Earlier, Tony Li wrote:
% ILNP does not provide mobility support for locally unique IDs.
That is a confusion.
I've already given this counter-example once, in longer form,
although Robin and Tony apparently did not read the earlier
note.
SIMPLIFIED EXAMPLE
A first node is using a cryptographically-generated local-scope ID.
(The IPv6 RFCs on this don't need changes for ILNP. Please go read
them now, as I'm not going to try to repeat the RFCs here.)
First node roams to a new subnet. Some other node ("attacker")
is trying to block that first node from roaming by using the
first node's ID on the new subnetwork.
The first node can authenticate cryptographically that it,
and not the other node ("attacker") is the authorised node
for that ID value -- using the mechanisms already defined in
IETF SEND RFCs.
END EXAMPLE
Thus, we can see that (1) the alleged attack does not work
and (2) that local-scope node mobility can work.
QED
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