Hi Job, Randy, > On 21 Dec 2021, at 23:57, Job Snijders via routing-wg <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 01:23:01PM -0800, Randy Bush wrote: >>> We hope you will find these reports useful >> >> very much so. thank you. > > Yes, I'd like to echo what Randy says. Thanks for sharing this. > >> btw, re RIPE-009 - Unencrypted Communication >> >> in the up/down protocol, objects are cms wrapped and hence signed and >> objct authenticated; i.e. i would not panic about transport cia. > > Indeed. But I can imagine that in a world where virtually all > (originally HTTP-only yolo) APIs now have been migrated to HTTPS, any > API which ** by design ** is HTTP-only, would indeed stand out to > pentest researchers. > > I think it is good the testers noticed this aspect, and also good that > RIPE NCC noted in the response "Up-down remains on HTTP and uses a CMS > wrapper for authentication." > > The up/down protocol is somewhat similar in terms of security > considerations to how one can transport signed RPKI data from > Publication Point (repositories) to Relaying Party (validator > instances). In that context too, the use of unencrypted transport (like > RSYNC, or PIGEON) is deemed acceptable because the threat model is based > on a robust interpretation of object-security** to such an extend that > transport-security is inconsequential.
I agree with that assessment. Any plaintext endpoint that could use TLS stands out. And in general, that is for a good reason, TLS provides encryption, authentication, and integrity - which are good properties to have. For published RPKI objects, encryption is not needed and the object-security model offers authentication and integrity. >> otoh, i suspect there could be a path to move your delegated CAs to >> TLS; which might be conservative in the long run. > > Would you mind elaborating on what you mean with the phrase "might be > conservative in the long run?". Moving delegated CAs to TLS would protect against currently unknown attacks. It is defence in depth. I would strongly prefer this endpoint to use TLS; there is a story on the RPKI backlog to move the delegated CAs to TLS. Kind regards, Ties — > > Kind regards, > > Job > > ** One crucial corner stone to the concept of 'RPKI object security' is > a thing called "RPKI Manifests". Manifests are an elegant and very > powerful idea in the X.509 universe: the ability to securely group > objects together. All modern validators use manifests: make sure your > validator is updated to the latest version! Read more about what > Manifests are here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09 > This doc is now going through IETF last-call. > > -- > > To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change > your subscription options, please visit: > https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/routing-wg -- To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change your subscription options, please visit: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/routing-wg
