Den 13/11/14 10:09, skrev [email protected]:
Hi Rob,
I've already explained why this had been happened at all first hand.
RIRs have different rules and principles and constantly invents new
methods of complicating the situation in exchanging information between
them.
Second thought: the "concern" was raised in presumption that the route
objects "authorize" something to a provider. It is NOT. The absence of
the routing objects would change nothing in the situation. A lot of
providers do not build any filters based on a RIR routing policy at all.
Yes. This was also the case with the providers of the rogue AS that
started this discussion.
There were even prefixes in the RIR db with a different origin AS than
the one being announced on the internet. The data in the RIR db seem to
have no influence on the routes being announced.
You could however argue that a more correct RIR db would make LIRs use
this db for actual filtering.
