Hi Leo,

Thank you for the reply, this is one of the structural vulnerabilities in the 
draft framework.  You're absolutely right that current Global Policies are 
narrowly scoped to IANA functions and resource empowerment. My concern isn't 
with how Global Policies work today, but rather with how Section 4.1(i) could 
undermine the ICP-2 evolution framework itself – particularly if we ever need 
Global Policies that impose obligations on RIRs rather than just IANA.

Section 4.1(i) creates an explicit escape hatch: any RIR can disregard any 
provision of the ICP-2 evolution framework (including governance obligations, 
accountability measures, or operational requirements) by invoking "applicable 
law." This transforms what should be binding commitments into optional 
guidelines.

Consider these hypothetical but plausible examples:


  1.  Data Localization/Sovereignty Laws Harming Continuity: An RIR might 
invoke data residency requirements to justify refusing cross-regional 
coordination or registry data sharing that the framework requires for stability 
and interoperability or denying data escrows to enable continuity.
  2.  Competition/Antitrust or other Legal Compliance: An RIR might claim that 
coordinating with other RIRs (as the framework requires) violates local 
competition law, using 4.1(i) to fragment unified operations. A court could 
order that the property of the RIR (including all the IP registrations) could 
go to the Government or a Plantiff in a lawsuit.
  3.  National Security Carve-outs: Increasingly, governments claim authority 
over "critical infrastructure" including internet resources. An RIR could 
invoke such laws to override governance provisions requiring transparency, due 
process, or multi-stakeholder participation.

Many of the links I provided speak to some real-world examples where some of 
these examples have already happened.

Why This Matters for ICP-2 RIR Governance Draft
The 2019 ASO MoU definition you cited is correct but incomplete for this 
context. While today's Global Policies focus on IANA empowerment, the ICP-2 
evolution framework must establish governance obligations that bind RIRs 
themselves – not just IANA. Section 4.1(i) preemptively exempts RIRs from these 
obligations whenever convenient.

The draft attempts to create enforceable accountability but simultaneously 
provides an unlimited waiver. Any provision requiring RIRs to maintain registry 
accuracy, ensure equitable access, provide due process, coordinate operations, 
or maintain transparency can be ignored by invoking "applicable law."

Proposed Solution
Rather than a blanket supremacy clause, the framework should:


  *   Acknowledge that RIRs operate under various jurisdictions
  *   Require transparent disclosure when legal conflicts arise
  *   Establish a structured process for addressing genuine legal conflicts
  *   Distinguish between mandatory compliance with actual legal requirements 
versus voluntary invocation of legal ambiguity as policy cover
  *   Empower revocation of an RIR if these diverge in a way that an RIR can no 
longer comply with the Global Policy and protect the number registrations as a 
result for end-users.

The current language in 4.1(i) does none of this – it simply grants unilateral 
authority to disregard any inconvenient obligation.  I'm happy to discuss this 
in detail with you if that would be helpful.

Thanks,

William

From: Leo Vegoda <[email protected]>
Date: Saturday, November 8, 2025 at 6:08 AM
To: bills <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [ripe-list] Feedback on the Version 2 (DRAFT) RIR Governance 
Document

Hi,

On 7 Nov 2025, at 16:35, William Sylvester via ripe-list <[email protected]> 
wrote:

[…]


Summary of Core Deficiencies
1.    The "Local Law" Supremacy Clause (Sec. 4.1(i)): The draft grants RIRs an 
explicit "carve-out" to ignore any global policy or draft provision if it 
conflicts with "any applicable law" [Sec 4.1(i)]. This single clause 
invalidates the entire framework, rendering it advisory rather than binding, 
and explicitly permits the very capture and fragmentation it was meant to 
prevent.

Can you please expand on this as I don’t understand your concern as it relates 
to Global Policies.

The 2019 ASO MoU defines Global Policy as “number resource policies that have 
the agreement of all RIRs according to their policy development processes and 
ICANN, and require specific actions or outcomes on the part of IANA or any 
other external ICANN-related body in order to be implemented.” (my emphasis)

So far, we only have global policies that require IANA action. They empower the 
RIRs to get resources from IANA.

ICANN ASO MoU 2019 | The Number Resource 
Organization<https://www.nro.net/icann-aso-mou-2019/>
nro.net<https://www.nro.net/icann-aso-mou-2019/>
[cid:[email protected]]<https://www.nro.net/icann-aso-mou-2019/>
Global Policy | The Number Resource 
Organization<https://www.nro.net/policy/global/>
nro.net<https://www.nro.net/policy/global/>
[cid:[email protected]]<https://www.nro.net/policy/global/>

Can you explain the kind of law and the kind of policy you have in mind?

Thanks,

Leo
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