The Wall Street Journal January 22, 2003 REVIEW & OUTLOOK Iraq for Iraqis
We don't have much time for the argument that President Bush's Iraq policy is about "blood for oil." But if anyone is looking for reasons to doubt his stated commitment to bring democracy to that country, they need only look at the way his Administration has been handling the Iraqi opposition. The Iraqi National Congress is by far the most significant player in that movement. It's an umbrella organization led by Ahmed Chalabi, a University of Chicago-educated mathematician and banker. Its professed goal is a unified, pluralistic and democratic Iraq -- which is why it draws support from among all Iraqi ethnic groups, including the two Kurdish factions. In 1996 it succeeded in unifying the Kurds and actually taking ground from Saddam's army only to be turned back after the Clinton Administration denied air support. The INC has since brought out scores of defectors and tons of information on Saddam's weapons programs. All in all a good set of allies -- to everyone but the State Department. Back in November we reported that Foggy Bottom was nickel-and-diming the aid requests of the INC, contrary to the spirit of the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act and Mr. Bush's statements about helping Iraqis liberate their own country. Our editorial apparently got some White House attention and the group's 2002 funds were finally released. But 2003 finds State still trying to micromanage the INC budget, balking at funds to help the INC cooperate with Defense Department efforts to train Iraqi exiles, to restart the group's satellite TV channel, and even for the post of Arab media coordinator. We could go on. But the truth is that much damage has already been done. If the U.S. invades, the INC won't be the military or public relations asset it might have been. What concerns us now are reports of heavy-handedness in planning for the transition to a post-Saddam Iraq. Opposition leaders complained that Washington tried to call all the shots at their big December meeting in London. Some even threatened a boycott. But the meeting turned out to be a success in any event. The exiles planned a conference for this month in Kurdish-controlled Northern Iraq and the U.S. said it would send a delegation. Then last week that meeting was canceled after the U.S. said it couldn't promise the kind of security the Kurds wanted -- leading some to speculate the U.S. didn't want the meeting to take place at all. But Iraqi sources told us yesterday that the meeting may go ahead soon anyway, and a senior Administration official confirmed that U.S. delegates would be there if it happens. That pledge of support is good news. But the INC still finds Washington rife with institutional prejudices and jealousies. State has never supported a policy of regime change for Iraq and has tended to view Arabs who espouse Western values as somehow inauthentic or unrepresentative. The last thing Foggy Bottom wants now is to see the INC playing a leading role in a provisional government and to have to admit its previous blunders. Ditto for the CIA, which is sour about the fact that the INC has brought far more useful intelligence out of Iraq than the Agency ever has. Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board, says of the hostility to the INC: "In 30 years in Washington I've never seen anything quite like it. They're being treated like enemies because of a policy disagreement." We have to assume Colin Powell agrees with his bureaucrats on the INC or State's policy would have changed. The White House's own point man on the Iraqi opposition, Zalmay Khalilzad, has the right instincts but his principal adviser is a CIA detailee. Iraqi exiles who visited the White House recently said the President seemed surprised that there might be a lot of democratically minded Iraqis to work with. We guess that explains the reports we've been hearing that the U.S. has been considering years of military occupation and/or U.N. administration for Iraq. Ditto the statements, eagerly embraced by the region's other despots, that the U.S. would be happy if Saddam chose exile or suffered a coup. Any of these outcomes might temporarily solve the weapons of mass destruction problem but they could vitiate the other compelling reason for U.S. action: the rapid emergence of a democratic, pro-Western Iraq. Managed correctly, Saddam's fall from power has the potential to be a truly region-changing event. A quick transition to a new, Iraqi-led government could set an example for democratic reformers in Iran, Palestine and even Saudi Arabia. It would do more than all the PR spending in the world for America's image in the region. Not so if Iraq is turned into a giant U.N. refugee camp or if power is transferred to another Baath Party thug. We realize that the coming months will bring their share of surprises and we don't expect any final decisions now on the shape of a post-Saddam Iraq. But we do hope that the Administration is committed to seeing off not just Saddam but his entire regime and that it will support a new Iraqi government as soon as feasible. The world is watching and Iraq's democrats are ready.
