Even that may be overkill in some circumstances.

Consider the case where an operator may decide that they'll permit BFD to be 
de-configured for protocols without also giving operators permission to 
similarly de-configure the underlying client protocols.  Examples of this may 
be that BFD is experiencing issues that are leading to false negatives and 
tearing down valid sessions.

While the above example would seem unusual, it was more of a concern in the 
more subtle use cases for BFD-on-LAG where links may be managed by one 
provisioning group and protocols by another.

-- Jeff

> On Jul 11, 2018, at 10:31 AM, Reshad Rahman (rrahman) <rrah...@cisco.com> 
> wrote:
> 
> Hi Acee,
> 
> That and a statement saying the BFD clients should be authenticated.
> 
> Regards,
> Reshad.
> 
> ´╗┐On 2018-07-11, 10:10 AM, "Acee Lindem (acee)" <a...@cisco.com> wrote:
> 
>    Hi Reshad, 
> 
>    Ok - so are you saying that all that is being asked for is that the NACM 
> rules on IGP BFD configuration be at least as strict as BFD since the IGPs 
> are instantiated BFD sessions? I'd be ok with that. 
> 
>    Thanks,
>    Acee 
> 
>    On 7/11/18, 9:25 AM, "Reshad Rahman (rrahman)" <rrah...@cisco.com> wrote:
> 
>        Hi,
> 
>        My read on the DISCUSS is not just wrt spoofing of BFD clients but 
> also making sure that the proper access restriction (NACM) is used for the 
> BFD clients. 
> 
>        I didn't interpret Benjamin's comments as requiring a security 
> boundary between BFD clients (BGP, IPGPs) and BFD running on the same dveice, 
> which I agree would be preposterous.
> 
>        Regards,
>        Reshad.
> 
>        On 2018-07-10, 10:17 PM, "Acee Lindem (acee)" <a...@cisco.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>            On 7/10/18, 7:46 PM, "Rtg-bfd on behalf of Jeffrey Haas" 
> <rtg-bfd-boun...@ietf.org on behalf of jh...@pfrc.org> wrote:
> 
>                On Tue, Jul 03, 2018 at 10:56:49PM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> On Wed, Jul 04, 2018 at 03:20:42AM +0000, Reshad Rahman (rrahman) wrote:
>>> <RR> I am not 100% sure I understand the point being made. Is it a question 
>>> of underlying the importance of having the IGPs authenticated since the 
>>> IGPs can create/destroy BFD sessions via the local API?
>> 
>> That's the crux of the matter, yes.  Since (in this case) the IGP state
>> changes are being translated directly into BFD configuration changes,
>> the NETCONF/RESTCONF authentication is not really used.  So, any
>> authentication/authorization decisions that are made must be on the basis
>> of authentication at the IGP level.  This does not necessarily mean a hard
>> requirement for IGP authentication, though using unauthenticated IGP would
>> then be equivalent (for the purposes of this document) to allowing
>> anonymous NETCONF/RESTCONF access.
>> 
>> I'd be happy to just have a note in the security considerations that "when
>> BFD clients such as IGPs are used to modify BFD configuration, any
>> authentication and authorization for the configuration changes take place
>> in the BFD client, such as by using authenticated IGPs".  But feel free to
>> reword in a better fashion; this is really just about acknowledging the new
>> access mechanism (since the boilerplate covers SSH/TLS for
>> NETCONF/RESTCONF).
> 
>                I must admit to being somewhat perplexed by the request here.
> 
>                In the cases where BFD as a top level module is not the 
> creator of a BFD
>                session, you seem to be concerned that BFD can be used to 
> attack a resource
>                by spoofing that non-BFD client.
> 
>                While this is perhaps logically true, it also means that you 
> have a far
>                greater problem of being able to spoof the underlying BFD 
> clients.  To give
>                some real-world examples:
>                - BGP typically requires explicit configuration for its 
> endpoints.
>                - Both OSPF and ISIS will require a matched speaker with 
> acceptable
>                  configuration parameters for a session to come up.
>                - Static routes with BFD sessions will require explicit 
> configuration.
> 
>                In each of these cases, a client protocol that also wants to 
> use BFD, the
>                simple spoofing of the protocol endpoints is already a massive 
> disaster
>                since it will allow injection of control plane or forwarding 
> state into the
>                device.  This is so much worse than convincing a BFD session 
> to try to come
>                up with its default one packet per mode that ... well, I'm 
> boggled we're
>                even talking about this. :-)
> 
>                My request would be that we not complicate the security 
> considerations of
>                this module for such cases.
> 
>            I agree. This is DISCUSS is just preposterous - imposing some sort 
> of security boundary between the IGP modules and the BFD module running on 
> the same networking device.
> 
>            Thanks,
>            Acee (LSR WG Co-Chair) 
> 
> 
> 
>                -- Jeff
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

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