William,

Credentials are to me something that are a must for business to trust one another, I 
find it interesting that everyone wants trustworthy credentials, but know one wants 
the responsibility.  And while it's not a specific goal or issue for the routing group 
to resolve, without proper digital credentials, we most likely will fail to gain 
sufficient momentum from the industry to support our efforts for a CPP model.

So, I'll through my two cents into the discussion.

When we look at the business model for "Credentialing" that has been sustained for 
years in the medical industry, I find it difficult to believe that we must somehow 
come up with a new entity for digital credentialing.  

I'm not an expert in Provider Credentialing, but other organizations are, and it is my 
understanding that all "Medical Providers" must register with the State and be 
"Licensed" to provide specific services.  Therefore, it seems to me that the obvious 
choice for a CA would be the Licensing authority.  If they can issue a paper license, 
why can't they also issue and maintain digital certificates?  I would presume that the 
technology and infrastructure to support such efforts would be contracted out to some 
other organization (Verisign, Entrust, Digital Trust, etc.)  but if a Provider chooses 
to do healthcare business electronically, why can't the licensing organization provide 
a digital certificate?

Same with a Payor organizations, it is my understanding that each payor must be 
licensed to provide insurance in a particular state and therefore should be able to 
receive both a paper license and digital certificate.

I know several states are attempting to create services that provide this type of 
trusted environment.  I'm specifically aware of the ACES program sponsored by the GSA 
at the federal level and "Transact Washington"  a state based certificate service to 
conduct electronic transactions with the State agencies.

Because the healthcare industry provides a social service and in many cases conduct 
business with the state, can we suggest that these certificates be used to conduct 
private business transactions between Covered Entities as well as public services 
transactions with state agencies?  If so, it's seems it would be possible to include 
in the CPP which certificates an organizations has obtained, and allow business 
partners the opportunity to validate such certificate to determine the level of trust 
they wish to associate with an entity.

Then the question becomes, will businesses accept a Federal certificate or a State 
certificate of a certain class of entity (individual, business representative, etc.) 
as a means to determine level of trust?

Ronald Bowron


>>> "William J. Kammerer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 08/07/02 08:02AM >>> 
Payers are not necessarily the best entities to serve as Certificate 
Authorities (CA), for various technical reasons that I can get into 
later. But payers identifying providers for the purposes of signing 
X.509 certificates is a completely separate issue from payers 
"credentialing" participating providers. I can certainly see how 
provider malpractice sewage can back up into a payer's basement: after 
all, the payer is the one who published the directory of participating 
providers passed out to subscribers, and in effect forced patients to go 
to one of those providers (because the patient wouldn't have been 
compensated as much if he chose a non-participating provider). That's a 
completely different matter, I believe, than serving as a CA for 
identity purposes in e-commerce. 

More likely, a payer would not want to serve as a CA simply because 
other payers, trusting the first payer's judgement, would rely on the 
certificate without any real benefit accruing to the signing payer. 

William J. Kammerer 
Novannet, LLC. 
Columbus, US-OH 43221-3859 
+1 (614) 487-0320 

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Kathleen Connor" < [EMAIL PROTECTED] > 
To: "Christopher J. Feahr, OD" < [EMAIL PROTECTED] >; "William J. 
Kammerer" < [EMAIL PROTECTED] >; < [EMAIL PROTECTED] > 
Sent: Sunday, 28 July, 2002 01:08 AM 
Subject: RE: The "Mao Zedong" PKI Model 

The problem is health plan/payer liability for credentialing a provider 
who is involved in a malpractice controversy - it's been a huge barrier 
to any rationalization of the credentialing process and would spill over 
to "credentialing" e-commerce id as well if fraud were a possibility. 
This has been explored in other venues and the only cure that's come up 
so far is national legislation that would remove some of the liability. 

-----Original Message----- 
From: Christopher J. Feahr, OD [ mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
Sent: Saturday, July 27, 2002 3:58 PM 
To: William J. Kammerer; [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Subject: Re: The "Mao Zedong" PKI Model 

William, 

Thank you... this is the most lucid and understandable explanation I 
have read on this subject! It would seem that large payors are the ideal 
Certificate Authorities (CA) for providers in the context of not only 
the CPP registry, but of claims and payments. The due diligence 
undertaken by larger payors in their "provider credentialing" processes 
is legendary. This would seem to make them more trusted (to vouch for 
identity of providers in the context of the health care industry) than 
provider professional associations, who would have no other business 
purpose for being so thorough. Since payors have to perform this 
credentialing task anyway... and since they would themselves benefit 
from "certified" identity on claims, I would think that the providers 
could be given certificates for little or no cost. 

In fact, if all payors could agree on a universal (small) set of 
attributes they needed "certified" (e.g., some want to confirm 
malpractice liability coverage, levels of licensure, etc.) then one 
payor like CMS could perform this credentialing operation very 
efficiently for all payors. CMS would seem to be in a good position to 
certify the identities of payors, too. There would be ongoing 
administration, of course, and the more attributes that are certified, 
the more frequently the certificates will expire and need to be 
recredentialed. But this model would not expose anyone's "customer 
list", as it would if each payor (or CH, VAN, etc.) were to only certify 
his or her own customers. 

Does anyone know if CMS is contemplating this role in connection with 
the nat. Provider ID? 

-Chris 

Christopher J. Feahr, OD 
http://visiondatastandard.org 
[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Cell/Pager: 707-529-2268 



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