South Asia Citizens Wire | 24 September, 2004 via: www.sacw.net
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[1] Pakistan: An interview with B.M. Kutty
[2] India-Gujarat: "Discouraging Dissent: Intimidation, Harassment of Witnesses, Rights activists" (HRW press release re new report)
[3] "If tomorrow all Muslim women don the jilbab and men grow beards, will the condition of Muslims improve?" (Ghayasuddin Siddiqui)
[4] India: The women of the Sangh (Jyotirmaya Sharma)
[5] Book Review: Exploding Myths on Conversions (Anshu Malhotra)
[6] Upcoming event: Sumit Sarkar lectures in montreal (October 6 and 7)
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[1]
The Times of India > Interview September 22, 2004
ACROSS BORDERS
Biyathul Mohiyuddin Kutty is a bridge between India and Pakistan. A founder member of the Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy, 74-year-old Kutty is currently joint director of the Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research, a trade union body. He speaks to M P K Kutty about politics in Pakistan.
A Malayali in Lahore: What made you stay on in Pakistan?
Normally, I should have stayed on in Karachi, which had a sizable number of Malayalis who had migrated in the 1920s during and after the Moplah rebellion and were running roadside teashops among other businesses. But the spirit of inquiry, rather than adventure, took me to Lahore. In Lahore, I came in touch with some very interesting Left intellectuals. They convinced me that I belong not only to Kerala but also to Lahore, and as days went by, to Pakistan. About a year later, I got married.
You even found the space to work as a political activist. How did you manage to win the confidence and trust of the people there?
The people I came across, my office colleagues and others, were extremely nice to me. My broken Urdu and relatively fluent English proved to be the plus points. Lahoris liked me for that. In fact, they owned me up as one of their own. And after my marriage, I became an integral part of the local community. I faced no hostility from anyone. This friendly environment and the interaction with progressive political elements, besides being married into an Urdu-speaking family (migrants from Uttar Pradesh) helped me to learn Urdu rather fast and facilitated the process of integration. The hostility I experienced came only from the intelligence agencies. I spent nearly three years in jail when General Ayub Khan imposed martial law in 1959 for my Left leanings.
You have been part of the trade union movement in Pakistan. But our impression is there is no place for such politics in Pakistan.
It is only partially true. Yes. During military dictatorships, or for that matter any kind of dictatorships, not just workers but people as a whole are generally denied political rights. But, with varying degrees of intensity, there have always been strong popular resistance to dictatorships. Of course, conditions had never been propitious for trade unions to flourish, even during non-military regimes. All the same, the trade union movement has fought for the rights of workers. A decade ago, eight major central trade union federations of the country, setting aside their political and international affiliations, united to form the Pakistan Workers' Confederation (PWC). The PWC is today an effective platform of the organised workers of Pakistan.
The rest of the world looks at Pakistan as a land of moulvis , religious fanatics and terrorists. Do you agree with this picture?
I beg to disagree. Overwhelming majority of Pakistanis is tolerant and friendly. Yes. Most of them are practising Muslims, but not at all fanatics. Violent extremism in the name of Islam appeared in the 1980s in Pakistan with the active support of funds, arms and training in terrorism from American intelligence agencies and their European allies and reactionary Arab rulers, in their war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. General Zia-ul Haq's unique brand of Islamic military dictatorship was the willing vehicle the Americans used to get to their goal and in the process they produced the most virulent form of religious extremism in the region. But believe me, this extremism is confined to small groups, trained and financed during the Afghan war and now let loose to seek new killing fields all over South Asia and beyond. Ninety-five per cent of Pakistani Muslims have nothing to do with terrorism of any kind. Many of them may be sporting beards but are no moulvis .
What about the influence of religion in politics?
Barring a freak victory in one province - North West Frontier Province - in the last elections, all the religio-political parties together could never win more than 2 to 3 per cent votes in any general election. The fact is that the people in NWFP were directly affected by US bombings and killings of their kinsmen in neighbouring Afghanistan. This public resentment was used by the MMA alliance to manipulate votes in their favour, in the absence of the traditional anti-imperialist platform of the Left. People voted against America but not for the MMA.
What can be done to remove anti-Pak prejudices among Indians and anti-India prejudices among Pakistanis?
Anti-Pakistan prejudices in India and anti-India prejudices in Pakistan are 57 years old. The people of our countries cannot be blamed for it. The ruling establishments in both countries have pursued mutually hostile policies that bred and nourished such prejudices. Free interaction at people-to-people level is the only way to remove such prejudices. The two governments should immediately lift all undue restrictions on travel and exchange of information, newspapers, books, TV channels and so on between the two countries. You must listen to what Indians visiting Pakistan and Pakistanis visiting India have to say about how their biased views changed after seeing things with their own eyes.
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[2]
Human Rights Watch - Press Release
INDIA: AFTER GUJARAT RIOTS, WITNESSES FACE INTIMIDATION
State Government Fails to Provide Protection; Time for New Delhi to Step In
(Bombay, September 24, 2004) -- As the courts hear cases stemming from the anti-Muslim riots of March 2002, the authorities in Gujarat are intimidating rather than protecting witnesses who seek to bring the perpetrators of the violence to justice, Human Rights Watch said in a new report released today. The central government in New Delhi must take immediate steps to ensure the protection of the victims and witnesses of the riots and their advocates.
The 30-page report, Discouraging Dissent: Intimidation and Harassment of Witnesses, Human Rights Activists and Lawyers, documents how Hindu extremists have threatened and intimidated victims, witnesses and rights defenders who are fighting for the prosecution of those responsible for the killing and injury of Muslims during the riots. Instead of pursuing the perpetrators of violence, the state government?formed by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under Chief Minister Narandra Modi?has nurtured a climate of fear. Officials have targeted those seeking justice with selective investigations by state tax authorities or the police.
"Two years after the Gujarat riots, witnesses are being threatened and sometimes even attacked," said Brad Adams, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Asia Division. "Not only has the Gujarat government failed to pursue those responsible for the riots, it is obstructing justice by its failure to protect witnesses."
The violence in 2002 started with an attack in Godhra on a train carrying Hindus. Fifty-nine people died when a train carriage caught fire. In a retaliatory spree by Hindu mobs, hundreds of Muslims were slaughtered, tens of thousands were displaced, and their property was destroyed. Two years later, Muslims still live in fear because their attackers remain free and continue to make threats, particularly against those involved in prosecutions.
While investigations in the Godhra case proceeded rapidly, with several indicted Muslims charged under the recently repealed Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), investigations into cases related to the anti-Muslim riots that followed were deliberately slow. The lower courts dismissed many cases for lack of evidence after public prosecutors effectively acted as defense counsel or witnesses turned hostile after receiving threats.
Human Rights Watch praised recent decisions of the Indian Supreme Court to move some trials out of Gujarat to allow for a more impartial atmosphere and greater protection for witnesses, victims and lawyers. State governments should give adequate protection to witnesses and victims, order the appointment of a new public prosecutor, and order fresh police investigations into the case, Human Rights Watch said.
The Supreme Court said that members of the Gujarat state administration ?were looking elsewhere when?innocent women and children were burning, and were probably deliberating how the perpetrators of the crime can be saved and protected.? The Court rebuked both the Gujarat High Court and the local justice system, stating, ?Judicial criminal administration system must be kept clean and beyond the reach of whimsical political wills or agendas.?
To address these problems, Human Rights Watch urged the Indian government to set up a credible witness-protection program and provide more aid to the thousands of Muslims who are still living in squatter camps since being displaced by the riots.
?The behavior of authorities in Gujarat during the riots and afterwards have given Muslims in India good reason not to trust the police or justice system,? said Adams. ?The new government in New Delhi has a chance now to show that it is serious about justice. It should instruct the Central Bureau of Intelligence to take charge of investigations, and it needs to provide protection to people facing attacks and threats.?
In previous reports on the 2002 Gujarat riots, Human Rights Watch has noted the failure of the court system to prosecute even known abusers and the authorities? lack of political will to identify those who planned and executed the attacks.
o o o o
The report "Discouraging Dissent: Intimidation and Harassment of Witnesses, Human Rights Activists and Lawyers," is available at: http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/india/gujarat/
Complete Title and Contents:
DISCOURAGING DISSENT: Intimidation and Harassment of Witnesses, Human Rights Activists, and Lawyers Pursuing Accountability for the 2002 Communal Violence in Gujarat
I. Summary
II. Background
III. Cases of Threats, Intimidation and Harassment of Victims, Witnesses, and Activists
Official Harassment
1. Threats and harassment of Bilkis Yakub Rasool Patel
2. Police Inquiries and Interrogation of Mukhtar Muhammed, Kasimabad Education and Development Society
3. Police Enquiries and Interrogation of Father Cedric Prakash, Director, Prashant, A Center for Human Rights, Justice and Peace
4. Inquiries by the Charity Commissioner of Ahmedabad against human rights activists
5. Harrassment of Mallika Sarabhai, Darpana Academy of Performing Arts
Anonymous and Individual Threats and Intimidation
1. Threats against activists and lawyers working on riot-related cases.
2. Threats against Trupti Shah and Rohit Prajapati, activists with People's Union for Civil Liberties-Shanti Abhiyan
3. Threats against Teesta Setalvad, Citizens for Justice and Peace, and Father Cedric Prakash, Director, Prashant, A Center for Human Rights, Justice and Peace
4. Attack on volunteers of Act Now for Harmony and Democracy (ANHAD)
5. Intimidation of Bilkis Yakub Rasool Patel and other witnesses
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[3]
The Milli Gazette, 1-15 September 2004.
Only an internally generated intellectual revolution would provide Muslims a place of respect
ROAD TO MUSLIM DIGNITY
Ghayasuddin Siddiqui
Recently a friend's daughter was getting married, and our family was invited to attend one of the pre-nuptial ceremonies: the henna night, at which the palm of bride-to-be is stained with henna with much fanfare.
Whilst the men chatted in a separate room, the women listened to a talk on the responsibilities of women. They were told that heaven has seven gates and those women who look after their husbands properly would be entitled to enter heaven through whichever gate they chose. Muslim women are so used to listening to such garbage that they simply laugh, ignore it and move on.
When my daughter-in-law related the story to me, other episodes came to mind. An acquaintance of mine when asked how his daughter was getting on in her education responded by saying that she was staying at home to give company to her mother. When asked whether she were ill or disabled the reply was: the Prophet's daughter did not go to school. Then there was the recent telephone call to our office was from an 18-year-old girl asking for details of Muslim colleges as she has not been allowed to attend school since she was 14.
During a debate on the subject of hijab organised by the Oxford Student's Islamic Society a few months ago I made the point that the Quran stresses modesty of apparel for both men and women. Surprisingly, the audience was reluctant to accept this idea. More scary was the fact that these young people of above-average intelligence seemed more interested in securing a position in the afterlife than in improving their own and others' lot in this one.
A couple of weeks ago, following the High Court judgement on the Luton jilbab controversy, I was saddened to hear a number of Muslim girls say they would sooner leave school than abandon jilbab. Those who were supporting Shabina Begum's case were looking not for reconciliation (the Luton school allows for the religious and cultural preferences of its pupils) but confrontation in order to enhance their status amongst the youth. In that they were guilty also of double standards, for whilst opposing democracy and human rights as non-Islamic they wanted the school to accept Ms Begum's right to chose her form of dress.
Many young people seem unaware that the headscarf or hijab controversy only became an issue as a result of the Iranian revolution, when Iranian women had started to observe hijab as a protest against the culture of nakedness promoted under the Shah. Now by emphasising hijab as an obligation, not a choice, a faction is making the outward manifestation of dress, rather than modesty in one's heart, the measure of Muslimness. God says He knows what is in our hearts and that is what matters. But the new generation of Islamists are changing the goal posts. By making hijab or jilbab a criterion of Islamic identity our clerics are taking on the role of God by laying claim to infallibility. If Muslims are not careful they might find themselves conniving at the introduction of a moral police, which could entail rifts within the community based on degrees of observance. In my view, this shift of emphasis is a distraction from the real challenges the Muslim world faces, challenges we prefer not to confront because that would require changing ourselves radically.
If tomorrow all Muslim women don the jilbab and men grow beards, will the condition of Muslims improve? More likely they will still be despised and marginalised. Muslims must recognise that it is their closed mind-set that has put them on the slippery slope to insignificance. Sadly even the pro-hijab conference recently held in London, supported by Ken Livingstone, also miss the point.
Following the collapse of the Mughal Empire in India in the 19th century there was an intense debate over the causes of Muslim decline and defeat. One view was that whilst we were sleeping a new body of knowledge had emerged elsewhere which now guided the destiny of mankind and without excelling in it our future could not be secured. An alternative hypothesis held that we declined because we abandoned the 'pure' Islam and to reacquire former glory we should shun contact with the alien West and return to aslaf (the practices of the forebears). Sadly, the latter view prevailed and manifested itself in the form of opposition to learning English. One hundred fifty years later, the folly of this attitude has been repeatedly demonstrated. Muslim orthodoxy still believes this was the right course but it denied Muslims any influence they might have had in world affairs.
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Islamic movements and clerics were manipulated by the CIA into allowing Islam to be used to pursue an American agenda (remember Reagan's alliance of 'God-fearing peoples' against godless Communism!). This gave rise to what is known as the Jihad in Afghanistan. Cold War Warriors became Holy Warriors. Using Muslims as cannon fodder, the CIA contrived to defeat the Soviet Union. Suddenly, a bipolar world had become unipolar. The subsequent developments made it possible for the neo-cons to set in motion their plan for domination of the world's resources.
If reluctance to learn English put Muslims on the road to intellectual irrelevance, the Afghan Jihad made their societies promoters of a culture of violence. We know that some of these Holy Warriors were trained in Scotland by the British Government during the Thatcher epoch. While referring to the war on terror, Tony Blair recently said he knew there were Jihadists living in Britain. He was of course right because Britain had been actively involved in the Afghan Jihad from the very beginning. Now as the US operation in Afghanistan falters, Britain is again involved in behind-the-scenes negotiations to find acceptable Taliban faces to incorporate in the Karzai Government. To pursue this goal, in March of this year, the spiritual father of the Taliban was invited to London as the guest of the Foreign Office. Governments never hesitate to use simple-minded groups and individuals to further their political ends. But an open debate within the community on the Jihad in Afghanistan and its unforeseen consequences might ensure that we begin our next love affair with the Taliban with our eyes open. The Islamists have destabilised the world and Muslims aught to know it.
Muslims have to do a lot of soul searching. They shall have to begin by challenging the forces of obscurantism. They must recognise that these forces have brought them nothing but defeat, humiliation and misery. Unless they emerge as champions of the empowerment of humankind, they shall neither have nor merit any place of respect in the world. The secular man who presently dominates world affairs will accord them grudging respect only if they beat him at his own game, which is to say, becoming as creative as he is. It is this change that can shift the balance of power in their favour, bringing them the dignity and acceptability they so desperately crave.
Muslims need an internally generated intellectual revolution. Small pockets of intellectuals already exist everywhere. What they need is a voice and a forum for their growth and recognition. This bridge-building may ensure that there is enough pressure on the rulers in the Muslim countries to grant basic freedoms to their own people.
(Dr. Ghayasuddin Siddiqui is leader of the Muslim Parliament and the Director of The Muslim Institute, London)
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[4]
The Hindu - September 24, 2004
THE WOMEN OF THE SANGH By Jyotirmaya Sharma
The Sangh relentlessly argues for the liberation, enlightenment, education and employment of Muslim women, something that it rejects in its notion of the ideal Hindu woman.
IN THE past few weeks, two events in public life have overshadowed everything else. One is the spectacle of Uma Bharti, flag in hand, emerging out of prison and setting out on her Tiranga Yatra, and the other is the question of the growth of the Muslim population in India. On the face of it, these two seem unrelated. A closer look, however, reveals a thread that runs through both, and also a pattern. Both have something to do with the Sangh Parivar's portrayal of women in general, and Muslim women in particular.
When the Rashtra Sevika Samiti (henceforth, Samiti) was founded in 1936 as the first auxiliary organisation within the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (henceforth, Sangh), K.B. Hedgewar confessed to its founder, Lakshmibai Kelkar, that he knew nothing about women. By the time the 1980 edition of M.S. Golwalkar's Bunch of Thoughts was published, a chapter on ideal motherhood in relation to nationalist sons was added to the text.
These minor shifts of emphasis, along with an excellent account of representation of women by the Sangh and the Samiti, is to be found in Paula Bacchetta's outstanding study of the representation of women in the Sangh Parivar titled, Gender in the Hindu Nation: RSS Women as Ideologues (New Delhi: Women Unlimited). Ms. Bacchetta identifies the Sangh's idea of women manifest in the concept of motherhood and the creation of the Bharatmata iconography and ideal. She is perceived as a chaste mother, victimised by Muslims and in constant need of protection by her sons, who at once are virile, physically strong, celibate, and fanatically Hindu nationalist.
In sharp contrast, the Samiti does not divest Bharatmata of all warrior qualities, but gives her some of Durga's fierce qualities. Simultaneously, it creates for itself the figure of another goddess, the Ashtabhuja, the one with eight arms, which hold a saffron flag, a lotus, the Bhagvad Gita, a bell, fire, a sword and a rosary. The eighth hand is held in a gesture of blessing. Ms. Bacchetta argues that while the Sangh works systematically to reinforce masculinity, it does so at the cost of diminishing the scope and symbolic potency of the feminine.
Golwalkar's chapter, `Call to the Motherhood', in his Bunch of Thoughts, implores Hindu women, who without exception are ideal mothers, to teach their sons the essentials of Hindu nationalism, fight the Hindu nation's enemies, but most significantly, desist from being `modern' (read Westernised). Modern women, argues Golwalkar, lack in virtue and think that `modernism lies in exposing their body more and more to the public gaze'.
During July-September 1969, the RSS journal, Organiser, conducted a debate in its pages on women and their role in public life. Ms. Bacchetta sees the entire debate not merely as a reaction to Indira Gandhi's rise to power, but also as representing the Sangh's view that women ought to remain in the background with occasional forays into the public realm. The debate in the Organiser endorses this view: whenever women have been invested with absolute power, it argued, they have caused havoc. It, then, turns to an interpretation of Freud by arguing that the physical changes in women's bodies supply the motivation to their actions and influence their thinking.
While the Samiti and the Sangh are tied together in their mutual quest for the Hindu nation, suggests Ms. Bacchetta, they do not necessarily have the same entity in mind. Therefore, the Samiti, while it borrows the figure of Bharatmata from the Sangh, does not represent her as a victim needing the protection of her masculine, Hindu nationalist, sons. Neither does the Samiti valorise virility and machismo. The Samiti sees negative Hindu males as those who harass Hindu women, fail to respect them, and who marry outside their caste and religion. Similarly, negative Hindu women are usually hapless and ignorant victims, `modern' women, feminists.
What about Muslim men and women? Here the Samiti's representation of Muslim men, argues Bacchetta, is more rigid than the Sangh. It views Muslim men as entities that degrade women and Muslim women as weak and inferior compared to Hindu women. The Sangh, while it banishes sexuality from its ideal of the Hindu male, projects what it has rejected on to Muslim men who are portrayed as sexually overactive and a threat to Hindu women. The Sangh proceeds to liken Muslim women as reproductive organs of their enemies. Ms. Bacchetta gives a detailed account of the arguments and texts where the Sangh blames Muslim men and women for India's overpopulation, and its consequent economic woes. It claims that the Muslims use the `population bomb' through polygamy to overwhelm the Hindus. What is significant in all accounts of the Sangh and the Samiti is the total absence of any notion of Muslim motherhood or motherliness. The very idea of motherhood is reduced to the biological act of producing babies.
The Sangh relentlessly argues for the liberation, enlightenment, education and employment of Muslim women, something that it rejects in its notion of the ideal Hindu woman. In a pamphlet produced in 2000, it marginally alters this view in relation to Hindu women by suggesting that women have a right to a role in public life as long as they remain committed to the family and motherhood ideals (Nari Jagaran Aur Sangh). Other than this minor concession recently, the Sangh played a negative role in the debates leading up to the Hindu Code Bill in the 1950s. It claimed that granting of rights to women would "cause great psychological upheaval" to men and "lead to mental disease and distress" (Bacchetta, p.124). The result would be a race of effeminate men. Similarly, the Sangh opposed the Hindu Law of Succession on the grounds that it was regressive.
To understand Uma Bharti, therefore, is to understand fully the implications of her rejection of the Sangh-favoured model of the ideal woman, represented symbolically by the Bharatmata figure. Her fiery speeches, her ability to court controversy and remain forever in the public eye represent her rejection of the Sangh's model of `domesticated femininity'. To accomplish a break from the rules set by the brotherhood of saffron and to assert her individuality, she must assume the warrior qualities of Ashtabhuja. At the same time, she must assert her fidelity to the cause of the Hindu nation by an excess of compliance with the ideal.
If this translates into a fanatical opposition to Muslims, Christians, things and people foreign in all forms and guises, including a regressive model of swadeshi, and an unapologetic allegiance to the Ram temple movement, it is only an assertion of an otherwise truncated model of womanhood available within the Hindu nationalist paradigm. In this attempt at asserting her own individuality, coupled with her status as a renunciate and the lack of `upper' caste status, Uma Bharti manages to imitate to a great degree the Sangh's model of the ideal male while privileging the more aggressive aspects of femininity outlined by the Samiti.
The Sangh Parivar's quibble about a growing Muslim population is also part of this demonology that helps keep afloat the goal of a Hindu nation. Demeaning Muslim women is only one instance of this strategy. The real issue is the failure of the Hindu nationalist project to persuade Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, tribals and Dalits, to register themselves as Hindus. As early as 1931, the Hindu Mahasabha was passing resolutions demanding a more inclusive notion of the Hindu community. This failure led to the theory that the increase in the Muslim population was primarily due to conversions, only to be followed by the `population bomb' theory.
Uma Bharti and the Sangh Parivar's anxiety about its perception of the growing number of Muslims represent the ultimate failure of the Hindu nationalist enterprise. The Sangh grants itself the idea of individuality by affixing `swayam' in its nomenclature, while the Samiti is meant merely for Hindu women to `serve' the Hindu nation defined and determined by men. In the case of Muslim women, the Sangh recognises them neither as individuals nor as part of a collectivity. This is where the dream of a Hindu nation justifiably falters.
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[5]
Economic and Political Weekly September 18, 2004 Book Review
Exploding Myths on Conversions
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Identity, Hegemony and Resistance: Towards the Social History of Conversions in Orissa, 1800-2000
by Biswamoy Pati;
Three Essays Collective,
New Delhi, 2003;
pp 57+i-xvii, Rs 180.
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Anshu Malhotra
The Three Essays Collective is a new and welcome entrant in the publishing world, adding an academic dimension to debates on contemporary issues through short, sharp essays presented in the pamphlet mould, without losing the rigour of scholarly work. The book under review is a handsomely produced tract on what has become a highly polemical issue, namely, the question of ?conversions?. In recent years, there has been a range of sophisticated writing exploring issues like the different dimensions of varied missionary activity in India at least from the time of the Portuguese, the relationship of the missions with the colonial state and with indigenous society at various levels, and a need to understand the dynamics of ?conversions?, whether high caste individual or low caste mass. The raucous and sustained anti-Christian rhetoric of the likes of the VHP, often culminating in grisly acts of violence such as the murder of Graham Staines and his sons in Orissa in 1999, and at the same time the gains made by the Sangh parivar in apparently ?reconverting? tribals/adivasis to Hinduism, has pushed some to delve into and elucidate on the angst of the Hindu Right against Christianity, and to understand their number-crunching politics in the predominantly tribal areas of states like Gujarat, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa. Biswamoy Pati brings another dimension to this debate by challenging the very idea of ?reconversions? of tribals and outcastes of Orissa, firstly by asserting that they were not ?Hindu? to begin with and therefore the question of ?re?conversion does not arise, and secondly and concomitantly explicating a long and gradual historical process of ?conversion? of tribals to Hinduism through their incorporation into the caste system, thereby putting a question mark on the assumed non-proselytising nature of Hinduism.
The questions Pati has raised about the apparent ?innocence? of Hinduism with regard to the question of conversions as against ?culpable? proselytising faiths, or even the gradual processes of change and the accumulation of identities, may not be entirely new. A few historians have also raised similar issues; for example, Eaton (1994) has discussed the gradual Islamisation of the people of East Bengal, and Sarkar (2004) has recently asked what may have happened to the large Buddhist population of India, or how was the spread of Hindu culture in south-east Asia accomplished? Yet Pati?s remains a very important argument, both because it challenges the common sense understanding of the nature of Hinduism, and at the same time draws attention to the multifarious pulls on the socio-economic and cultural world of the tribals of Orissa to point to the layers in the acculturation of a tribal to a Hindu over a long period in the state.
Drawing on the work of B P Sahu on early medieval Orissa, associated with the period of feudalisation and the emergence of castes, Pati shows both the transplanting of brahmins from the gangetic plain to Orissa and their creation from among the indigenous population, and also discusses the manner in which the adivasis were absorbed into Hindu society as sudras and their chiefs as kshatriyas. With the establishment of the colonial state in Orissa, this move towards Hinduisation got a further boost, especially as the agricultural interventions of the colonial state ? commercialisation, monetisation, and the establishment of irrigation projects ? required pushing tribals to settled agriculture. Pati shows the complex ways in which the colonial state legitimised itself by encouraging select elements of Orissa?s culture, established relations with often ?invented? princes, and was complicit in the desire of the princes to establish their claims to rule by conjuring ancient relation with the adivasis. Thus, along with Hinduisation, the ?kshatriyaisation?/?rajputisation?/?oriyaisation? of certain groups was accomplished. On the other hand, colonial rule also unleashed a number of conflicts over issues like the erosion of rights over forest use by tribals, or the extraction of forced labour from them. Importantly, Pati shows how some groups took advantage of this economic situation to establish themselves within the caste system, for example, the rich peasants, while the marginal groups experienced a worsening scenario, like the Paharia tribals. Refreshingly, it is always this dialectic within the indigenous society in its relationship with Hinduism and the colonial state that informs the present work.
In a brief section, Pati also looks at the role of the nationalist movement, especially in its Gandhian phase, which may have played a role in further Hinduising some tribals and outcastes. The adoption of the name harijan by some, or turning to vegetarianism, were modes through which this occurred, though the author is quick to assert that this was also a legitimate route to achieving self-respect. The author points to the adoption by the post-colonial governments of some of the modes of the colonial bureaucracy in order to establish their legitimacy among the tribals. He also notes the often overt attempts made by governments, and not necessarily of the right, to exploit the issue of ?reconversions?.
A little disappointingly however, Pati hardly discusses the issue of conversion to Christianity, giving a rather bland explanation that Christianity was not a ?serious option? as it was too closely associated with the exploitative colonial state. The relationship of the missionaries with the colonial state ranged from the collaborative to the oppositional, a contrariety that has been documented in a plethora of writings [Frykenberg 2003]. Indeed, his own materials seem to suggest greater complexities than he is willing to concede. The example of Gangpur Mundas that he discusses, who started a no-rent movement in 1939, which was visible among the Lutheran Mundas rather than the Roman Catholics, is a statement that is a pointer to the spectrum of relationship of the missionaries and the converts to the state and indigenous population, whose implications must be explored by the author. Again, when he talks of the 1950s conversion of the kandhas to Christianity, it cannot just be the absence of the colonial state that is salient here; a serious look is required at the continuities/discontinuities in the work of the missionaries in this area from an earlier period. Another question that requires serious comment is that of taking on a new identity, for example, that of a Christian in a public platform and performance. While the author has delineated, and rightly so, the process of a gradual accumulation of identities, the question of sharp breaks and a public taking on of a new persona remain equally important, and the politics this represents needs to be addressed. Perhaps the present work, more in the nature of a concise essay, did not permit the space to investigate these questions, and one looks forward to a larger study that will take them on.
These questions are important especially in the scenario painted by Pati in the postscript. The attempts at sharp polarisation of the people indulged in by the Hindu Right in the wake of the Staines murders, and the celebration of the murderer Dara Singh as a hero, the fear of disappearance of civil society, is a despairing situation that can be countered by historicising the process of identity formation, as the author has done, showing the multiple identities that continue to be nurtured, and the politics, both empowering and otherwise, behind it. Again, it is not enough to say that communalism is ?clouding? the ?real? world of poverty, hunger and unemployment, problems especially acute in Orissa, but also to understand why certain choices are made, and not others, in difficult conditions. The book is indubitably an important work both for exploding the myths that sustain the propaganda and programmes of the right and for underlining the necessity of understanding the historical processes that make us complex and multi-layered peoples.
References
Eaton, Richard M (1994): The Rise of Islam and Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
Frykenberg, Robert E (2003): ?Introduction: Dealing with Contested Definitions and Controversial Perspectives,? in the book edited by him, Christians and Missionaries in India: Cross-Cultural Communication since 1500, Routledge, Curzon, London, pp 1-23.
Sarkar, Sumit (2004): ?Christianity, Hindutva and the Question of Conversions? in his Beyond Nationalist Frames: Relocating Postmodernism, Hindutva, History, Permanent Black, Delhi, (first published 2002), pp 215-43.
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[6]
Indian historian SUMIT SARKAR at CONCORDIA University, Montreal
TWO LECTURES:
"Secularism in a Globalizing India" Wednesday 6 October, 1:15-2:30pm Room FG-B060 Faubourg, 1616 Ste-Catherine ouest
"Democratic Politics as Majoritarian Tyranny or Minority Protection � lessons from India�s post-colonial history"
Thursday 7 October 7-9pm
DB Clarke Theatre, Concordia University, Hall Building, 1455 de Maisonneuve ouest
Professor SUMIT SARKAR is one of India�s most eminent historians. Until his recent retirement, he was Professor of History at Delhi University, India. His most recent publication is Beyond Nationalist Frames: Relocating Postmodernism, Hindu Fundamentalism, History. His other works include the classic Modern India 1885-1947, Writing Social History and Swadeshi Movement in India 1903-08. Professor Sarkar has been General Secretary of the Indian History Congress and Visiting Professor at Oxford, Canberra, Paris and Hawaii.
presented by PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION SERIES, in conjunction with the Departments of English, History, Political Science and Religion and the South Asian Studies Program, CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
supported by the SHASTRI INDO-CANADIAN STUDIES INSTITUTE (Celebrating its 35th anniversary) and CERAS (Centre sur l'asie du sud)
OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
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Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on matters of peace and democratisation in South Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit citizens wire service run since 1998 by South Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
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