Thanks for your answer, comments below. On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 12:52:19PM -0500, Adrien Béraud wrote: > Ring and OpenDHT try to hide the publicly visible identities of participants. > In OpenDHT, the node ID used for DHT routing and seen by other nodes is > independent from the Ring ID which is a public key ID. > When an encrypted message is stored on OpenDHT, it appears as a random blob > with no way to know the signer or the recipient (except for the recipient > himself).
How can a Ring client receive calls? Does it register a listener in OpenDHT for its own Ring ID? Then, any client that wants to call the first client would need to announce a value at this ID? > So one just listening on the DHT could only see random blobs at some > key. How is the key chosen for a given message? Is it just the hash of the content? Sorry if these are dumb questions, I'm just trying to understand how Ring and OpenDHT go along together :) > However someone having a complete overview of the DHT network may indeed > eventually be able to guess that an IP address contacts some other IP > address. > This is difficult to prevent: even with Tor, privacy can be compromised if > someone controls or see some proportion of the network. > But bigger the network is, more difficult it becomes to monitor. > > There is work in progress to make this kind of monitoring even harder with > measures like listening key randomization etc. > Suggestions and comments are welcome.
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