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Posted by: Michael Mandel on July 14
Investors figured out today that the Paulson/Bernanke rescue plan is not going 
to save Fannie and Freddie in their current form as private companies. The 
stock of the two companies dropped—5% for Fannie and 8% for Freddie—while 
Freddie had a stronger than expected demand for its debt offering. 
This is exactly what we would expect. The two companies are now on the 
inevitable road to being bailed out, nationalized, and shrunk—not as bad as 
being drawn and quartered, but not good either. 
Why do I say inevitable? We now have a situation where the Treasury Secretary 
and the Fed Chairman have taken the first small steps towards placing the full 
faith and credit of the U.S. government behind two private financial companies. 
These steps cannot be undone. Once the promise has been made to 
investors—however vague—the government has to step up to fulfill it. 
The logical end state here is a full takeover. It’s simply not sustainable for 
two private companies to be able to do business as usual with a full and 
explicit government guarantee. It’s not fair to other companies, and it opens 
up the door for all sorts of risk-taking which could make the problem even 
worse. 
However, the markets have correctly assessed that Paulson/Bernanke are 
committing to making the debtholders whole, but they are making no such 
promises about the shareholders. In fact, good central banking practice says 
that the shareholders should take a very deep haircut if there’s a 
bailout/takeover, just like what happened with Bear Stearns. 
My timeline for the full transition, as per my earlier post, is still the 
beginning of the next administration. I think the next president, whether it’s 
Obama or McCain, will be looking at a $400-$500 billion bailout of the U.S. 
housing sector. This will encompass not just Fannie and Freddie, but a wide 
buy-up of bad mortgages—just getting them off the books of the financial sector 
at a substantial discount.
It’s worth looking at the S&L crisis of the 1980s to see how that might work. 
The total size of the bailout back then was $225 billion (see the GAO report, 
Appendix I, page 31). The Resolution Trust Corp recovered $140 billion, so 
taxpayers had to put in roughly $85 billion (these numbers are very rough).
Assuming that the same ratio holds this time, a $400-$500 billion bailout would 
end up requiring $150-$180 billion of taxpayer money, spread out over several 
years. 
That’s a lot of money—which is why I don’t think anything major can be done 
with the presidential election looming, though Paulson went further than I 
thought he would. 

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Reader Comments
Hal
July 15, 2008 02:33 AM

Compared to the costs of the stupid war in Iraq, they are minimal. How much are 
we wasting every month in Iraq?


      

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