the problem you're trying
to solve.
Agreed. If your main worry is that the hardware will be stolen, cheap
hardware abounds in the marketplace. I'd not invest heavily in systems
that aren't going to be monitored - probably better to treat them as
throwaways if you aren't going to lock them in some form of cabinet.
And don't rule out hardware terminal servers like those available from
HP starting at $200.
If it's the data that you are worried about, the fact that you have to
ask how best to protect it should tell you that doing it with local
storage is probably a very bad idea.
jef
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