> (For example, one hopes that a HIP ID is computationally > infeasible to forge without compromising the originating key, > but every deployed cryptographic system I know of does > eventually suffer key compromise, at which point that HIP ID > would not be globally unique either.)
Even the cryptographically generated ID suffers ID theft/forgery, then what about the ordinay ID without such security mechanism? > > If so, would you please explain the reason? > > Any proposal has to handle the case where some bad party is > deliberately mis-using an Identifier (or Address) that is not > really theirs. This case is not new to Routing RG, instead > this is exactly like the situation in today's deployed IP > Internet with forged Source IP Addresses. [US CERT: CA 1995-01] Yes. However, the id/locator split will make the situation worse if no special security mechanism is taken. Best regards, Xiaohu _______________________________________________ rrg mailing list [email protected] https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/rrg
