How can you explain the emergence of populism and to
some extent of eurosceptiscism in some Eastern
European countries since 2004?
By Salomeea Romanescu - Romania
Definition of concepts of populism, extremism and
euroskepticism
Abraham Lincoln could not have summed up the populist
ideology better when, in his famous Gettysburg
Address, he advocated "... government of the people,
by the people, for the people."( in the sense of "I
will govern for the people)
Populism is a political ideology that holds that
the common person is oppressed by an elite in society,
which exists only to serve its own interests, and
therefore, the instruments of the State need to be
grasped from this self-serving elite and instead used
for the benefit and advancement of the oppressed
masses as a whole.
Extremism is a term used to describe the actions or
ideologies of individuals or groups outside the
perceived political center of a society; or otherwise
claimed to violate common standards of ethics and
reciprocity. It is usually considered by those to whom
it is applied to be a pejorative term. It is typically
used in reference to political and social ideologies
seen as irrational, counterproductive, unjustifiable,
or otherwise unacceptable to a civil society. The term
connotes the illegitimacy of certain ideas or
methods.
Euroscepticism (from European and scepticism) has
become a general term for opposition to the process of
European integration. It originated in the United
Kingdom, and at first referred to those within the
Labour Party and Conservative Party who were sceptical
of their parties' official support for UK membership
of the then European Economic Community. Since then,
the meaning has expanded, to cover most opposition to
the European Union, to its policies, to the
introduction of the euro, and to any future
pan-European entity in the form of a superstate, a
federation, or a confederation.
The aim of the essay and the principal questions
After defining the principal concepts my essay would
like to argue at the deeper and surface structure,
which are the principal reasons for the emergence of
populism and to some extent to euroskepticism in some
eastern European countries since 2004.
The principal guestions of the essay are:
How to explain the current tide of populist
movements in the region?
How can one explain Euroskepticism over New Europe
after 2004?
These questions imply several others:
Who are the Euroskeptics and Populists?
What are the connections between
Euroskepticism/populism and the democratic deficit?
To answer to the principal question lets analyze at
the surface structure.
In the region there are certain common features and
trends after joining the EU with important
implications for the state of democracy and the future
of European integration even there is a great
diversity of situations and political contexts.
I will try to identify the common features with
different forms on different Visegrad countries after
2004 after identifying who are the
populist/euroskeptical groups in New Europe.
Who are the Euroskeptics, but Populists?
- The various populist/euroskeptical parties and
politicians found in the New Europe are difficult
to classify as left-wing or right-wing
Bluebirds and Tories for Euroscepticism - The Czech
Civic democrats (called Bluebirds because of the logo
of the party) decided to launch the "Euroskeptic"
faction in the European parliament. They are facing
some problems however. Not lack of Euroscepticism but
weak position in their countries forced them to
postpone the real start of the faction after three
years.
- Some populists/euroskeptical come from the peasantry
and claim to defend their interests against the
cultural pollution coming from the West and from the
market forces that threaten to overwhelm the people.
- Others such as Tymoshenko are self-made business
people who decide it is time to directly market
themselves and their ideas. In either case, they exist
in virtually every country in Central and Eastern
Europe.
Just a simple lesson: If you are loser you are
Euro-skeptic or Populist.
Lets sume the four principal features-reasons of
populism/euroskepticism in the studed region of
Visegrad, according to Jacques Rupnik . Some reasons
are common for the rise of Populism and Euroskepticism
in the region, after 2004.
- The first feature is political instability and the
low level of predictability of political actors in the
region while elections have just taken place in all
the Visegrad countries over the past year. These
features are common with the globalization features so
are general in a Globalised world and for this reason
common to all countries from the region.
More worryingly in this Visegrad region is the erosion
of trust in democratic institutions. Both populism
and euroskepticism are linked with democratic deficit
because of the utopian expectations from European
Integration, seeing on EU the most positive features
of Capitalism, Democracy and Communism: full
employment, high standards of leaving, prosperity and
productivity, freedom and low level of crime.
Democratic institutions werent able to provide all
this exaggerate expectations and they perceived a lot
of threats. Slovakia felt the most threatened with
various domestic and external threats (Russia, USA and
immigrants)
According to Gallup International poll East-Central
Europeans appear as the most skeptical concerning the
state of democracy (only about one-third have trust in
the democratic process). By difference to a majority
of West Europeans the East Europeans do not judge
their elections free and fair. To the question Do
you think your voice matters? some 22% give a
positive reply.
The lack of trust that citizens of the New Europe
have in their democratic institutions is reflected
also in low voter turnout for recent elections.
For example, only 21 percent of eligible voters in
Poland and 16 percent in Slovakia turned out for the
June 2004 European Parliamentary elections.
It is no by coincidence that the same countries that
saw low voter turnout for these elections also
experienced a rise in populist success at the ballot
box. Polish populist Andrezej Lepper and his
Self-Defense Party did extremely well in these
elections. This was also the case in Slovakia where
populists Vladimir Meciar (Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia [HZDS]) and Roberto Fico (Social Alternative
for Slovakia [SMER] or Direction Party) captured 35
percent of the vote between them.
In conclusion democracy today has no rivals but is
losing supporters. Populist movements to some extent
express that ambivalence and dissatisfaction.
They are not anti-democratic (indeed they claim to
be the true voice of the people and keep demanding
new elections or referenda) but anti-liberal.
I agree with Jacques Rupnik that if democracy means
popular legitimacy and constitutionalism then the
populists reject the idea that constitutional norms
and representative democracy have primacy over values
and legitimate popular grievances.
He argues that the politics of values Polish style
is based on the assumption that moral order based on
religion should prevail over the freedoms guaranteed
by permissive liberalism on issues such as abortion,
gays or the death penalty.
In Slovakia the anti-liberal reaction is reflected
also to the treatment of national minorities: Jan
Slota, the leader of the Slovak National Party, was
reported saying that he envies the Czechs for having
expelled the Germans and that he would not mind
sending Bugar, the leader of the Hungarian minority,
to Mars without a return ticket. So legitimation of
xenophobia is a main feature of the offensive on
political liberalism.
The conclusion of our author Jaques Rupnik is that
the common prototype in all the Visegrad countries is
one of acute polarization.This was embedded on
communist political culture: you do not face a
political opponent with whom you argue or negotiate,
but an enemy, which you must destroy .
- Another aspect of the anti-liberal behavior concerns
economics. After fifteen years of unabashed
free-market policies the populists in Warsaw,
Bratislava or Budapest want to put on the table again
the social question and bring back the state. The
losers of the transition cannot really get excited
about the merits of capitalism, see new Tigers from
Tatra. The populists have destroyed the myth of
liberal new Europe, because of the economic
deterioration.
- The third feature of the East European populist
drive is its onslaught on the elite consensus that has
prevailed since 1990 according to the same source. I
agree with our author that despite the fluctuation of
Governments they have followed very similar
market-oriented policies at home and NATO/EU-oriented
foreign policy.
In Poland we find an interesting combination of the
anticorruption and de-communization with the
denunciation of the original sin of the 1989
compromise between moderate dissident elites and
moderate communist elites which led to a non-violent
exit from communism. This moral and political fault
has converted political power of ex-communists into
economic power and led to the widespread corruption
related to the privatization process. (see
anti-corruption and de-communization, which is a
leitmotiv of Kaczynski twins, Orban, and, to some
extent of the right-wing (ODS) party now in office in
Prague. )
- The fourth feature of the recent populist tide in
East-Central Europe is a unwillingness or clear
opposition to European integration. The pro-European
coalitions have been fatigued and disintegrated in the
immediate aftermath of joining of the EU inform as
Jacques Rupnik. Significantly, the Polish, Czech and
Hungarian prime ministers resigned within days or
weeks after fulfilling the historic task of
returning to Europe. The nationalist populist
Kaczynski pretend that he is the only defenders of
national identity and national sovereignty against
external threats. The EU is the wonderful target
since as a liberal, elitist, supranational project it
represents a combination of most of the above
mentioned grievances. I also agree with his conclusion
that the assumption that joining the EU is
stabilizing the political system of the new
democracies seems to work most effectively in the
pre-accession phase. After joining the EU the now we
can show them who we really are is a general
satisfaction in joining Europe in order to oppose
those who for half a century built it without taking
us into account Eastern part. The populist
nationalists seem to reveal nature of Europe they have
in mind (a Europe of sovereign nation-states, a
Christian Europe opposed to the materialist,
decadent, permissive, supra-national one ).
- This last feature of Populism is linked with
Euroskepticism.. However Euroscepticism is not a
well-defined ideology, and eurosceptics differ on both
their vision of Europe and on the manner in which
Europe is perceived to fail. Thus, some seek a
different form of European 'Union' (with perhaps a new
name), some seek reversal of the process of European
integration, some seek withdrawal of their own country
from the EU, whilst others seek the complete
dissolution of the EU.
In conclusion Populism can be present among any group
of ordinary people in any democratic country which is
being subjected to stressful forces and where there is
a failure of elite politicians running the country.
As a result of such stress, this group of people may
identify itself with a leader who they believe can
provide them with more material support and hope for
the future than the old elite. Supporting populism
relies on the fact that some group of ordinary
citizens does not view the government as legitimately
and properly representing their interests and are
willing to bypass these institutions when necessary
through recourse to direct political action, by legal
form of using referendums to bypass national
institutions.
What is the reason for the rise of Populism at the
deeper structure?
The neglect of the social protection and the denying
of the existence of genuine unemployment by the
standard model that economists had used for
generations could be one explanation; the only reason
that unemployment existed was the wages were too high,
suggesting the simple remedy: lower wages.
They argued that markets worked perfectly and outworn
presumption that markets, by themselves lead to
efficient outcomes and this failed to allow the
desirable intervention of the government in the market
for the guidance of economic growth and make everyone
better off.
There is a huge rate of unemployment, hidden
unemployment and exploitation of human being by the
level of minimum salary is very low and cant provide
a decent standard of life for employed people in the
majority of Eastern European Countries.
Conclusions and perspectives
Populism and Euroskepticism was generated by economic
concerns in all countries or the region, by
conceptions of identity (in Poland), by general
political distrust (in all Visegrad countries), and by
specific EU policies (Poland- Commun Agricultural
Policy).
Euroskepticism is a function of ills that afflict new
democracies, such as political apathy (yang people
from all Visegrad countries), distrust in political
institutions (the majority of citizens), declining
voter turnout (in all Visegrad countries),
unconventional protest (Poland), economic insecurity
(in all Visegrad countries) and cultural threat
(peasants in Poland).
There are distinctive types of Populism/Euroskepticism
political, economic, cultural, individual vs.
organized.
Euroskepticism could be primarily elite-driven like in
Hungary or public-driven like in Poland. Populists or
euroskepticals could be: citizens, political parties,
social movements, and interest groups, like
agricultural one.
In all Visegrad countries Euroscepticism was often
associated with support for the nation-state and for
national sovereignty, and was typically motivated by
fears that the "ever closer union" enshrined in the
preamble of the Treaty of Rome will erode that
sovereignty.
How Populism Could Create New Security Challenges in
Europe?
It is interested to know Steve C Ropp description of
this process and stages: were bursts of populist
turbulence to occur in this region on a large scale,
they would have the potential to undermine the
democratic core upon which most of contemporary U.S.
security policy is based.
Phase 1: Major global and/or regional changes
undermine institutions in representative democracies.
Phase 2: Populist leaders emerge to reflect the
stresses and uncertainties shared by the people in
these democracies.
Phase 3: New regional clusters of populist-led
countries form around common interests or even new
ideologies.
Phase 4: Bursts of populist turbulence occur in and
among these countries.
Phase 5: New security challenges quickly appear for
the United States.
The economy of the essay doesnt offer then space for
exemplification.
Cirtautas shows that nationalism is gaining in
strength throughtout CEE and may rival neo-liberal
transformation ( see annex )
Annex
>From the anterior period of Accession, in Poland,
similar to the Austrian FPO, potential project of
nationalist resistance could be led by the ROP, which
wants to defend Polish interests against foreign
exploitation. It may be supported by the PSL,
especially if the negotiation settlement in
agriculture is unsatisfactory, and important parts of
the AWS, which, contains strong elements of clerical
nationalism. The right-wing SPR-RSC may lead
resistance in the Czech Republic around a nationalist
anti-EU movement. Its overall chance of success,
however, looks on considering that it failed to
re-enter parliament in the 1998 elections.
In Hungary, the right-wing MIEP could develop
nationalist resistance. The positions of the ISCM in
the Czech Republic and the MP in Hungary are still
unclear and it is yet to be seen which type of
rejection their programme will take, once the
negotiations have been completed and the referenda
come closer.
In conclusion the attitudes toward integration of
these groups may be negative or positive, and further
and deeper study should examine their situation.
Potential resistance to membership was small in all
three countries, because the communist systems in CEEC
are fully discredited and it has, therefore, been much
easier for neo-liberalism to triumph in comparison
with Austria and Sweden, where the post-war Keynesian
welfare state didnt lose complete credibility. Rural
solidarity was swept up by anti-government protests in
early 1999. The Agricultural lobby led by Andrzej
Lepper, an extremely vocal leader of that faction,
which blocked roads and orgnanised manifestations in
Warsaw. He considers integration a danger and not an
opportunity and apparently sides with potential
losers.
After Accession the situation has changed as we
already understood from our essay. For the moment we
cant predict which will be the future of Populism and
Euroskepticism in Europe. We hope that it will not
degenerate in extremism very soon but at longer term
bursts of populist turbulenc could occur in and among
these CEE countries, as Steve C Ropp predicted. In
this way new security challenges quickly will appear
for the United States, which could undermine the
democratic core upon which most of contemporary U.S.
security policy is based.
.
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