Hi Tim,

On 09/10, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:
> 
> 
> > On 10 Sep 2021, at 11:57, Job Snijders <[email protected]> wrote:
> > 
> > On Fri, Sep 10, 2021 at 11:39:39AM +0200, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:
> >> I think all would agree that transparency is good.
> >> 
> >> A key difference between RPKI and most other PKIs is that in the RPKI
> >> all objects are published in the open for all the see. 
> > 
> > Small nitpick: all objects are SUPPOSED to be published, in the open,
> > for all to see. However it is important to keep in mind we cannot assume
> > all objects were published in a way for all to see.
> > 
> >> As you mentioned your RPKI validator may miss intermediate state
> >> changes if it retrieves objects using rsync, but the RRDP protocol
> >> supports deltas, see [1].
> >> 
> >> I believe that transparency can most easily be achieved by ensuring
> >> that these deltas are preserved, and that they cannot be modified.
> > 
> > RRDP is an unauthenticated and unsigned protocol. It is possible for a
> > Publication Point to present different RRDP deltas to one RP compared to
> > what they present to another RP. Archiving RRDP deltas is interesting,
> > but IMHO happens too late in the pipeline for TA/CA audit purposes.
> > 
> > RRDP is not a replacement for Certificate Transparency, both
> > technologies solve different problems.
> 
> I did not say that it was.
> 
> I just suggested that *in the context of RPKI* RRDP can be used as a basis
> to keep track of all historic public changes.
> 
Archiving the RRDP deltas can certainly provide information as to what
was observed at the publication points, but the security of the RPKI
system lives at the object-signing layer, and so an audit log needs to
capture activity at that layer: issuance actions by the CA.

Comparing a CT log to RRDP delta archive could certainly be useful in
many cases, but that's exactly because they say things about different
parts of the infrastructure.

Cheers,

Ben

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