Dear list, Talking about how public and non-public probe participates in built-in and user-defined measurement, a possible scenario has come to my mind (maybe it’s not really relevant to what you are discussing right now). Here goes the case:
I host a probe and it is required to participate in a UDM involving sensitive destinations, say DNS measurement to ISIS’s site (could be interesting and useful in certain senses), which however might violet my local security policies. As a consequence, the big brother might knock at my door and invite me for a coffee…or something more serious. My question is, if that happens, am I really responsible for that and whether it is possible to avoid participating in certain risky measurements. Possibly I wrong too much. Best regards, wenqin > On 22 Oct 2015, at 16:35, Daniel Quinn <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi James, > > I just wanted to clarify a few points about how the probes work in response > to your comment. > > All RIPE Atlas probes, even those not marked “public”, are available to be > used in both built-in and user-defined measurements *as sources*. > > Many probes are not hosted on the open Internet, so they make for lousy > targets. In most cases, they're hosted on internal networks, so they're often > not “targetable” at all. More importantly, hosting a probe does not make your > network (which already exists on the open Internet) any more or less likely > to be the target of a measurement. > > And in terms of outgoing traffic, the probe generates next to nothing > (typically a few Kb/s, even when it’s being used for user-defined > measurements). > > You can learn more about this from the FAQs: > https://atlas.ripe.net/about/faq/ > > Please let us know if you have any other questions. > > Regards, > > Daniel Quinn >
