I too am inclined towards a variant of option 3. - option 1 to me is simply too much heavyweight structure for a single- person role.
- option 2 I feel is exclusionary to otherwise well-matched candidates, and places the role at risk of capture by employer vested interests. On 02/20/18 06:25, Malcolm Hutty wrote: > Before leaping to conclusions, it might be worth kicking around > ideas for how the risks identified in Option 3 might be mitigated. Indeed, there ought to be models that would uphold the RIPE Chair's autonomy and policy/editorial independence while still being funded by the RIPE NCC. This might involve funding via long-term grant/endowment commitments rather than annual budget revenue stream-derived salary, fixed-term appointment, and/or other arms-length approaches along Malcolm's suggestions. It's very possible other organisations (not necessarily in our sector) have already figured out models for such arrangements, and it may be a good idea to research these for appropriate approaches. Keith > I agree think the risk of loss of independence is a valid concern we > should be wary about. I wouldn't agree with someone who was casually > dismissive of this as an issue. But Option 3 doesn't *have* to be > "the RIPE Chair is employed at will by, and under the direct > instructions of, the NCC". With care and thought, I am confident we > can do better than that. > The terms of this contract could in principle be designed to protect > his independence from the NCC, and accountability to the RIPE > community. The Chair will himself have an interest defending those > terms. > > For example, perhaps the contract could provide that it may not be > terminated by the NCC unless and until some RIPE community process > has removed the person as Chair [*]. That might still require us to > be a bit more clear what the process in the RIPE community for > removal of the Chair should be, but it moves the locus of work to be > done back into the community.
