On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 10:46:04AM -0500, Derek Martin wrote:
> On Tue, May 08, 2012 at 12:24:52PM -0500, Derek Martin wrote:
> > Henrik Erkkonen has discovered that, through clever manipulation of
> > environment variables on the ssh command line, it is possible to
> > circumvent rssh.  As far as I can tell, there is no way to effect a
> > root compromise, except of course if the root account is the one
> > you're attempting to protect with rssh...
> > 
> > This project is old, and I have no interest in continuing to maintain
> > it.  
> 
> Actually, I have a patch for this.  I'll be publishing it later this
> week, when I can find some time to do it.

I haven't had the time to work up a proper release for this issue, but
I do have a patch, which is attatched.  Hopefully I'll get some time
to do a release this weekend.

-- 
Derek D. Martin
http://www.pizzashack.org/
GPG Key ID: 0x81CFE75D

diff -ru rssh-2.3.3.orig/main.c.in rssh-2.3.3/main.c.in
--- rssh-2.3.3.orig/main.c.in   2010-08-01 15:43:30.000000000 -0400
+++ rssh-2.3.3/main.c.in        2012-05-11 16:44:39.000000000 -0400
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@
         * determine if the command in cmdline is acceptable to run, and store
         * name of program to exec in cmd
         */
-       if ( !(*cmd = check_command_line(cmdline, opts)) ) return NULL;
+       if ( !(*cmd = get_command(cmdline, opts)) ) return NULL;
 
        /* if we need to do chroot processing, do it */
        if ( opts->shell_flags & RSSH_USE_CHROOT ){
@@ -252,7 +252,9 @@
        }
 
        /* return vector of pointers to command line arguments */
-       return build_arg_vector(cmdline, 0);
+       argvec = build_arg_vector(cmdline, 0);
+       if (check_command_line(argvec, opts)) return argvec;
+       else return NULL;
 }
 
 void vers_info( void )
diff -ru rssh-2.3.3.orig/util.c rssh-2.3.3/util.c
--- rssh-2.3.3.orig/util.c      2010-08-01 09:07:00.000000000 -0400
+++ rssh-2.3.3/util.c   2012-05-11 16:43:10.000000000 -0400
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
        /* print error message to user and log attempt */
        fprintf(stderr, "\nThis account is restricted by rssh.\n"
                "%s\n\nIf you believe this is in error, please contact "
-               "your system administrator.\n\n", cmd);
+               "your system administrator.\n\n", cmd);
        if ( argc < 3 )
                log_msg("user %s attempted to log in with a shell",
                        username);
@@ -132,31 +132,35 @@
  */
 bool opt_exist(char *cl, char opt)
 {
-       int     i = 0;
+       int     i = 1;
        int     len;
-       char    *token;
-       bool    optstring = FALSE;
-
 
        len = strlen(cl);
 
        /* process command line character by character */
-       while ( i < (len - 2) ){
-               if ( cl[i] == ' ' || cl[i] == '\t' ){
-                       if ( cl[i+1] == '-' ){ 
-                               optstring = TRUE;
-                               i+=2;
-                       }
-               }
-               if ( cl[i] == opt && optstring ) return TRUE;
-               if ( cl[i] == ' ' || cl[i] == '\t' || cl[i] == '-' ) 
-                       optstring = FALSE;
+       if (!(cl[0] == '-')) return FALSE;
+       while ( i < (len) ){
+               if ( cl[i] == opt ) return TRUE;
                i++;
        }
        return FALSE;
 }
 
 
+bool opt_filter(char **vec, const char opt)
+{
+       while (vec && *vec){
+               if (opt_exist(*vec, opt)){
+                       fprintf(stderr, "\nillegal insecure %c option", opt);
+                       log_msg("insecure %c option in scp command line!", opt);
+                       return TRUE;
+               }
+               vec++;
+       }
+       return FALSE;
+}
+
+
 bool check_command( char *cl, ShellOptions_t *opts, char *cmd, int cmdflag )
 {
        int     cl_len;         /* length of command line */
@@ -186,69 +190,78 @@
        return FALSE;
 }
 
+
 /*
  * check_command_line() - take the command line passed to rssh, and verify
- *                       that the specified command is one the user is
- *                       allowed to run.  Return the path of the command
- *                       which will be run if it is ok, or return NULL if it
- *                       is not.
+ *                       that the specified command is one the user is
+ *                       allowed to run and validate the arguments.  Return the
+ *                       path of the command which will be run if it is ok, or
+ *                       return NULL if it is not.
  */
-char *check_command_line( char *cl, ShellOptions_t *opts )
+char *check_command_line( char **cl, ShellOptions_t *opts )
 {
 
-       if ( check_command(cl, opts, PATH_SFTP_SERVER, RSSH_ALLOW_SFTP) )
+       if ( check_command(*cl, opts, PATH_SFTP_SERVER, RSSH_ALLOW_SFTP) )
                return PATH_SFTP_SERVER;
 
-       if ( check_command(cl, opts, PATH_SCP, RSSH_ALLOW_SCP) ){
+       if ( check_command(*cl, opts, PATH_SCP, RSSH_ALLOW_SCP) ){
                /* filter -S option */
-               if ( opt_exist(cl, 'S') ){
-                       fprintf(stderr, "\ninsecure -S option not allowed.");
-                       log_msg("insecure -S option in scp command line!");
-                       return NULL;
-               }
+               if ( opt_filter(cl, 'S') ) return NULL;
                return PATH_SCP;
        }
 
-       if ( check_command(cl, opts, PATH_CVS, RSSH_ALLOW_CVS) ){
-               if ( opt_exist(cl, 'e') ){
-                       fprintf(stderr, "\ninsecure -e option not allowed.");
-                       log_msg("insecure -e option in cvs command line!");
-                       return NULL;
-               }
+       if ( check_command(*cl, opts, PATH_CVS, RSSH_ALLOW_CVS) ){
+               if ( opt_filter(cl, 'e') ) return NULL;
                return PATH_CVS;
        }
 
-       if ( check_command(cl, opts, PATH_RDIST, RSSH_ALLOW_RDIST) ){
+       if ( check_command(*cl, opts, PATH_RDIST, RSSH_ALLOW_RDIST) ){
                /* filter -P option */
-               if ( opt_exist(cl, 'P') ){
-                       fprintf(stderr, "\ninsecure -P option not allowed.");
-                       log_msg("insecure -P option in rdist command line!");
-                       return NULL;
-               }
+               if ( opt_filter(cl, 'P') ) return NULL;
                return PATH_RDIST;
        }
 
-       if ( check_command(cl, opts, PATH_RSYNC, RSSH_ALLOW_RSYNC) ){
+       if ( check_command(*cl, opts, PATH_RSYNC, RSSH_ALLOW_RSYNC) ){
                /* filter -e option */
-               if ( opt_exist(cl, 'e') ){
-                       fprintf(stderr, "\ninsecure -e option not allowed.");
-                       log_msg("insecure -e option in rdist command line!");
-                       return NULL;
-               }
-               
-               if ( strstr(cl, "--rsh=" ) ){
-                       fprintf(stderr, "\ninsecure --rsh= not allowed.");
-                       log_msg("insecure --rsh option in rsync command line!");
-                       return NULL;
+               if ( opt_filter(cl, 'e') ) return NULL;
+               while (cl && *cl){
+                       if ( strstr(*cl, "--rsh=" ) ){
+                               fprintf(stderr, "\ninsecure --rsh= not 
allowed.");
+                               log_msg("insecure --rsh option in rsync command 
line!");
+                               return NULL;
+                       }
                }
-
                return PATH_RSYNC;
        }
+       /* No match, return NULL */
+       return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * get_command() - take the command line passed to rssh, and verify
+ *                that the specified command is one the user is allowed to run.
+ *                Return the path of the command which will be run if it is ok,
+ *                or return NULL if it is not.
+ */
+char *get_command( char *cl, ShellOptions_t *opts )
+{
 
+       if ( check_command(cl, opts, PATH_SFTP_SERVER, RSSH_ALLOW_SFTP) )
+               return PATH_SFTP_SERVER;
+       if ( check_command(cl, opts, PATH_SCP, RSSH_ALLOW_SCP) )
+               return PATH_SCP;
+       if ( check_command(cl, opts, PATH_CVS, RSSH_ALLOW_CVS) )
+               return PATH_CVS;
+       if ( check_command(cl, opts, PATH_RDIST, RSSH_ALLOW_RDIST) )
+               return PATH_RDIST;
+       if ( check_command(cl, opts, PATH_RSYNC, RSSH_ALLOW_RSYNC) )
+               return PATH_RSYNC;
        return NULL;
 }
 
 
+
 /*
  * extract_root() - takes a root directory and the full path to some other
  *                  directory, and returns a pointer to a string which
@@ -264,7 +277,7 @@
        len = strlen(root);
        /* get rid of a trailing / from the root path */
        if ( root[len - 1] == '/' ){
-               root[len - 1] = '\0';
+               root[len - 1] = '\0';
                len--;
        }
        if ( (strncmp(root, path, len)) ) return NULL;
@@ -309,7 +322,7 @@
  *                     same name, and returns FALSE if the bits are not valid
  */
 int validate_access( const char *temp, bool *allow_sftp, bool *allow_scp,
-                    bool *allow_cvs, bool *allow_rdist, bool *allow_rsync )
+                    bool *allow_cvs, bool *allow_rdist, bool *allow_rsync )
 {
        int     i;
 
diff -ru rssh-2.3.3.orig/util.h rssh-2.3.3/util.h
--- rssh-2.3.3.orig/util.h      2006-12-21 17:22:38.000000000 -0500
+++ rssh-2.3.3/util.h   2012-05-11 16:21:12.000000000 -0400
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
 #include "rsshconf.h"
 
 void fail( int flags, int argc, char **argv );
-char *check_command_line( char *cl, ShellOptions_t *opts );
+char *check_command_line( char **cl, ShellOptions_t *opts );
+char *get_command( char *cl, ShellOptions_t *opts);
 char *extract_root( char *root, char *path );
 int  validate_umask( const char *temp, int *mask );
 int validate_access( const char *temp, bool *allow_sftp, bool *allow_scp,

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